

THE
C O U R T
OF THE
G E N T I L E S.

PART IV.
Of Reformed Philosophy.

BOOK III.
Of Divine Predetermination.

WHEREIN
The Nature of *Divine Predetermination* is fully
Explicated and Demonstrated, both in the General,
as also more Particularly, as to the *Substrate*
Matter, or Entitative Act of Sin:

WITH
A Vindication of *Calvinists* and others from that Blasphemous
Imputation of *Making God the Author of Sin.*

By *Theophilus Gale.*

Si Pelagio tantillum dederis, danda sunt omnia. Cornel. Jansen.
Præfat. in Pelag.

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1852

P R E F A C E.

THE strong and almost invincible Inclination I have to Solitude and Retirement, with a natural aversion from the Controversies of this Age, wherein there is so little of Christian Candor, Fidelitie, Ingenuitie, and Moderation to be found, hath given me no small satisfaction in my being exempted hitherto from those vexatious Conflicts which I see many learned and pious men involved in: and it seems to me a thing no lesse than prodigious, to consider, with what warm zeale and self-complacence some learned men contend in the mists and clouds of ambiguous termes, as if they had no other designe but that of some Mercenary Soldiers, who do what they can to protract the War. These and such like considerations have kept me, for some Moneths, from the publication of this Discourse, with hopes there might be found out some Expedients for the putting a period to those unhappy Controversies it refers to, which I now have little hopes of. But enough of that.

The Discourse it self both as to its first conception and present publication, has not been without various agitations in mine own thoughts; and how little my natural Inclinations have induced me hereto, is well known to some. But I must confesse, the crime charged on us being no lesse than Blasphemie against the God of Heaven, it may be deservedly judged too great a violation to the Laws of Christianitie not to purge our selves from so black an Imputation; and yet in as much as some reverend Divines, of repute among us both for their Learning and Pietie, have entertained Sentiments opposite to our Hypothesis, we have been very studious, yea emulous to deliver our own thoughts in such a mode or forme, as may be least obnoxious to passionate emotions, personal reflexions, or whatever may unbecome one that lies under essential obligation to love and honor the Persons of some that differ in Judgement about these points. Wherefore, to render our Discourse the lesse offensive, we have cast it into a thetic and dogmatic Method, rather than agonistic and polemic. And because it is altogether impossible distinctly and demonstratively to discusse such an Hypothesis, without some opposition against such as defend the Antithesis, we have pitcht on Strangius as our principal Antagonist, who indeed,

Preface.

to give him his merited character, has ventilated this Controversie with candor, perspicuitie, and force of Argument beyond his Sectators. Yet we must also do the Cause we undertake this justice, as to declare, that we have not omitted to examine the Reasons and Arguments of other Reverend Divines, who oppose our Hypothesis, albeit we have, as in dutie we conceived our selves obliged, concealed their Names. For indeed, of what use are such personal Nominations and Reflexions, but to render us a grief to Friends, and reproche to Enemies?

As for my Style, if any judge my pen too much drenched in Scholastic Theologie, I shal not denie, but that I have spent some time in those Studies, neither do I as yet see any reason to repent thereof; for I have found those Controversies about Divine Concurse and Efficacious Grace, nowhere more accurately examined and demonstratively determined, than among the Scholemen, specially, Bradwardine and Alvarez; neither can I conceive how any one can distinctly and perfectly discusse these Controversies, specially as now miserably perplexed with ambiguous obscure termes, without some inspection into and knowlege of Scholastic Theologie. For doth not a principal part of the Controversie depend on that scholastic Notion of Free-will? Yea, is there any thing New started by the Arminians or New Methodists, but what has been fully examined and answered by some among the more sober Scholemen, specially Aquinas, Ariminenlis, Bradwardine and Alvarez. Whatever others may judge of them, yet Reverend Mr. Baxter, Cathol. Theol. Part I. p. 124. prefers the Scholemen before Arminians. And albeit I have a particular kindnesse for some of the more sober Scholemen, as to such points wherein they serve not the Papal Interest, and their own vain Imaginations; yet what a low and cheap esteeme I have of the Scholemen in the general, is sufficiently apparent, by the Character I have given them, Court of the Gentiles, Part III. B. 2. c. 2. S. 1. §. 2. And indeed I would read them, with the same indifference and suspension of mind, as I read Plato and Aristotle. But to conclude, if any private Christian desires, not to charge his thoughts with the Scholastic part of this Controversie, but only to satisfie his Doubts and confirme his Faith in the Scriptural part, he may confine himself to Chap. III. of this Discourse, (which contains almost a third Part of the Book) where we have under seven general Heads largely given the Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis, Touching Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin, with Solutions to such false Glosses and Comments as our Adversaries give thereto; which are suited to Vulgar Capacities.

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The COURT of the GENTILES.

PART IV.

Of Reformed Philosophie.

BOOK III.

Of Divine Predetermination.

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12. 16, 17.	88	26. 24.	58	4. 19.	52	17. 17.	81.

Table

Table of *Hebraic* Words Explicated.

אֱלֹהִים, verily.	p. 102	מִסַּךְ, to mingle, or pour forth.	92
נָבַל, to termine, and determine.	23	נָגַף, stumbling, or smiting.	100
גִּזְרָה, to decree.	24	נָתַן, to predetermine.	80, 81
הֶעֱמַד, to make to stand.	102	סִימִין, they were designed.	106
הִשָּׁח, daub, or dim.	91	סָעַר, to work efficaciously.	22
חָשַׁב, to contrive.	55	סָפַר, to declare.	22
חָטָא, he hath daubed.	92	עָבַד, to worke.	22
טִעַם, the Judgement.	88	עָרַפֶּל, thick darknesse.	93
יָהוּלֵל, he infatuateth.	ibid.	פָּעַל, efficaciously to worke.	103
יָסַד, to found.	104	פָּדַשׁ, to explicate more clearly.	60
יָסַח, he excited.	75	קִוֵּם, to erect.	102
כָּחִי, mine omnipotent severities.	103	רָדַם, to stupify.	91
כִּוֵּן, to ordain.	104	רָשַׁם, to seal, or constitute.	24, 65
כִּי, because.	86	שׁוֹגֵג, a deceiver.	88
כִּלְהָ, to be determined.	23	שׁוּלָל, spoiled.	ibid.
כִּפַּר, to cover over by daubing; thence to expiate and purge.	100	שׁוּם, to constitute, or destine.	106
מִכְשׁוֹל, a Stumbling-stone or block.	100, 105	שָׁלַח, to predetermine.	90, 102

Table of *Grecanic* Words Explicated.

Ἀδόκιμος, reprobate, drossie.	93	καταρτίζω, aptly to fit or frame.	104
Βεβλή, a fixed decree.	62, 63	ὁρίζην, to determine.	23, 24, 60
Βεβόμενος ἐβέλετο, he peremptorily willed.	86	Πνεῦμα κατανύξεως, a stupifying Potion.	91
Γνώμη, a determined decree.	81, 82	Προγεγραμμένοι, designed.	107
Ἐδωκεν, hath predetermined.	80, 81	Προείζην, to predetermine.	24, 60, 64
Ἐνέργεια, Efficacie what.	22	Προτάτειν, to preordain.	24
Ἐνεργῶν, to worke efficaciously.	22	Σκάνδαλον, a Stone of offence.	100, 105, 107
Ἐξήγησα, I have constituted.	102	Σύκαμψον, bow down.	91
Ἐξουσία, legal Authoritie.	61	Συνεργῶν, to cooperate.	22
Ἐργάζομαι, to Predetermine.	103	Τιθέναι, to constitute.	106, 107
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THE
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PART IV.
Of Reformed Philosophie.

BOOK III.
Of Divine Predetermination :

Wherein the Nature of Divine Predetermination is fully explicated and demonstrated, both in the general, as also more particularly, as to the substrate matter or entitative act of Sin.

CHAP. I.
The Explication of the Terms.

(1) *The Origine of the controversie about Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin; with the method we procede in.* (2) *The Nature of Sin, its Origine and material constitution; al acts in their*
B generic

generic nature indifferent: *Al Morality determined by the Moral Law: Sin as to its formal reason a privation: Of actions modally and intrinsically evil.* (3) *The Libertie of the Wil: The new-coined distinction of Libertie, largely and strictly taken, with its abuse: A true Idea of Libertie.* (4) *Moral Libertie or Free-wil to good: Necessitie, Impossibilitie, Possibilitie what.* (5) *The Wil of God, its Distribution into Significative and Decretive.* (6) *Divine Concurse, its Immediation, Efficacie, and Predetermination: ἐνέργεια, ἐνέργειαν, θεΐζειν, προορίζειν, with the Nature of Predetermination explicated.*

The Origine of
the Controversie.

§. I. **T**HE Doctrine of *Divine Concurse, and Creatural Dependence* has in al Ages of the Church, but more specially since the rise of Pelagianisme, received vigorous assaults from many learned and potent Adversaries: and indeed no wonder, sithat corrupt Nature propagated from *Adam* has, in imitation of its first parent, been ever aspiring after an equality to the Deitie; and that not only in being the *last End* of its Acting, but also the *first Principe* of its Dependence. This vain attempt has appeared more visibly in some daring and proud spirits, such as *Nebuchadnezar*, Dan. 4. 30. *Is not this great Babylon that I have built, &c?* But in others the Design and opposition against the Concurse of God has been more refined, under a pretext of vindicating the Divine Majesty from the blasphemous imputation of being the *Author of sin*. And because al pious Souls have so great a veneration for the Blessed Deitie, as to abhor the very shadow of such Blasphemie, therefore the Adversaries of Divine Concurse have in al Ages pitcht on this as the most puissant argument to oppose the same, that it brings the most holy and blessed God under the black imputation of encouraging, yea impelling men to Sin. And albeit those that assert Gods efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, do most vehemently detest in their own souls, and solemnly protest against the least thought or opinion that makes God the Author of sin, yet nevertheless this direful piece of blasphemie is stil charged on them. Moreover, there being in this Doctrine of Efficacious Concurse (as in al other great Mysteries of Faith) some intricate difficulties, which the wise God has left us under, to trie our faith and submission to Divine Revelation; hence also many learned, and some pious men

men have been at a great loss in their Inquiries, how to reconcile the Libertie of the human Wil with the Efficace of Divine Concurse, so as to free the blessed God from the imputation of impelling men to Sin. These and such like considerations made me the more prolix in the philosophic metaphysic contemplation of the *Divine Concurse*, its *Nature*, *Origine*, and *manner of working*, particularly as to the *entitative act* of what is sinful; together with the *creatures Dependence* thereon: which I have more fully discussed, *Court of the Gentiles*, Chap. 7, 9, 11. with design and endeavours, if it might be, to give the blessed God and his sinful Creature both their dues, and remove those extremes which men are apt to fall into.

But these my sincere desires and endeavours have not had that success which was desired; which brings me under a fresh obligation to vindicate mine own Hypothesis, touching *the efficacious concurrence of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of what is sinful*. I must confess, the province before us is difficult on many accounts, but principally, because whiles we endeavour to defend the Concurse and Providence of God about the entitative act of sin, it is suggested by some, and believed by others, that we make the holy God the *Author of sin*, which is the dregs of blasphemie, and that which every serious spirit abhors more than Hel. Yet we need no way to doubt, but that, with divine assistance, we may firmly assert and demonstrate the efficacities of Divine concurse to the material entitative act of that which is sinful, and yet fully vindicate the Divine Majestie from that blasphemous Imputation of being the Author of sin. And for our more distinct and demonstrative procedure herein, we propose this method or form as most apt for the subject mater before us. (1) To examine and explicate the Terms formally implied in, or virtually relating to, the subject in controversy. (2) To shew wherein the opposite parties agree, and wherein they differ both among themselves and each from other; together with the original and principal motives, grounds, and causes of such Differences. (3) To give a Scriptural Explication and Demonstration of our own Hypothesis, touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful; with an answer to those false glosses and comments, which our Adversaries the Jesuites, Arminians, and some new Methodists give to those Scriptures for the evading the force of them. (4) To draw up a brief Historie

*The method of
our procedure.*

rie or Narrative of this controverſie, and its ſtate in al periods of the Chriſtian Churches to this day. (5) To give the Demonſtration of our Hypotheſis from Reaſons grounded on Scripture, with the Vindication of thoſe Reaſons from the ungrounded invalid answers given to them by our opponents, *Strangius*, and others. (6) To ſolve and answer the Objections urged by thoſe that oppoſe our Hypotheſis, particularly *Strangius*, *Baronius*, *Le Blanc*, with others. (7) And finally, to lay down the proper Sentiments and Hypotheſes of the Orthodoxe about this ſubject, in oppoſition to thoſe falſe Opinions which their Adverſaries charge upon them: as alſo to produce the proper opinions of the adverſe party, and the dangerous conſequences that naturally and neceſſarily flow from them.

The explication
of the Termes.

§. 2. Our firſt and indeed principal task, in order to a clear and demonſtrative procedure in this controverſie, wil be, to explicate the termes, and diſabuſe them from thoſe ambiguities, confuſions, and falſe impositions, in which at preſent they are involved. And here indeed I cannot but break forth into a doleful Lamentation over the bleeding ſtate of the Churches of Chriſt, by reaſon of thoſe vexatious controverſies which rend and tear out their very bowels, and al from the ſophiſtic abuſe or Ambiguitie of termes. And I no way dout but to make it moſt manifeſt, when opportunitie is offered, that moſt of the controverſies of this Age are fomented and maintained from the obſcuritie and abuſe of termes miſapplied by ſubtile wits, for the eſtabliſhment of their own Hypotheſes. This is moſt evident in our preſent caſe, which makes it a duty abſolutely neceſſary, before we enter on our province, to clear up the way by a diſtinct and particular explication of thoſe termes that relate thereunto.

of Sin.

The firſt Terme we are to conſider is *Sin*: wherein we are to examine its *Origine*, *Causes*, *Conſtitution*, both *material* and *formal*, and *Kinds*; particularly the nature of Acts *ſubſtantiſſimally* or *intrinſecally* ſinful: al which we ſhal diſcuſſe with that Brevitie and Perſpicuitie the mater wil admit. 1. As for the *Origine* of Sin, it came firſt into the world from the *Defectibilitie* of our firſt Parents their Free-wil, and has been ever ſince maintained and fomented by the *Vitioſitie* of human nature depraved by *Adams* ſin, as we have copioſely demonſtrated, *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 2.* and *Philof. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. ſect. 4. §. 3.*

Its Origine.

2. Sin;

2. Sin, as to its *material constitution*, has for its substrate mater or subject some natural good: For al sin being, as to its formal nature, but a *moral privation or relation*, it necessarily requires some natural good as its substrate mater or subject. The wise Creator and Gubernator of althings has by his Law so constituted al *moral* Beings, both Virtues and Vices, as that they cannot subsist but in something *natural*: albeit sin be, according to its formal reason, a mere privation, yet it requires some positive, real natural Being for its subject, according to the nature of al other privations. Thus *Augustin*: *That which is evil by reason of vice, is good by nature.* Again he saith, *That sin is not nature, but the vice of nature.* And that trite Maxime communly received by al the Ancients, *That al evil is founded in some good, i. e. natural*, sufficiently demonstrates this our assertion. Thus *Augustin*, *Enchirid.* 97. *Although therefore things sinful, as sinful are not good; yet not only that good things, but also that sinful be, is good: i. e. things sinful are good, not morally, but naturally, as means utile and conducible to the promoting of Divine glorie: for albeit they oppose the bonitie of the creature, yet materially considered they oppose not the bonitie of the Creator; who can extract the greatest good out of the greatest evils. Doth it not then belong to the infinite bonitie of God, to permit sins to be? Yea, doth not the ingresse of sin into the world belong to the perfection thereof? is not then the substrate mater thereof some natural good? This is wel demonstrated by Suarez, Metaph. Disput. II. sect. 3. p. 252. 'Sin as sin has a material cause, which is always 'some good. So Augustin saith, That there can be no evil but in 'good, because if there were pure evil it would destroy itself: and the 'reason is, because sin, as to its formal cause, is not purely positive, or a pure negation, but a privation of debite perfection, 'therefore it requires a subject unto which such a perfection is 'due; which subject must be some good, &c. Yea, Strangius himself, our principal Adversary in this Controversie, grants in this particular as much as we demand, pag. 629. That it is absurd to say, any sin or defect can exist of itself, sithat there can be no separate evil; but al evil is [seated] in good. Yea, he ingenuously confesseth, pag. 245. That hatred of God, [which is an action intrinsically evil] as it is an Act and Being, so it is from God, namely as it is hatred. For, adds he, So hatred truly, as it is abstracted from this or that object is a physic action, to which the metaphysic bonitie of Ens*

2. Its substrate mater.

Quod malum est per vitium, bonum est per naturam, Aug. contra Advers. Leg. & Prophet. cap. 5.

Absurdum esset, si diceretur, ullum defectum aut peccatum, aut ullum peccatum aut defectum, posse per se existere, cum nullum detur separatum malum, sed omne malum sit in bono, Strang. de Volunt. l. 3. or c. 19. p. 629.

or Being agrees, and it is morally indifferent; but as it is determined to God, hence is its ἀνομία, Obliquitie. This concession of Strangius, if wel considered, would not only overthrow his own Antithesis against our Hypothesis, but also put a period to this Controversie, as in what follows we shal demonstrate, Chap. 6. §. 1.

*Al Acts in their
generic nature
indifferent.*

3. But the principal thing to be examined in the explication of sin is its formal Constitution or Reason, which we shal endeavour to manifest in the following Propositions. (1) *Al human acts considered in their generic physice Entitie or natural Being, abstracted from their moral constitution, are neither good nor evil, but morally indifferent.* Al moral Beings or Acts are seated, ἐν ἰδίᾳ φύσει, in proper nature, as Cyril; neither can they existe without that proper nature whereunto they are appendent. There is no virtue or vice which has not something of nature for its subject and seat: it's true, there may be nature where there is no moralitie, yet there cannot be moralitie where there is not some nature to sustain the same. Now al human nature, as also al natural Acts considered in their generic natural Idea, albeit capable of virtue or vice, yet are in themselves morally indifferent. Al thoughts, words and actions considered physically and abstractly, without regard to their moral determination by the Wil and Law of God, are neither good nor evil. For Moralitie is a mode not physically or intrinsically inherent in human acts, but appendent to them from the determination of the Divine Law: The very acts of loving and hating God, considered in their generic, physice and entitative nature, as abstracted from the moral relation they have to their object, are morally neither good nor evil; because moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are differences of human acts merely accidental or modal, as Suarez and other Scholemen generally grant. Thus much Strangius frequently grants; as pag. 158. he saith, *That moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are accidents of natural Actions.* So pag. 875. *The action considered apart and physically is morally indifferent, neither may it be lesse subject to virtue than to vice.* Hence,

*Actio seorsim
per se & phy-
sicè considera-
ta indifferens
est moraliter,
nec minùs vir-
tutis quàm vitio
substerni po-
test.*

*Al moral con-
stitution from
the Divine Law.*

(2) *Al Moralitie and moral Acts, whether good or evil, receive their Constitution and Determination from the moral Divine Law.* This Hypothesis is defended by Scotus, and other Scholemen, and that on the highest reasons: For the Divine Wil is the supreme measure and rule of al Justice and Sanctitie: Things are therefore just and good because God wils them; and whatever God wils is for that very reason, because God wils it, good and just. There-

fore

fore that Platonic notion defended by some learned men, *That the reasons of good and evil are eternal*, is of dangerous consequence, albeit it hath somewhat of Truth (as other errors have) mixed with it: we grant, that in things morally good, there is a *natural condecence or congruitie* to human nature, even antecedent to the Divine wil and constitution. As on supposition of mans being created, he immediately falls under a necessary and essential obligation of loving God, hating sin, &c. These are duties naturally congruous, yea morally necessary to human nature. Whence it is, that Divines usually determine, *That Original Righteousness was natural to Adam*, i. e. most condecent, congruous, and morally necessary to his Nature. Yet all this hinders not, but that the formal Determination of al Morals arise from the free constitution of the Divine wil and Law. The Law of God is the great *Expansum* or *firmament*, which God has spread over the rational world, whereby al Mankind are moderated and regulated in al their moral Acts, and by which they shall be at last day judged: whence it necessarily follows, that al moral constitution must procede hence, as we have more amply demonstrated, *Court Gentiles*, P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. §. 1, 2. Thus also *Voetius*, *Disput. Theolog.* Par. 1. *de jure & justit.* Probl. 10. p. 351. proves, *That the divine wil is the fountain and rule of al Goodness*. So much also *Strangius* grants us, p. 89. namely, *That, as whatever is true is therefore true, because conform to the first Truth; so whatever is good, is therefore good, because conform to the first Goodness: and as the Truth of God belongs to his Intellect, so Goodness to his Wil.* The like Mr. *Baxter*, *Catholick Theolog.* Part 1. p. 100. *Al created Justice and Holiness is such*, i. e. good (for goodness is their essence) because Gods efficient wil made them so. Hence,

(3) *The formal reason or nature of Sin consists in its being a Deordination, or Transgression of the Divine Law.* This Proposition is fully stated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie, as we have copiously proved, *Court Gent.* P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 1. and *Philos. General.* P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 1. so that it requires not further Explication or Demonstration. Hence,

(4) *Sin as to its formal constitution and nature is not a positive Sin as to its real Being, but privative.* This Hypothesis has found general formal nature a
assent to it among al the Ancients both Pagan Philosophers and *privation.*
Christians, excepting some few, *Marcion* and *Manes*, with others. It's true, the *Manichees* held *Sin to be a positive Being*, and they took

took up principles suited thereto, namely, *That there were two first Beings or Causes, one of good, the other of evil*: But the sober Philosophers and Christians abhorred such sentiments. *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, c. 34. p. 171. has an excellent Discourse to prove that *sin is not in the nature of Beings, but ἀγαθῆς ἐκένσις, a privation of Good*, which we have largely explicated, *Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3 §. 4. §. 2.* And this was generally asserted by the Greek and Latin Fathers. Thus the spurious *Dionysius* assures us, that *Sin must necessarily be, παρὰ τὴν φύσιν, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, without nature, without subsistence*. So *Greg. Nyssen. ἀνυπαρκτὸν ἐστὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἡ κακία, Sin is an insubsistent Being, or privation*. And it was a general conclusion in the Greek Scholes, that *sin resulted, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, from the absence of good, as darkness from the absence of light*. Thus also among the Latins, *Augustin* asserted, that *Sin was not Nature, but the evil of Nature*. Again: the *Amision* of Good has taken up the name of *Sin*. And *Strangius*, who is our principal adversary in this controversy, yet l. 1. c. 13. p. 97, &c. he strongly demonstrates this Hypothesis, *That the formal reason of sin consists in Privation*. This I conceive deserves a particular remarque, because some late Authors, and those not of inferior note, make great use of this Antithesis, namely, *That Sin is as to its formal nature positive*, as their chief engine to oppose our general Hypothesis, touching *God's efficacious concurrence to the substrate mater of that which is sinful*. They tel us, that *Sin, as to its forme, is not a mere privation, but a moral Relation, which has so much Realitie as a relation*. But to obviate all mistakes and verbal contests, we grant, [1] That *Sin may be termed a moral privative relation, or rather, relative privation, as it is a transgression of, and so must have relation to, the Moral Law*. [2] That *Sin is not a mere nothing, but has some kind of logic positivitie or notional entitie, so far as to render it capable of being the terme of a Proposition, as we have more fully shewen, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 2.* But, [3] We may not yield, that *Sin is a moral positive Relation, much less a positive act or real Being, such as is the term of a natural production*: For such a perswasion wil necessarily force men to grant, that *God is the Author of Sin*, or to hold with the Manichees, that *there are two first Causes, one of good and the other of evil*.

4. Touching the kinds of sinful Actions, that which principally concerns our present controversy is the distinction of sinful Actions,

Actions, into such as are *modally only*, or such as are *intrinsically evil*.

(1) By *actions modally evil* they generally understand such as are *Actions modally sinful*. substantially good, yet have some modal accidental vitiositie or sinfulness appendent to them. Such are al the sincerely pious acts of good men in this imperfect state; which have an evangelic perfection and goodness in them, yet mixed with much corruption and imperfection. For such is the profunde mysterious wisdom of God, that he permits a mixture of sin even with the best good works on this side Heaven, thereby to render the methods of his Grace the more illustrious: so that the same Act, which is in evangelic estimation sincerely good, is also modally sinful and imperfect. Thus *Strangius*, l. 2. c. 9. p. 205. *Sithat al transgression of the Law is sin, men sin both by doing what is forbidden, as also by doing what is commanded, if not in that manner as commanded: Again, both by not doing what is commanded, as also by abstaining from what is forbidden, if they abstain not in a regular manner. Thus oft it comes to pass, that the action may be good according to the substance of the work, and yet evil as to the mode of acting. As for example; to give Almes to the poor is a work substantially good, yet if it procede not from Faith and Charitie, and respect to the glorie of God, it is evil as to the mode of acting.* Thus *Strangius*. But I adde, that the best works of Unbelievers are substantially evil, in that they have nothing of sincere good in them; but full of hatred of God; and the best works of pious souls in this imperfect state are modally evil, because they have a tincture of vitiositie appendent to them.

(2) By *Actions intrinsically evil*, they generally understand *Actions intrinsically evil*. such as being referred to and determined by such or such an object, carrie in them an intrinsec vitiositie and malignitie; so that whiles under such a reference and determination they can never become good. And the commun instance is in hatred of God, and Blasphemie. Not that those acts are in their phy sic material entitie or substance sinful, but only in their moral constitution and formal determination or reference to their object. Thus much is also acknowledged by *Strangius*, l. 1. c. 13. p. 89. *When, according to the commun sentence, it is said, that some also are in themselves or intrinsically evil, the acts are not understood as abstracted from their Object, but as they refer to their object, in regard of which they have their vitiositie.*— *It seems to me, that the vitiositie, which is in the hatred of God, doth not belong to the material,*
C but

but formal of Sin. Which is an ingenuous confession, and wil be of much use to us in what follows. At present we shall only remarque; that this notion of *Acts intrinsically evil*, if duely examined, wil be of no use to our Opponents, albeit they seem to lay the most stress on it. For [1] They grant, as *Strangius* here, *that the vitiositie, which is in the hatred of God* [and so in all other acts intrinsically evil] *doth not belong to the material but formal of sin*: so that Gods concurse to the material or substrate mater of sin doth not suppose his concurse to the formal obliquitie of sin. [2] In acts *sincerely but imperfectly good, and modally evil*, the substrate mater or material act, which is both good and evil, is one and the same: now our Adversaries grant Predetermination to the material act as good: how then can they denie predetermination to the same material entitative act which is evil, though not as such? But of this more hereafter, c. 5.

The Libertie of
the Wil.

§. 3. The next terme to be discussed by us is the *Natural Freedom, or Libertie of the Wil*; which is indeed the hinge on which our whole controversie turns, as our more intelligent Opponents confesse. A reverend Divine, *Cathol. Theologie*, Part 3. p. 80. saith, *I do readily confesse, that, as the sum of all the controversie is, Whether man hath truely any free-wil, &c.* I do readily concur with him in this, *That the sum of all the controversie must be resolved into this notion of free-wil*; and therefore if we cannot make good our ground here, we must necessarily fall under the efforts of our Antagonists. And I must confesse this conception has been deeply engraven on my thoughts, for twenty five years or more, that the whole of the Pelagian and Arminian controversie centers in this point, touching the *Libertie of the Wil*: and he that endeavours to remove those maladies, but overlooks those Pelagian infusions that lie hid in the heart of Free-will, doth act but like the unskilful Physician, who, to remove an *Hectick Feaver*, endeavoured to cure the *Itch*. What made *Durandus* drive Gods immediate Concurse to human acts, but this perswasion, that it destroyeth the Libertie of the wil, and so makes God the Author of sin? And what makes the Jesuites denie Predetermination, but the like groundless perswasion? So also *Baronius*, in his *Metaphysics*, Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 79. p. 147. Here it was that the Pelagians of old took Sanctuarie, and under the shadow of this terme *Free-wil* concealed all their venomous Infusions: here, by their sophistic logic and ambiguous cloudy distinctions,

distinctions, they fortified themselves against the Defenders of Efficacious Grace. Thus *Janfenius*, *August. de Natur. Laps.* Tom. 2. l. 4. c. 24. proves largely out of *Augustine*, that the principal fraud and cheat of the Pelagians lay in their philosophic ballucination about natural free-wil, which they placed in Indifference, but *Augustine* in a rational spontaneitie. Herein they are followed by the Jesuites and Arminians, who indeed differ not scarcely one hairs breadth from the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians. Yea *Baronius*, (whom *Rutherford* rangeth among the Arminians) with confidence maintains *Bellarmines* definition of Libertie, as justifiable and orthodoxe, *Metaphys.* Sect. 12. p. 285.

But other of our Antagonists, *Strangius*, *Le Blanc*, &c. perceiving that our Reformed Divines have generally placed Natural Libertie in a Rational Spontaneity, and so presumed, that voluntary necessitie is very wel consistent therewith, hence they have found out an artificial distinction for the reconciling the Calvinists with the Jesuites, Pelagians and Arminians: They distinguish Libertie, into that which is largely, or strictly taken: and they confess, (1) That Libertie taken largely, as it is a perfection of the Soul, so it has one and the same notion with Rational Spontaneitie; and such is the Libertie of glorified Souls. This Libertie they make essential to the wil; of which see *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. also p. 691, 702, 703. But, adde they, (2) There is also a libertie strictly so termed, which consists in the Indifference of the wil to this or that object, also to act or not to act: and this Libertie is most proper to this our imperfect state, as *Strangius*, p. 188. 687. 689. 711. So likewise *Le Blanc*, p. 435. and others. There were some first lines of this distinction drawn by *Camero*, who makes libertie strictly so termed to be about the means, not the end; yet his Notions about Libertie are tolerable, in that he makes Divine Predetermination consistent with human Libertie. But the first creator of this distinction touching a two-fold Libertie, among those who owned the *Synod of Dort*, was *Strangius*, who asserts a two-fold Libertie, one considered in its own Nature, which is essential to the wil, and the other as limited to lapsed man, which includes Indifference, &c. as in places above cited.

The new coined distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken.

What these new Methodists mean by this new coined distinction of Libertie, unless it be a gratification to the Pelagians, I cannot conjecture: Certain I am, that I never could find it

among the ancient Philosophers, Primitive Fathers, Scholastic Theologues, or any other but these new Methodists or their Sectators. Do any of the Greek Philosophers make mention of any libertie, but what is essential to the wil and al human acts? Can we find among the Greek Theologues any notices of this two-fold Libertie? Yea do not the very Jesuites herein concur with us, that Liberty is essential to al moral acts, both in the future, as well as the present state of the Soul? Is not Libertie constituted by them and the Arminians as the foundation of al Moralitie? Doth not *Amyraldus, de Libero Arbitrio*, as well as we, make Libertie properly taken essential to the wil and al its Acts? Of what use then can this distinction of a two-fold Libertie be? Wil it satisfie the Pelagians, Jesuites or Arminians? No; because they al make Libertie strictly taken essential to al Moral Acts. Or, wil it any way relieve the Calvinists in their conflicts both with Jesuites and Arminians, to say the wil is sometimes free and sometimes not? If it be supposed, that Indifference be essential to libertie in this imperfect state, wil it not then be replied by Pelagians and Arminians, that the wil is not, according to these new Methodists, free in Conversion, because not indifferent? It were not difficult to demonstrate, how invalid this new-coined distinction of Libertie is, and unapt to reach those ends for which it was designed by the authors thereof.

The True Idea
of Libertie.

As for the true Idea and notion of Natural Libertie, we have, with what studie and diligence we could, inquired into and discussed the same, *Court of the Gentiles*, P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. §. 11, 12. & B. 4. c. 1. §. 29---32. also *Philosoph. General*, P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. S. 4. §. 2. the sum whereof may be drawn forth in these following Propositions. (1) *Natural Libertie, as it denotes a power, has one and the same Idea or Nature with the Wil.* This is copiously demonstrated, in the forementioned places. Hence, (2) *Al acts of the Wil have libertie in the strictest notion essentially appendent to them.* (3) *The Dominion which a free Agent has over his own Act is not absolute, but limited and conditionate.* (4) *The necessitie which ariseth from the concurrence of God the first cause, no way diminisheth, but establisheth the Natural Libertie of the Wil.* For nothing offers violence to the Wil, or is injurious to its Libertie, so long as the act it puts forth is voluntary: so long as the wil doth voluntarily elect and embrace what it is predetermined unto, the act is in its own power and free: for

for as *Aristotle*, *Eth. l. 5. c. 12.* wel observes, οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν αὐτῆς πρᾶξι βύλησιν, nothing happens to such an one, but what he wils.

(5) *Actual Indifference to varietie of Objects or Acts*, is no way essential to natural Libertie, but only an Accident resulting from its imperfection. (6) The formal, native and genuine Idea or notion of natural Libertie, both as to state and exercise, includes no more than a rational spontaneitie. This last proposition, which is the principal, *Strangius* f owns; and *Le Blanc de Libr. Arbit. Thef. 19. p. 405.* confesseth this to be the general opinion of our Reformed Divines, even of *Amyraldus*, *Placcus*, and other new Methodists. That this also is asserted by our Judicious *Davenant*, see his Determinations, *Quest. 22. That the Divine Decree takes not away Libertie.* These Propositions about natural Libertie, we have in the forecited places more amply demonstrated, because the whole Pelagian and Arminian controversie, and particularly this about Gods concurrence to the substrate mater of sin depends thereon: and he that shal undertake this Province of resolving our present Question, without a clear Explication and Demonstration of the Wils natural Libertie, doth nothing to purpose.

f Libertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud esse videtur, quàm τὸ ἐκείνου νοητικόν, spontaneum intellectuale.
Strang. l. 3. c. 14. p. 686.

§. 4. Next to the natural Libertie of the Wil, we are to consider *Moral Libertie* or *Free-wil*, as also what is possible or impossible to corrupt Nature. By *Moral Libertie* or *Free-wil* is generally understood the moral potence or spiritual abilitie of the Soul to do good. This moral and spiritual Libertie, our Adversaries the Pelagians, Arminians and new Methodists confound with natural Libertie, and from our denying the later in corrupt Nature, they falsely charge us with denying the former: therefore to remove this confusion of the termes, and those false imputations which are charged on those that defend efficacious concurrence, the following Propositions wil be of use unto us.

Moral Libertie or free-wil to good.

1. *Natural Libertie is essential to the Wil and al its acts, but moral Libertie or free-wil to good only accidental and separable.* The Wil is not a Wil if it be not naturally free in al its acts; whatever act is voluntary, is for that very reason free; Voluntary and free being in Scriptural estimation, as also by the determination of the best Philosophers, termes synonymous and equipollent, as we have demonstrated, *Philos. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. §. 1.* But now as for *Moral Libertie* and free-wil to good, that is only accidental to the human Soul; it may come and go, be present and absent without the natural destruction of the Soul,

Soul, or violation to natural Libertie. It's true, that Moral Libertie, consisting in virtuous Habits, Inclinations and Exercices, is the Perfection of Man, yet so as the Essence of the Soul is not diminished or destroyed by the loss thereof.

2. *Our first Parents in their innocent state were invested not only with natural but also with moral Libertie or free-wil to good.* This is granted on both sides, and therefore needs not further demonstration.

3. *Since the fal corrupt Nature in its unregenerate state lies under a total, universal and naturally moral Impotence as to al Moral and spiritual good.* I cal this Impotence total and universal, as it overspreads the whole soul, and has stript it of al seeds of, or inclinations to, any spiritual or truly moral good. I terme it also *natural, or naturally moral*, in that, albeit the subject be moral, yet the Impotence being communicated together with corrupt Nature, connatural or congenite and proper thereto, as corrupt, and as to al natural power inseparable therefrom, it is become a *moral Nature*. I am not ignorant, that some new Methodists, together with the Arminians, stiffely contend, *that this Impotence is not natural but only moral*; but either they intend under the ambiguitie of the termes to concele some Pelagian Infusions of natural seeds of virtue and Free-wil to Moral good, or else they must wrest the termes Moral and Natural from their native sense, and what is intended by those that defend a natural impotence. For al know, that by *moral Impotence* is generally understood an *Impotence contracted* by frequent Acts of and Custom in Sin; and so on the contrary by natural Impotence is understood such as is traduced together with, and through the miserable contagion of sin inseparably appendent to corrupt nature. Of this see more *Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 5. §. 1.* Hence,

4. *Sin in corrupt Nature becomes necessary, and the observation of Divine Precepts impossible.* This Proposition has ever been in al Ages of the Church, the great bal of contention between the Patrons of Free-wil, and the Defensers of Free-grace. The Pelagians of old as the Arminians of late have made this their main Refuge for the defense of their *Diana of Free-wil*. If Sin, say they, be necessary, and so inevitable, then it ceaseth to be sin: if it be voluntary, then it may be avoided. But these Pelagian Armes *Augustin* and his Sectators have stoutly refelled, by shewing,
(1) That

(1) That the Law was not originally impossible to mans Nature, but only is become so accidentally by reason of Sin, and the impotence of corrupt Nature. (2) That this Impotence is not less voluntary than necessary, yea the more necessary it is, the more voluntary: The necessitie of this Impotence is seated in and ariseth from the Wil, and therefore most voluntary. Thence *Augustin* termes it *dura Necessitas*, an hard Necessitie, because the more necessary this impotence is the more voluntary, and the more voluntary it is the more necessary. *Plato*, *Phileb.* p. 22. gives it the character, ἀνάγκη ἐν ὁδῶν, of a miserable necessitie; which he opposeth to that blessed necessitie of adhering to the chiefest good, of which see *Court Gent.* P. 4. B. I. c. 4. § 7. (3) That albeit the avoiding of sin and the observation of Divine commands be legally impossible to corrupt nature, yet both are Evangelicly possible through the habitual and actual assistances of the Spirit of Grace. See more of the impossibilitie which is in corrupt nature for the observation of Divine precepts in *Jansenius*, *Ang. Tom.* 3. l. 3. c. 15, &c. *Philosoph. General.* Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect. 5. §. 1. *Court Gent.* P. 4. B. I. c. 4. §. 8.

5. Notwithstanding the necessary impotence of corrupt nature as to what is morally and spiritually good, yet it stil retains a phisic or natural facultie and remote passive power capable of receiving spiritual good. No one denies, but that the Soul, as a rational and voluntary subject, is remotely, passively, and naturally capacitated for the reception of gratiose infusions; al the Controversie is about a proxime or next, active, and moral power, which we denie to remain in corrupt nature.

6. The Necessitie of consenting and Impossibilitie of resisting which attends the wil on the supposition of Divine concurrence efficaciously moving and applying the same to act, is only consequential, hypothetic, or conditionate and voluntary, not simple, absolute, and coactive or violent. Here we are to inquire what a simple and absolute impossibilitie is, and how it is differenced from a conditionate and limited Impossibilitie. A thing is said to be simply and absolutely impossible, when it is in no regard possible: for if it be in any respect possible, it cannot be said to be simply and absolutely impossible. Now nothing can be said to be in no regard possible, or simply and absolutely impossible, but what in its own nature implies a repugnance of existing: and surely nothing in its own nature implies a repugnance of existing, but what involves a contradiction: that which involves a contra-

contradiction comes not within the compass of possible, because contradictions have no passive power of being verified; for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other; the truth of the one makes the other false: But whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of existing, that *may be*; and therefore cannot be *simply* and *absolutely impossible*, of which see *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 4.* Now that the Concourse of God predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sinful acts cannot render the opposite act of obedience simply and absolutely impossible is evident; because (1) the opposite act of obedience implies no contradiction or repugnance of existing: For God can and doth work it in some: albeit it be in a limited sense impossible to corrupt nature, yet it is possible to Grace, as before. (2) The wil predetermined to one act has an habitual indifference or radical flexibilitie to the opposite act; and therefore the impossibilitie is only conditionate and limited. A reverend Divine supposeth, *That Gods determinative concurrence to the substrate mater of sin leaves it undeniable, that the mater of al his Laws, in reference to al such actions, are a simple and most stricly natural impossibilitie.* Which I conceive to be a great mistake, and that according to the confession of our principal Adversary, *Strangius*, who *lib. 3. cap. 8. pag. 625.* speaks thus: *Therefore the Divine determination either by efficacious grace, or any other way [which includes concurrence to the entitative act of sin] being granted, there is truly inferred a necessitie of the consequence; because that act of the wil unto which it is determined by God must necessarily follow, but it is not a necessitie of the consequent, which in its own nature remains contingent; and therefore in a composite sense the wil, when it is determined by God to act, cannot but act.* Whence some Scholemen say, *That in free-wil there is a simltie of power to opposites, but not a power of simltie, i. e. a power of embracing opposites at one and the same time: whercof the reason is this, because a power to one act is not opposed to the power unto the negation of the same act, or to a contrary act, but two contraries or contradictories cannot be together in the same subject.* Of which mater *Alvarez* discourseth learnedly, *de Auxil. l. 9. Disp. 94. & l. 12. Disp. 115.* Note wel here, that *Strangius* in this point fals in with the Dominicans, and fully assents and consents to their mode of conciliating Divine determination with human libertie, which if the fore-mentioned reverend Brother and others would do, I should judge our Controversie ver-ry near, if not fully at an end. The sum of al is this, That the de-termination

In libero arbitrio est similitas potentiae ad opposita, sed non potentia similitatis, Alvarez.

termination or predetermination of Divine concurse to this or that act doth not make the negation of that act, or a contrary act a simple or most strictly natural impossibilitie, as some would persuade us, but only infers a necessitie of the consequence, the wil having stil, *in sensu diviso*, i. e. on supposition of the withdrawment of Divine concurse, an habitual indifference to act or not to act, though, *in sensu composito*, as predetermined by Divine concurse, it cannot but act. Or summarily thus: The wil has at that very time, when it is predetermined by God to this or that act, an habitual power or radical indifference to the negation of that act, or to the putting forth a contrary act: So that Divine predetermination excludes only a contrary act, not the radical power to that act. Thus also *Davenant*, *Animadv.* against *Hoard*, p. 240, 333, 341, 360, 402. proves strongly and accurately, *That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events, though not with contrary events.* Of which more hereafter.

§. 5. The next terme that falls under consideration is *the Wil of God*, its different Ideas and various Acceptions in the Scriptures, under which our Opponents conceale themselves, and their misrepresentations of our sentiments. The ancient distinction of the *Divine wil*, (which they say *Hugo de S. Victore* first formed) was, into *voluntatem signi* & *voluntatem beneplaciti*, Gods *significative wil* and his *beneplacite wil*. (1) Gods *significative wil* they make to consist of *Precepts, Promisses, Prohibitions, Permissions, Counsels, and Admonitions*. By *Permissions* here we must understand such as are *moral*, not *natural*, which as to sin properly belong to Gods *beneplacite wil*, as anon. This *significative Wil* of God some Divines terme his *Reveled wil*, from *Deut. 29. 29.* others terme it his *Legislative* or *Preceptive wil*: others his *Approbative wil*, whereby he declares what he approves and what he disapproves, of which see *Davenant Animadv.* against *Hoard*, pag. 222, 356, 391--399. Lastly learned *Chamier*, and *Daillé* out of him, terme this *significative wil* of God, his *wil euagēias*, of *complacence*, or *complacential wil*, whereby he declares, what is most agreeable to him, and what not. Our judicious *Davenant* makes use also of this terme, as having one and the same Idea with the former notion of Gods *Approbative wil*. These several notions of Gods *significative wil*, albeit they may differ in some formalitie, yet they agree in substance and import, denoting Gods reveled wil touching mans dutie, and that which is most agreeable to his holy wil and nature.

(2) As for Gods *Beneplacite wil*, commonly stiled his wil *eudonias*, of good pleasure, it is that whereby he decrees, effects, or permits al events and effects: whence it is distributed into *effective* and *permissive*. Gods *effective beneplacite wil*, is that whereby he decrees and produceth al natural and supernatural effects: Gods *permissive beneplacite wil*, is that whereby according to his eternal Decree he efficaciously permits the existence of sin.

This distribution of the Divine wil is greatly opposed by the Pelagians, Arminians, and new Methodists. (1) The Jesuites, whom we may without breach of charitie terme Pelagians, do what they can to baffle this distinction: so *Molina*, the Head of that Faction, in *Thom. Part. 1. Quest. 19. Art. 12.* tels us, *That these signs of the Divine wil signifie properly and formally some nolition or volition in God; and therefore Gods significative wil cannot be contradistinguisht to his beneplacite wil.* The same is urged by the Arminians. But the Orthodox both among Papists and Protestants replie, that Gods reveled significative wil is only *equivocally, analogically, figuratively and improperly* termed his wil, as the Edicts of Princes, and Laws of States. So *Sanderson de Obligatione Conscientie, Praelect. 4. sect. 20.* tels us, *That Gods beneplacite wil is that whereby God has from al Eternitie constituted with himself what he wil do: his significative wil is that whereby he has appointed unto us a Law, by signifying what he wil have done by us. Whereof the former is properly and univocally the wil of God, but this later improperly and analogically so called.* The like *Davenant, Animadvers. pag. 392.* It's true, Divines grant, that this significative wil of God has some Decree or Act of the beneplacite wil answering thereto: for the wise God decreed, that this or that should be mans dutie; but they denie that this reveled wil of God touching mans dutie is the same with his decretive wil touching events. (2) Our Adversaries pretend, that by this distinction of the *significative and beneplacite wil* we make two opposite wils in God, and such as clash each with other. This makes a reverend Brother to reject this distinction, as of no use in our present case. But Divines answer, that these wils are not *opposite* in God, but only *disparate and diverse*: the things decreed, and the things reveled and constituted by Gods significative wil may oppose each other, but the decretive and reveled wil never oppose each other. The most holy and wise God really intends whatever he commands, or approves, with an intention that it shal be mans dutie, and rewarded if performed,

formed, but not alwayes with an intention that it ſhal be effected. (3) Our Opponents, and particularly the new Methodiſts, confound Gods *Beneplacite Decretive Wil*, with his *Wil of Complacence and Approbation*: and under this confuſion endeavor to ſecure their oppoſition againſt Gods willing the Permiſſion of Sin. Thus *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. *None can be ſaid to wil what he doth not approve*. Thence others make Love of complacence eſſential to al acts of the Divine Wil: and thence conclude, if God wil the permiſſion of Sin, he muſt neceſſarily take complacence therein. But the replie hereto is not difficult: we ſay, that God takes complacence in al his own Acts, but not in al the objects they refer unto: but now love of complacence is not ſo termed from the act, but object about which it is converſant; which muſt be ſome good either natural or moral. Whence it is evident, that God may wil the permiſſion of Sin, and its exiſtence as a conſequent thereto, and yet not take complacence in or approve of ſin. See more of Gods Wil and its various Diſtributions, *Court Gent.* P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. §. 3.

§. 6. The laſt terme that needs our Explication is *Divine Concurſe*, its *Immediation*, *Efficacitie* and *Predetermination*. *Strangius*, l. 1. c. 11. p. 59. diſtinguiſheth *Concurſe* from *Influxe* thus: (1) *Influxe* is more large than *concurſe*: for the cauſality of every efficient is termed *Influxe*; and therefore the *Influxe* of God is ſeen in many things, in which his *concurſe* is not, as when he acts without the concurrence of a ſecond cauſe. Thence, (2) the terme *Influxe* is abſolute, not denoting the reſpect of any other cauſe, but that of *concurſe* is relative. I have no mind to quarrel about termes without juſt ground, and therefore can eaſily admit this diſtinction, though it make neither for nor againſt either party. But that which more immediately concerns our preſent controverſie is, 1. To give the true Idea and Notion of *Immediate Concurſe*, as generally aſſerted and ſtated in the Scholes: which we ſhal endeavour to explicate both negatively and poſitively.

(1) Negatively, *Immediate concurſe to an Act conſiſtes not in the preſervation of the principe, or rendring of it apt and habile for any congenerous action*. I know a learned and pious Divine, who ſeems in termes to grant immediate *Concurſe* as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful actions, yet in the cloſe placeth it only in this, *That God as the firſt Mover, ſo far excite and actuate thoſe*

Of Divine Con-
curſe.

Immediate Con-
curſe what.

powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, to which they have a natural designation; and whereunto they are not sinfully disinclined. But al this, as I conceive, no way reacheth the true notion of Immediate concurse, neither is it consistent with it self. For, [1] If God as the first mover excite and actuate those powers, then are they necessarily by him drawn or applied to act, which is more than being apt and habile for any congenerous action: certainly to excite and actuate a power is more than to render it apt and habile for an action. [2] If the Powers by Gods exciting of them are rendred only apt and habile for any congenerous action, then where is immediate concurse as to the Act? Did or would any terme this immediate concurse, so far to excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous Action? [3] What this Aptitude and Habilitie is, which the Powers receive by being thus excited and actuated by God, I cannot divine: Are not the powers of the soul as powers apt and habile for natural actions, such as the substrate mater of sin is? What other Aptitude or Habilitie doth God give unto the natural faculties as to sinful acts, but merely the facultie of acting? Need sinners any other facultie, power, Aptitude or Habilitie to sin, but the rational faculties depraved? It's true, God applies those faculties to the entitative act of that which is sinful, but yet doth not adde any aptitude or habilitie to sin. [4] Doth not *Durandus* and his Sectators grant al this, and yet denie immediate concurse as to the entitative act of sin? The Hypothesis of *Durandus* doth no way exclude any kind of Aptitude or Habilitie, but rather include the same; it only excludes the immediate application of the power to its act; which also is excluded by this laxe notion of Immediate concurse. [5] Lastly, if they who oppose Gods concurse to the substrate mater of al sinful acts, do indeed and in truth assert and owne an immediate concurse to any one entitative act that is sinful, al those black and direful consequences, which they cast on the assertors of Predetermination, may with as much facilitie be re-torted on them, as we shal demonstrate, chap. 5. §. 4. Hence,

(2) Affirmatively, *Immediate concurse as to its formal Idea not only gives an Aptitude or Habilitie to act, but also immediately produceth the very act it self.* That this notion of immediate concurse is universally received in the Scholes, is most evident. I shal desire the Reader to consult our Countrey-man *Compton*:
Carleton,

Carleton, a learned and acute Jesuite, who had his first education in Cambridge, and is more moderate than most of that faction. He saith, *Philosoph. Disput. 28. de Causa prima*, Sect. 3. p. 319. *God therefore concurs with al his Creatures immediately to al their actions, not only by the Immediation of Virtue, but also of Supposite, i. e. that action, whereby the creature operates, doth also flow immediately from God himself, and not from any other substituted in his place.* A clear explication of Immediate concurse, so far as it regards its Immediation. Whence *Disput. 29. Sect. 2.* he determines thus, touching Gods Immediate concurse to the act of Sin: *We must say therefore, that God doth physically and immediately concur to the act of sin, together with the create Wil.* And he confirms this Hypothesis by Arguments out of *Aquinas, Suarez, Vasques, Anselme, Tanner, Zumel, Montefinus, Mulderus, Arriaga, and Oviedo.* So that this notion of Immediate concurse seems to have been generally entertained by al parties, both *Thomists, Scotists, and Jesuites*, as that which is most rational and self-evidencing.

2. But the principal point in controversie is touching the *Effi-* *Efficacions and*
cacitie and *Predetermination of Divine Concurse*; wherein the Je- *predeterminant*
suites and Arminians oppose the Dominicans and Calvinists. I *concurse.*
must confess, when I first undertook the explication of Divine Concurse, specially as to the substrate mater of Sin, I studiosely avoided the terme *Predetermination*, (although it be frequently fathered on me) as is intimated *Court Gentiles*, P. 4. B. 2. c. 11. §. 7. partly to avoid needless contests about words, and partly because I would not professedly espouse the interest of any one Sect, but adhere to Scriptural termes; but since, upon a more accurate inquiry, finding the terme expressly laid down in Scripture, and that as to the very mater in controversie, touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin, I see no reason why we may not make use of it, notwithstanding the prejudices some endeavor to load it with. Therefore for the more full explication of this terme I shal endeavor to shew, (1) *What efficacious concurse notes*; and (2) *How this efficacious concurse may be termed Predeterminative.*

1. Divine Concurse is termed *efficacions* as it doth most po- *Efficacions con-*
tently and invincibly produce its effect. The Grecanic terme, *course what.*
whereby the *efficacitie* of Divine Concurse is expressed in the Scriptures, is *ἐνεργεια*, *efficacitie*, or *energie*, which notes the *puissant force.*

- Eph. 1. 19. force of any operation. So Ephes. 1. 19. *κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς ἐξουσίας αὐτοῦ*, according to the energie or efficacious working of the might of his power. Here is, (1) Power or force. (2) Might of power or most potent power; and (3) The efficacious working of this most potent power: Which note the puissant efficacities of divine concurse. Thence the Syriac renders it *ܟܬܝܢܐܒܪܗܡܐ*, according to the efficacy. So Ephes. 3. 7. *κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς δυνάμεως*, according to the energie or efficacy of his power. The like, Phil. 3. 21. *κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑποτάξαι ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα*, according to the efficacious working, whereby he is able even to subdue althings unto himself. So Col. 1. 29. *κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐνεργουμένην ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐν δυνάμει*, according to his efficacious working, which worketh in me mightily. In al these Texts we have mighty power, yea omnipotence joined with the efficacy of divine Concurse; which demonstrates its invincible manner of working, in the production of al its effects. So that *ἐνέργεια* signifies Gods intime presence with al second Causes, and efficacious concurring with and actuating of them in al their operations. The like import may be applied to its conjugate *ἐνεργεῖν*, which notes, to effect any thing in the most efficacious manner, so as to overcome al resistance made against the force of the Agent. So 1 Cor. 12. 6. *ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα*, who efficaciously worketh althings. The like v. 11. of which hereafter. This efficacious concurse, as it cooperates with the second cause is termed *συνέργεια* cooperation or concurse, and *συνεργεῖν*, to cooperate. So Mark 16. 20. *τῷ κυρίῳ συνεργῶντι*, the Lord cooperating, or efficaciously concurring. So elsewhere, that *ἐνεργεῖν* as applied to God notes his actuose, efficacious, and pre-determinative concurse in and with althings, is evident from the use of the word both in sacred and profane Authors. So with Phavorinus *ἐνεργεῖν*, is *ἐτοίμως πρᾶσθαι*, to work readily. It's rendred by the Syriac, sometimes *ܥܒܪ*, to work, as 1 Cor. 12. 6. *ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πάνσιν* where it notes not only an universal general concurse, but a particular, present, certain, efficacious force or efficacities of Divine Concurse, exerting it self in al individual acts and effects. Again, *ἐνεργεῖν* is rendred by the Syriac, Rom. 7. 5. and 2 Cor. 4. 12. by *ܐܬܚܝܬܐ*, to work, to act with diligence, to be efficacious, as Boderianus. And 1 Cor. 12. 11. it is rendred by *ܥܥܪ*, to act, to work, to perform, to effect, as Boderianus. Lastly, it is rendred by the Syriac, Ephes. 1. 11. *ܕܠܐ ܥܥܪ*, who hath efficaciously wrought althings. Which sufficiently demonstrates the

the predetermination of Gods concurse, as to al second causes and acts. Hence,

2. This efficacious Concurse, as it determines and applies the second cause to act, is both in sacred Scripture and by scholastic Theologues termed *Determinative* and *Predeterminative*. We find both these termes in Scripture applied to Divine Concurse. Thus *οείζεν*, from *εἰ* a terme or limit; (1) primarily and properly signifies to *termine*, *set bounds* or *limits* to any cause, effect, or thing. So *Acts* 17. 26. *οείσας προτεταγμένους καιρὸς καὶ τὰς οἰκισίας*, and *Act. 17. 26.* hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation: i. e. God has determined or predetermined to every Man, Nation, and Kingdome their fixed termes of duration and life. So *Arrian*, *Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 12.* speaking of God, he saith, *ὅτι ἡμέσιν οὐ δέσσει*. And *Virgils* Song is remarkable: *Stat sua cuiq; dies*, Every ones day stands fixed or determined: which *Servius* understands, of the fixed determined period of human life. So that we see that not only sacred Philosophie, but the very Pagans by their dim light, asserted a fixed period of Divine life, as determined by God; albeit some that professe themselves Christians denie the same. Then he addes, *καὶ τὰς οἰκισίας*, and the bounds, or the position of termes: for *οἰκισία* properly signifies the position of termes or limits to any cause, action, effect, or thing. God by his eternal Decree has predetermined or set termes and limits to al second causes, their actions, effects, and events: there is nothing so contingent in nature, but it is predetermined by the Divine wil. We find the Verbe *οείζεν* applied to times and places, as wel as to causes and acts: So *Heb. 4. 7.* *οείζει ἡμέραν*, he determines or limits a day. Thence in the Glossarie, *οειδῆσα ἡμέρα* is a stated or determined day: and so *οείζω ἐν τόπῳ*, I termine or limit as to place. Whence *Hesychius* makes *οείζει*, he determines, to be the same with *δίδωσι*, he gives terme or limit. Thence also *οείζω* with the LXX. answers to *קבץ* to termine, determine, or constitute termes to any place or thing, *Num. 34. 6.* *Josh. 13. 27.* & *15. 11.* also to *קצר* to be bounded or determined. Whence lastly *οεισμός* signifies a definition, which is the terme or boundary of an essence, according to *Cicero*, who renders it, the circumscription of a thing. (2) From this primary notion of *οείζεν* follows a secondary, namely, to decree, destine to a certain end, predestine, predetermine. In which sense it signifies the same with *προοείζεν*, to predetermine: and so it is transferred to predestination, predetermination, or the decree and purpose

Luke 22. 22.

Acts 2. 23.

Predeterminative
concurrence
what in Scrip-
ture.

I Cor. 2. 7.

Rom. 8. 29, 30.

Eph. 1. 5, 11.

Acts 4. 28.

purpose of the Divine wil, even about the substrate mater or entitative act of sin; as Luke 22. 22. *καὶ τὸ ἀεισμῶνον*, as it was determined, or predetermined, decreed. Our Lord speaks of his Crucifixion, which was the greatest of sins and intrinsically evil, and yet lo! as to the substrate mater or entitative act, predetermined and decreed by God. The same Acts 2. 23. *Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel, and foreknowledge of God: ἀεισμῶν βουλῇ*, by that defined, determined, or predetermined counsel: of which more Chap. 3. §. 2. Hence *ᾤοντο* to decree, deliberate, determine is expounded by Theodotion, Job 22. 28. *οὐκ ᾔδει*. And Hesychius makes *οὐκ ᾔδει* he determines synonymous to *κρίνει*, *διματίζει*, *ἰσχυρίζεται*, which when applied to the Divine wil note predefinition and predetermination.

As the simple *οὐκ ᾔδει*, so also the composite *προορίζειν*, to predestine or predetermine is used six times in the N. T. (1) of things appertaining to salvation, I Cor. 2. 7. (2) of persons elect, Rom. 8. 29, 30. Eph. 1. 5, 11. (3) of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, yea that which was intrinsically evil. So Act. 4. 28. *For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before, or predetermined to be done.* For so *προέωκεν ἡμεῖς* may more properly be rendred. *προορίζειν* primarily signifies to predefine, predestine, predetermine, to set limits, bounds, termes to persons or things. Thence, as to this present text and point, when it is said here, that those who crucified Christ *did what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done*, it must be understood of the substrate mater or entitative act, which was predetermined by God, as in what follows, Chap. 3. §. 2. The Syriac version interprets *προορίζειν* by *ܐܘܪܐܝܬܐ* to seal, constitute, or make firm any thing, which is rendred by the LXX. *τάττειν*, *ἐκτάττειν*, *ἐντάττειν*, to order, dispose, constitute, institute. The Divine Wil and Decree gives order, constitution, limitation, determination, yea predetermination to althings: al persons and things, times and places, ends and means receive termes, limits, destination, and predetermination from the Divine Wil and Decree. Hence *προορίζειν* in the N. T. is made synonymous to *προγινώσκειν*, to foreknow, I Pet. 1. 20. to *προτάττειν*, to preordain, Act. 17. 26. to *προτιθέναι*, to propose, or purpose, Rom. 1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to *προετοιμάζειν*, to prepare, Rom. 9. 23. I Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see, what footsteps predetermination, and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, has in the sacred Scriptures.

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We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues, and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie. (1) Some distinguish between Gods *predefinition* and his *predetermination*: his *predefinition* they restrain to his Decrees, and his *predetermination* to his Concurse. Others distinguish the predetermination of God into *extrinsec* and *intrinsec*: by *extrinsec predetermination* they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree, whereby the creature is predetermined to act: by *intrinsec predetermination* they mean the *previous motion* of God upon the creature, which continually moves and applies it to act. But I should rather distinguish predetermination, (as Creation and al other Acts of God *ad extra*) into *active* and *passive*: [1] By *active predetermination* I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil, whereby al second causes, persons, acts, effects and things receive their termes, order, and limitation as to power and activitie. This is the same with predefinition, predestination, and extrinsec predetermination. That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil, without any impression or actual influx on the second cause has been defended by *Scotus* and others of great name in the Scholes, and that on invict reasons: for if God wil, that the second cause, (suppose it be the human wil) act, immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow, not from any previous impression on the second cause, but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause: as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves. See *Suarez, de Auxil. l. 1. c. 5. n. 3.* and *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 3.* [2] By *passive predetermination* I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act, and not *really*, but *mentally* or *modally* only distinct therefrom: For as *active* predetermination is the same with the Divine wil, so *passive* predetermination is the same with the second cause, its act and effect, as we have demonstrated *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. §. 1.*

(2) Predetermination is usually distinguished into *physic* or *natural*, and *ethic* or *moral*. This distinction dependes on that of causes into *physic*, and *moral*: a *physic* or *natural cause* is that which is truly efficient, and so doth really influence the act and effect, in a way of proper effieience or causalitie: whence an *Ethic* or *moral cause* is that which doth not immediately, directly, or in a way of real proper effieience produce the act and effect, but only *morally*,

E

by

Predeterminative Concurse active and passive.

Predetermination on physie and moral.

by proposing objects, motives, precepts, promises, or the like moral means and influences, with excitements and persuasions. Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into *physick* and *moral*. [1] By *physick predetermination* we must understand not corporal, or natural in a strict notion, which is proper only to things inanimate or Brutes, but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act, and really, yea immediately influenceth both act and effect. Thus *Suarez*, *Metaphys. Disput. 17. sect. 2. num. 2.* *A physick cause [and so predetermination] in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause, acting by corporeous and material motion; but it's taken more universally, for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect: for as nature sometimes signifies any essence; so physick or natural influx is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect: to which when a moral cause is opposed, it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act, yet it doth so carrie itself, as that the effect may be imputed to it: such a cause is he that comforts, beseecheth, or hinders not when he may and ought.* Hence [2] by *moral predetermination*, as it regards Gods influence on the moral rational world, we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end, his stating mans dutie by moral precepts, inviting thereto by Evangelic promises, dehorting from sin by penal comminations, and al other moral influences. Here we are to note, that albeit physick and moral predetermination be comprehended under physick and moral causalitie, yet the later is more comprehensive than the former: for physick predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior, but physick causalitie to any efficient, as *Strangius* doth wel observe.

But to sum up the whole, both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this, That the holy God doth not *morally* predetermine any to sin: for he neither counsels, encourageth, commandes, or invites any one to the least sin. The Question therefore must be understood of *physick predetermination*; which I shal describe according to the explication of *Strangius*, *l. 2. c. 4. p. 159.* thus: 'By the physick predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God, whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act, and so antecedently to al operation of the creature; or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes, God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions: i. e. he actes and causeth, that the creature

'ture actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth: so that
'without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing: and
'this premotion being given it is impossible, in a composite sense,
'that the creature should not act and do that, unto which it is pre-
'moved by the first cause. And more particularly, though concisely, as for Gods predetermination of the human wil, *Strangius*, *Prædeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum, & facere ut faciat, Strang.* l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus: *To predetermine the wil, as they teach, is to applie the wil to act, and to make it act.* Which description of predetermination I do readily close with, and so the Question before us will be summarily this,

Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions, even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them? Affirm.

I am not ignorant, that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis, states the question otherwise, as if we held, *That God doth by an efficacious influence universally move and determine men to al their actions; even those that are most wicked.* But this Hypothesis, as proposed and intended, I know no sober mind but abhors: whoever said, that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such? were not this to make him the Author of sin, which every pious soul detestes? For to determine to wicked actions as such, implies also a determination to the wickedness of those actions: and this determination cannot be physick; because sin as sin has no physick cause or determination: therefore it must be moral: and surely whoever determines morally to the most wicked actions cannot but be the moral cause, and Author of them: and is not this an high piece of blasphemie? We are so far from asserting, that God determines men to the most wicked actions, as that we say, he determines men to no wicked action; no not the least: Yea we adde further, that in actions sincerely but imperfectly good, and in part sinful, albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodness of the action, and naturally to the substrate mater or natural act, yet he predetermines not to the vitiositie of the act, or the act as sinful. So the sum and whole of our Hypothesis is this, *That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions, even such as have sin appendent to them.* This Hypothesis we no way doubt but to make good both by scriptural and rational demonstration.

C H A P. II.

The state of the Controversie.

- (1) *Ten general Propositions wherein the New Methodists and Predeterminants agree.* (2) *The New Methodists differences among themselves about Prescience, Futurition, Divine Concurse, and Gods permission of sin.* (3) *The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodists about absolute Decrees, the Futurition, Divine Permission, Prescience, Providence, Predefinition, and Predetermination of Sin.*

THE prolixitie we have used in explicating and stating our Question wil render our subsequent work more facile and concise. For here that old Proverbe holds true, *A good beginning is half the work*. But before we enter on the Demonstration of our *Hypothesis* it wil be necessary to manifest, (1) *Wherein we and those who maintain the Antithesis do agree.* (2) *Wherein our Opponents, who maintain the Antithesis, differ among themselves.* (3) *Wherein we differ from them.* The explication of these Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect state and determination of our Question.

wherein we and
our Opponents a-
gree.

§. I. *Wherein we and our Opponents, who maintain the Antithesis, do agree.* Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are; others on the contrary make them lesse: our first work therefore wil be to shew, *wherein we agree*; which I shal endeavor to lay down in the following Propositions.

I. Prop. *That God hath decreed althings that come to passe.* Herein our Adversaries generally concord with us; albeit they differ from us, as also among themselves about the manner how God decrees the substrate mater of sin. Thus *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 3. p. 558. 'But also we confesse and say, that God doth truly decree althings that happen, but not althings in one and the same manner; but some things *effectively*, other things *permissively*: which 'is the commun opinion of Theologues, according to that famose 'Axiome of *Augustin*: *There is nothing done, which the Omnipotent 'doth not wil, either by permitting that it be done, or by doing of it.* Yet the said *Strangius*, in what precedes, gives us a very dangerous position touching the Divine Decrees: 'It is not needful, saith 'he,

‘he, that we appoint so many particular Decrees of God, touching his Concourse to be afforded, as there are actions of the creature and particular objects of them. Sithat that one general Decree or Institute of God may suffice, whereby he hath determined to concur with al the actions of the creature, as he hath given them a power to act, &c. This general Decree, foisted in to salve his own Hypothesis, is most unworthy of the Divine Being, in that it overthrowes the Prescience of God, imposeth imperfection on the Divine Wil, and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianisme.

2. Prop. *That Election of some to Grace and Glorie is absolute, and no way dependent on the prevision of any act of man.* This Proposition, although it be denied by the Pelagians, Socinians, and Arminians, yet it is generally granted by our Adversaries, the New Methodists, *Amyraldus*, *Strangius*, *Le Blanc*, and others. For these, albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans sin, yet they grant a particular absolute Election of some to Grace and Glorie: which to me seems very strange and inconsistent with their Hypothesis about Reprobation: For if the Decrees of God be absolute as to Election, why should they not be also esteemed such as to Reprobation? Can the Divine wil be moved by any thing but itself? Are not conditional Decrees inconsistent therewith? Doth not God in the glass of his own Decrees foresee al acts and events of the human wil? Must they not then be al decreed absolutely by God? See hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3.

Volitiones purè
conditionales
sunt alienæ à
sapientia &
prudentia Dei,
*Ruiz. de Volunt.
Dei, Disp. 20.
§. 1.*

3. Prop. *That God hath a certain Science or Prescience of sin, as wel as of al other Events.* This Proposition is universally granted by al the New Methodists, *Amyraldus*, *Strangius*, &c. as also by most Arminians, although it be utterly impossible and inconsistent with the sentiments both of the one and t’other Partie. For al the wit of man, yea I wil with confidence addè of Devils, wil never be able to explicate and demonstrate a certain prescience in God of things future, but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees. I must solemnely professè, I can see no way left to evade the force of *Socinus*’s argument against the certaintie of Gods prescience, if we resolve it not into the free determination of his own wil decreeing al future events: of which more in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 2.

4. Prop. *That whatever God absolutely predefines or predestines from Eternitie, he predetermines in time.* This Proposition the New Metho-

Methodists seem generally to grant. So *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. 'When we speak of absolute predefinition, we willingly grant, that the predefinition of God from eternitie, and the Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other; so that whatever particular singular Act God hath absolutely predefined should be done by us, to the same he doth determine our wil: For whatever God hath by his Decree so predefined, it is necessary that he effect the same, or cause that it be done; because the Decree of God, seeing it is absolute and efficacious, must necessarily have its effect; which it cannot have but by efficaciously applying the create wil to the predefined act: otherwise, if the wil should not act that which is predefined, the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustrated, which is absurd. A good concession, which wil be of use to us in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 3.

5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good, as also to some other commun acts and effects. This Proposition is generally rejected by the Arminians, as also by *Baronius*, yet the New Methodists, who have chalked out a middle Way, generally entertain it. Thus *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 5. p. 584. 'We have shewen, that God doth not in al things predetermine the human Wil, namely not in actions intrinsically evil, and to which Vitiostie is necessarily annexed; albeit in things lawful, not only in works of Grace, but also in others that are commun, according to his own pleasure, he determines it, with the preservation of its own native libertie, sithat he can never offer any violence to the wil, but only moves it sweetly according to its own nature. See more on this argument in what follows, c. 3. §. 1. on *Prov.* 21. 1. This great concession of *Strangius* indeed cuts the nerves and sinews of al his arguments against our Hypothesis: For if God can and doth predetermine the wil to some acts, without any violence offered to its Libertie, why may he not also predetermine it to al its acts, without prejudice to its Libertie? The force of this consequence is so strong, that it forceth *Baronius* and the Arminians to denie al Predetermination. See Chap.

5. §. 4.

6. Prop. That God predetermines the Wil to the substrate mater of some sinful acts, even of such as are not intrinsically evil. This Proposition is granted by *Strangius*, l. 4. c. 1. p. 766. 'But although
'in

‘in the actions of wicked men, when God doth use them as Instruments for the execution of some peculiar works, it may peradventure be said, that God doth determine their wils, yet it seems more incommode to say, that God moves and predetermines to al other acts, as to acts of hatred of God, blasphemie, &c. So that he yieldeth, that God may predetermine to the mater of some sinful acts: and indeed it cannot be rationally denied; sithat Acts imperfectly good are also in part sinful; and the substrate mater of the act as good and sinful is the same: wherefore if God predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater of the act as good, must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the act as sinful? When I say, that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act as sinful, *As* here must not, yea cannot be taken *Reduplicatively*, but only *Specificatively*, as it specifies one and the same Act, and distributes it into its opposite Adjuncts of *Good* and *Evil*: So that the meaning is no more than this, *that God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil*: and if he predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good, (as our Adversaries grant) he must also necessarily predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act whereunto sin is annexed: because the substrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the same. When our Adversaries shal have given us a rational and distinct solution to this argument, I shal confess they have done much for the subversion of our Hypothesis. Of this Argument, see Chap. 5. §. 4, 5.

7. Prop. *That there is no real positive Act or Entitie in nature, whereof God is not the efficient cause.* This is generally granted by al those that denie sin to be a positive Being. So *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 3. p. 557. ‘There is no Entitie, and no action as it is an action or has any realitie, whereof God is not the cause, or which he hath not decreed either absolutely or respectively. So l. 4. c. 11. p. 859. ‘The entitie of the Action is reduced unto God, as the first cause, on whose concurse and influx it dependes. So a Reverend Divine, *Cathol. Theol. Part 1. Sect. 17. p. 85.* ‘It is certain, that as *motus vel actio* is *quid naturale*, it is of God as the first cause of Nature: and so when a sinner acteth, it is not without the first Universal Cause. One would think that this concession, if well stated and prosecuted, would put an end to our controversie: For al that we demand is, that the real positive

tive act, whereunto sin is annexed, be from God as the first cause of Nature: But yet what our Opponents grant, as limited by them wil not answer our expectations. For some hold with *Durandus*, that the action is from God, but not immediately; others, that it is immediately from God, yet not by a predeterminative concurse. Hence,

8. Prop. *That God concurs immediately to the substrate mater or entitative act whereunto sin is annexed.* This Proposition is not granted by such as follow *Durandus* either in words or sense, yet by others it is. Thus *Strangius*, l. 1. c. 10. p. 54. *But we must judge, that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature, and that both by the Immediation of virtue and supposite or person.* For as God himself, so his virtue is every where present and energetic. For the proof whereof he cites *Isa.* 26. 12. *Rom.* 11. ult. *1 Cor.* 12. 6. *Act.* 17. 28. with other Scriptures. So *Ch.* 11. p. 61. he confesseth, that there is a common influx of God unto al actions, which he calls *ἐνέργεια*, the energie and efficacy of God, whereby he doth subordinate second Causes to himself; so that whatever they are or do act, they essentially depend on him in both respects. Whereby he seems to evince, that Gods Influx doth not only render the subject habile to act, but also immediately reach the very act, even that has sin annexed to it. The like he addes, l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. 'It may truly be said, and men are wont so 'to speak, That God is the cause of vitiose actions, albeit he be 'not the cause of the actions as they are vitiose. And more fully l. 4. c. 3. p. 783. 'From what has been said, it may in some 'manner be understood, how in a sane sense God may be said to 'impel or incline to some sin, when yet he is void of al sin: specially if these things be observed. (1) That it be not understood, that God moves or inclines men to sin in general. (2) Neither that it be said, that God moves to al sin, but only to such, 'in which he useth depraved wils as instruments to execute his 'good works. (3) Neither that it be understood, that God doth 'properly move to sin simply and formally taken, or sin as sin; 'but only to the material of sin, i. e. not to the sin of the Action, 'but to the Action as substrate to the sin, so that he be not the 'Author of the vitiositie, which he only permits, but of the 'substrate Act, and of his own direction and ordination, which 'he exerciseth about the vitiose Action, &c. Yea in Actions intrinsically sinful, he seems to grant, that the Act, as it is a
physic

physic or natural Being, is from God. *Sol. 4. c. 12. p. 876.*
 ' That which is also true of Actions which are intrinsically evil,
 ' such as the hatred of God, perjury, &c. In which also we must
 ' distinguish the physic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral
 ' evil.— That God concurs to the physic action, but not to
 the moral vice of the action we have above shewen. There are
 two observables in these concessions of *Strangius*, which, if he
 were candid and uniforme in granting us, would put a period
 to the controversie. [1] *That in Actions intrinsically evil there*
is a physic or natural entitie separable from the ethic or moral vi-
tiositie. [2] *That the physic or natural entitie of al sinful Actions,*
even such as are intrinsically sinful, is immediately from God, as the
first cause of Nature. But I must confesse, I cannot find that
Strangius is candid or uniforme in these his concessions, but
 elsewhere he seems to overthrow what he has here granted.
 For, [1] He sometimes asserts, that the natural act of hating
 God is so intrinsically evil, as that the vitiositie cannot be sepa-
 rated from it. Again, [2] albeit he seem frequently to grant
 an immediate concurrence to the substrate mater of sinful acts, yet
 when he comes to explain what he intends thereby, he doth too
 much verge unto, if not wholly espouse *Durandus's* mediate con-
 currence, as to acts intrinsically evil. Thus also *Amyraldus*, as it
 is wel noted by *Le Blanc*, *Thef. Conciliat. Arbitrii*, &c. *Thef. 48.*
p. 436.

9. Prop. *That Gods Providence is universally and efficaciously*
active in the directing and governing the Sins of men unto his own Glo-
rie. This most of the new Methodists grant, albeit some seem
 to denie it, at least in part. Our Proposition is granted by *Stran-*
gius, *l. 3. c. 4. p. 469.* ' Neither doth it follow from our opinion,
 ' that any free act is substracted from the Providence of God, if
 ' man doth that which God permits, sithat whether it be good or
 ' evil that man doth, God must foreknow, and direct and order
 ' it to the end appointed by himself. *Sol. 4. c. 1. p. 760.* ' Fur-
 ' thermore it must be observed, which we have oft mentioned,
 ' that God albeit he doth not wil sin as sin, yet he doth advisedly
 ' permit, direct, and ordain it in the best manner, to execute his
 ' righteous judgements, and illustrate his glorie. The like *p. 764.*
 ' Albeit we denie that God doth ever determine the wil to sin for-
 ' mally taken, or to the actions unto which sin is necessarily an-
 ' nexed, yet we acknowledge, that God doth so rule and order

‘the sinful wils of Men and Devils, that by permitting tentations, offering objects, subministrating occasions, denying Grace, which he owes to none, letting loose the reins to Satan, removing impediments, or by operating in any other secret manner, the event which he pre-appoints infallibly follows, and specially that that work be performed, for the effecting of which God useth their ministerie. How much would this concession conduce to put a period to this controversie, were our Adversaries but ingenuous in their assent and consent to it? Doth he not say here as much as we, abating only the terme Predetermination? and yet elsewhere how doth he start off from what is here granted?

10. Prop. *That God doth no way concur or predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin so as to be the cause or author of Sin.* This Proposition we chearfully and with our whole Souls assent and consent unto; although it be the grand designe and unwearied endeavors of our Adversaries, both Pelagians, Jesuites, Arminians and new Methodists, to fasten the Antithesis on us, namely, *That we make God to be the Author of sin.* Which Imputation has been in al Ages of the Christian Church fastened on those that defended Efficacious Grace and Divine Concurse, as we shal shew in what follows, Chap. 4.

Wherein our Opponents differ among themselves.

§. 2. Having laid down the general Propositions, wherein our Opponents generally, though not without some variation, concord with us, it follows, *that we shew briefly wherein they differ among themselves.* Indeed, so great is the difference of our Adversaries, specially the New Methodists, *Amyraldus, Baronius, Strangius, Le Blanc*, and others among themselves in this point touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of sin, as that it is very difficult for us to forme common principes or Hypotheses wherein they al agree. And albeit they generally agree in their opposing our Hypothesis, touching Gods immediate predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of actions intrinsically evil, yet they lay down their own Antithesis with so much caution, suspension, and hesitation of mind, as if they were afraid the contrary might prove true. *Placeus, Tractat. de Liber. Arbit. p. 174.* cunningly waves the determination of the Question, with this modest concelement of his mind: *Truely we, according to the reverence we have towards the infinite Majestie of God, dare not define what the Dependence of the second cause on the first*

first is: It sufficeth us, that too much dependence cannot be asserted, provided that it doth not asperse God with any the least spot of our sins. Which we readily close with, renouncing al such dependence as brings the holy God under the imputation of sin. So *Baronius*, *Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 78. pag. 147.* having given us the mention of the *Thomists* previous predeterminative concurrence, namely, that the human wil is in al its motions excited by God, and efficaciously, i. e. irresistibly moved, first to act, and then to act this rather than that, before he undertakes the refutation hereof he thus premonishes us: *In the mean while we profess these two things: (1) That we do much against our wil recede from this opinion, and that because we conceive so honourably of those great men, which are Patroness thereof. (2) That we are ready, if any thing may follow from this our Doctrine against any article of faith, to reject it. Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Thes. 55. pag. 438.* seems to wave the Controversie; yet *Thes. 56.* he inclines to the opinion of *Strangius*, That God cannot physically promote and predetermine free causes to acts intrinsically evil, without being the Author of sin. But *Thes. 57.* he confesseth, That provided God be not made the Author of sin, the dependence of the second causes on the first in acting cannot be too much asserted, &c. And *Thes. 58.* he concludes, That the force and efficacy of the Divine providence even about sinful acts, is not to be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurrence; but that God doth many ways procure, promote, direct, and moderate sinful events. So great is the hesitation of our Adversaries. Yea, how frequently do the very same persons differ from themselves in their sentiments about this point? Doth not the same person sometimes seem to grant an universal concurrence immediately influencing al natural acts, and yet elsewhere denie the same to acts intrinsically evil? And so in other points controverted by us. But the differences of our Opponents among themselves are more palpable and visible as to the following Particulars.

1. They are greatly confused and at variance among themselves as to Gods Prescience of sinful acts. Al the New Methodists generally grant Gods certain prescience of al sinful acts, but yet they are at a great difference, yea contradiction among themselves in the stating of it. (1) *Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 594.* tels us, That among al the modes which are wont to be explicated, that seems the most probable, which is taken from the presence of al things in Eternitie. Wherein he follows the Dominicans, and so must by consequence

*Their differences
1. about Gods
Prescience.*

resolve the futurition of sin into the wil of God permitting it, which overthrowes his Hypothesis. Yet *cap. 8. pag. 622.* he resolves the certaintie of Gods foreknowing future events *into the mere Essence of God.* And *pag. 626.* he resolves it *into the actions themselves and their determinate causes.* Lastly, *cap. 10. pag. 646.* he in down-right termes confesseth, *That the science of future sins is referred to the science of Vision.* Which is al that we contend for, and that which necessarily resolves Gods prescience of sin, into the act of his wil permitting it. Some of our Opponents resolve Gods certain prescience of sin into the *infinity of his science.* Thus *Le Blanc De Concord. Libert. p 444. Thes. 39.* As for the fourth opinion, which seeketh the certitude of Divine prescience in the infinity of the Divine Intellect, and in the determinate veritie of those things which are contingently future, it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate. Yet *Thes. 40.* he confesseth, *That this opinion doth not satisfie the Question, nor take away the principal difficultie.* For that which is here most difficult to be understood is, how future contingents do from Eternitie passe from mere possibles into the nature of futures, that so under that reason they may be perceived by God. Which knot he endeavors to untie, by telling us, *that the same causes that give existence to things future give them also their futurition.* But this is a very jejune and poor evasion, as we shal hereafter shew, *Chap. 5. §. 1.* (3) Others refer Gods certain prescience of sin to the Jesuites *middle science*, whereby God foresees, that if the wil of man come under such a connexion of causes, circumstances, and providential concurrences, the effect wil certainly follow, albeit in itself merely contingent. Thus *Lud. Crocius, Dyodec. Differt. Differt. 7.* where he largely but weakly defends this *middle science*: which *Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. pag. 449. Thes. 26,* &c. makes to be the opinion of *Baronius* and others. *Le Blanc* himself, *pag. 444. Thes. 42.* confesseth, *That it wants not great difficultie, how a thing which is supposed to depend on a cause in itself indeterminate should be certainly knownen by the Divine Intellect: for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot see what is not, nor yet change the nature of its object.* Whence he concludes, *Thes. 43.* *That seeing there is so much darknesse on al sides, our safest and most ingenuous course is to confesse our own ignorance herein.* The like subterfuge *Strangius* makes use of, *l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. & c. 6. p. 591.* with this pretexte, *That the mode of Divine prescience is not reveled in Scripture.* A poor refuge indeed! why then do they so daringly sift and

and prie into the Divine prescience, and draw it down to the model of our corrupt reason? We easily grant, that the mode of Divine prescience is incomprehensible by poor mortals, and therefore can content our selves with scriptural descriptions thereof: but this we assert, that it is impossible the Divine prescience, which is in itself most certain, should depend on the most uncertain ambulatory wil of man; and so much Scripture and Reason grounded thereon doth fully demonstrate.

2. Our Adversaries differ greatly among themselves *about the futuration of sin, and Gods predefinition thereof.* 2. The futuration of sin. Strangius, l. 3. c. 11. holds, *That some free acts are absolutely future, and known of God as such, without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts: and yet he denies, that those free contingent futures can be known by God according to any Hypothesis, which doth not necessarily infer the determination of the create wil; and thence which doth not include an absolute Decree of their futuration.* Whence it wil follow, that God can foreknow no contingent sin: I act as absolutely future, but what he first decreed to be absolutely future; which yet Strangius admits not. Herein he is opposed by *Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. pag. 455.*

3. Our Opponents are also at variance among themselves *touching Gods concurrence, its immediation, totalitie, prioritie, efficacy, and predetermination as to sinful acts.* 3. Divine Concurrence. (1) How many of them incline to the sentiments of *Durandus*, denying al immediate concurrence to sinful acts? And of those that grant immediate concurrence in termes, how many yet denie it in realitie? Among those that grant immediate concurrence both name and thing, do not many espouse such consequences as are inconsistent therewith, yea repugnant thereto? (2) Our Adversaries also differ much about Gods total particular concurrence to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin. Some grant a total concurrence to the physie entitative act in the general, but not in particular: others grant a total concurrence to the entitative act in particular, abstracting the reference it has to its object: Thus *Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 3.* who grants, *that God doth concur by a special concurrence to the special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically; which is al that we contend for: Others, on the contrary, make Gods concurrence to the substrate mater of sin only partial and general, asserting with Molina, Part. 1. q. 14. a. 3. Disp. 6. That God is only a partial cause of the entitative act of sin: So a Divine of name among us; yea he asserts, that God never totally permits sin.* (3) Our Oppo-

Opponents differ alſo among themſelves touching the *Prioritie* of Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Some grant Gods concurſe hereto *previous*, though not predeterminative; ſo *Strangius*: but others make it to be only *ſimultaneous*; aſſerting, that God concurs with the wil of man in the ſame moment of nature and reaſon, to the ſame act. So *Baronius*, wherein he alſo follows *Lud. Molina* and the Arminians. (4) Laſtly, the principal difference among our Adverſaries is about the *Efficacitie* and *Predetermination* of Divine concurſe as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Some make the concurſe of God to be only *general* and *indifferent*, and ſo *determinable* by the ſecond cauſe, as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it workes upon. Thus *Baronius*, *Meta-phyſ. Sect. 8. Diſput. 3. §. 73, 74, 75. pag. 142, &c.* where he makes Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts to be the ſame with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horſe. Wherein he follows the Remonſtrants and Jeſuites, more particularly *Molina*, *Concord. Liber. Arbitr. cum Grat. donis, &c. Queſt. 14. Diſput. 26.* Thus a reverend Divine of name among our ſelves openly aſſerts, that Gods concurſe is *determinable* by the creature. But *Strangius*, albeit he too far falls in with the ſentiments of *Baronius* againſt predetermination; yet he rejects this Hypotheſis of a general indifferent concurſe as too groſſe and Pelagian. So *l. 2. c. 3. p. 134.* We ſay not therefore, that God concurs only by a general concurſe, as the Sun concurs in the ſame manner to the generation of a man, and of an horſe, and of a mouſe; but we determine, that the influx of God is ſpecial to ſpecial effects, as they are phyſically diſtinguiſhed ſpecie, and unto al kind of entitie, but not to the reaſon of moral iniquitie, which conſiſtes in privation. *Strangius* here ſeems to oppoſe *Baronius's* Hypotheſis touching a general indifferent concurſe; but yet, I muſt confeſſe, upon a more accurate reſearch I cannot find that he differs materially from *Baronius* herein: for although *l. 1. c. 11. p. 61.* he calls this concurſe *inefficax*, efficace, yet he makes it be but commun, and no way *determinative*, and therefore only *indifferent*. The like *l. 2. c. 19. p. 373.* And I am very poſitive in this, that no man living can rationally exempt themſelves from the imputation of the Jeſuites indifferent concurſe, and aſſert an efficacious ſpecial concurſe, but what is determinative as to the ſubject it workes on. And thence *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. part. 3. theſ. 36. p. 434.* confeſſeth, That *Strangius's* opinion as to this point differs but little from that of *Baronius*. Laſtly,
Baro.

Baronius denies al predetermination both as to good and evil actions; as *Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 78, &c. p. 146.* *Strangius* allows predetermination to al acts moraliy though but imperfectly good, and to many other acts of the wil, whensoever God pleaseth, or need requireth; yet he denies it to al acts of the creatures, specially to such as are intrinsically evil, as *lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 162.* and elsewhere. Herein he is followed by some Divines of note among our selves, who I am very confident wil never be able to maintain their singular Hypothesis, but wil at last be driven to the opinion of *Baronius*, the Remonstrants, and Jesuites, or else fal under the lode of al those black consequences they clog our Hypothesis with; of which hereafter, *Chap. 5. §. 4.*

4. Our Adversaries differ much among themselves about Gods permission of sin, its nature and efficacy. (1) A Divine of repute among our selves asserteth, that no act of sin, no not the active selling of Joseph, or crucifying of Christ was willed by God; but only the passive vendition and crucifixion or effect; yea he saith, That God doth not wil sin as a punishment in a proper sense: but others allow, that God wils the acts of sin as penal, or conducive to his own glorie, though not as sinful acts. Thus *Strangius, l. 4. c. 2. p. 773.* where having refuted that distinction (at first framed by *Bellarmino*, and of late reassumed by a Divine of great name among our selves) of active and passive vendition and crucifixion, he concludes thus: Therefore here was not an otiose or idle permission, but an efficax operation in the selling of Joseph, which is more orthodoxe and consistent with itself, than the former Hypothesis which seems to be contradictory to itself, as hereafter, *Chap. 3. §. 2.* (2) Some of our Opponents assert, Gods permission of sin to be altogether inefficacious, yea idle and unactive: but others allow it an efficacy, and energie for the limiting, directing, and ordering of sinful acts to their proper ends; albeit not about the act itself; which I conceive no better than a modest contradiction: for how can Gods permission limit, direct, and order sinful acts, but by influencing the very act itself materially considered? See more of this, *Chap. 5. §. 6.*

5. Our Adversaries also differ greatly among themselves about the Nature of sin, its formal Reason, &c. Some, and those of no small repute among our selves, hold sin, as to its formal reason, to be a positive real Being: which indeed is most agreeable to their Hypothesis touching acts intrinsically evil, which they denie to be as

as to their substrate mater or entitative act from God. I must confesse this opinion would carry somewhat of probabilitie with it, if we could with the Manichees hold two first Principes or Causes, one of *good*, the other of *evil*; but for us that assert but one first Cause of al create positive Beings, I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypothesis of the *positivitie of sin*, without making God the Author of sin, or making mans corrupt wil independent, and so the first cause of a real positive act. Therefore Strangius, *lib. 1. cap. 13.* to avoid these black consequences strongly argues, with the Orthodoxe, *that the formal reason of sin consistes in privation.* But withal we are here to note, that this Hypothesis utterly overthrows his other Hypothesis touching acts intrinsically evil, which he denies to be from God as to their substrate mater; of which more hereafter, *Chap. 5. §. 5.*

There are other points of moment wherein our Antagonists differ among themselves, as wel as from us; namely, touching the *natural or moral libertie of the wil*, *natural impossibilitie and possibilitie*, *Gods decretive and approbative wil*, of which before *Chap. 1.* And indeed we need no way wonder, that our Adversaries thus differ among themselves, sithat their Hypothesis is liable to so many inconsistencies and contradictions: for how is it possible, that they should agree among themselves, when as their principal Hypothesis is so disagreeing from itself? But more of this when we come to the demonstrative part, *Chap. 5.*

Wherein we differ from the new Methodists.

§. 3. We procede now to shew, *Wherein we differ from those of the new method*, Strangius, Baronius, Le Blanc, and others, *about Gods concurrence to the substrate mater of sin.* Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of *Dort*, wherein the Antitheses and sentiments of the Arminians were so strongly and fully refuted, there sprang up some Divines, who gave their assent and consent to the Canons of the said Synod, but yet contrived a new method, specially as to *universal Grace*, *Reprobation*, and *Gods concurrence to the substrate mater of sin*, in order to a coalition with the Arminian partie, as we shal hereafter demonstrate. And the principal Agent, who undertook the new modelling this last head, was *Strangius*; which he has copiosely treated of, according to the new method, in his Book, *De Voluntate & Actionibus Dei circa peccatum*: whose sentiments we are to examine in what follows; but at present we shal only lay down in several Propositions wherein we differ from him, and those who follow his method in the stating Gods Concurrence to the mater of sin. We assert, 1. Prop.

1. Prop. God has an absolute efficacious Decree about the substrate mater or entitative act of al sin. This Proposition *Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 547.* grants to be true in althings but sin, specially the first sin, and such acts as are intrinsically evil: which sufficiently proves our Proposition; for we say and are ready to demonstrate, that the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed, is not in itself or its natural entitie sinful, but naturally good. What there is of sin annexed to it ariseth from its moral estimation and relation to the Law of God violated thereby: in which regard we peremptorily denie that it is from God. Yea *Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 569.* grants, That God is the cause of the act, though he doth not absolutely predestine or decree the same: and then to that objection of *Alvarez*, That the Divine preordination and eternal predefinition extends itself to al those things unto which the causalitie and effiience of God extends, he replies, That God decrees althings either absolutely or respectively. But this is a very poor Pelagian evasion: for respective or conditional Decrees are every way unbecoming the Divine perfections of God, as our Divines, particularly *Davenant Animadvers.* against *Hoard, pag. 226.* have proved against the Arminians. Lastly, *Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 576.* denies, That God decrees al sins, specially the first sin: which we shal in its place endeavor to prove, with the solution of his objections against it. Hence,

2. Prop. The Decree of God gives futurition to the substrate mater or material entitative act whereunto sin is annexed. The Antithesis hereto is defended by *Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585.* where he affirms, That it is not repugnant to the nature of God, or of the thing itself, that something be future, which God has not predefined. So c. 9. p. 628. he denies, that God hath decreed al futures, namely the fal of Adam, or the sin against the Holy Ghost. This Proposition is also violently impugned by *Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. Hum. par. 1. thes. 55, &c.* But specially I can no way approve of what *Twisse* doth in many places assert, That the Decree of God and his wil is the sole and only cause of the futurition of every event. And he instanceth in the fal of Adam and the Angels. His Arguments against the futurition of the substrate mater of sin from the Decree of God, we shal examine in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 1.

3. Prop. The permissive Decree of God about sin is not idle but efficacious. This Proposition is opposed by *Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 556.* Neither do we grant, what some affirme, that the permissive Decree of
G
God,

1. As to Gods Decrees.

2. The Futurition of sin.

3. Gods permissive Decree.

God, whereby he permits al sin, is efficacious, albeit not effective. For so the fal of Adam and al other sins should procede from the efficacy of the Divine Decree: which is an hard saying. Neither is that lesse hard, which some affirme, that God hath absolutely decreed, that men do not more good than what they do, and omit not more evil than what they omit. This Hypothesis is so far from being hard, as that I conceive Strangius's opposite persuasion is most dangerous and destructive of the Divine Decrees, as we shal shew in its place. Yea Strangius himself, in what follows, pag. 557. grants what Lombard, lib. 1. dist. 47. assertes, namely, that the wil of God is always efficacious, &c.

4. Gods prescience of sin.

4. Prop. Gods Prescience of things future, and particularly of acts whereto sin is annexed is founded on his Decrees. Thus Hilarie, de Trin. lib. 9. What God decreed to do, those things he knows in his wil. This sentence of Hilarie Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 576. ownes as orthodox, but yet denies, that the absolute Decree of God is the reason of knowing al things. So Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par. 1. thes. 63. I see no reason, why we should denie unto God the knowledge of those things which are freely future under a certain condition, albeit in that condition there be not included a decree of predetermining the free cause to this or that. But Scotus and his followers fully espouse our Hypothesis, asserting, That God certainly knows al future contingents, because his Divine Essence, which is the reason of knowing, representes to the Divine Intellect the thing determinately future from the determination of his own wil. And then as to the prescience of sin, they hold, That albeit God doth not predefine sins as such, yet he predefines the permission of sins, in which he knows them to be future. Which is orthodox, and that which we shal demonstrate hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 2.

5. Divine Predetermination.

5. Prop. It belongs to the Perfection of Gods wil and providence to predefine and predetermine al the free acts of the wil. This predefinition and predetermination as to gratiose acts Strangius, lib. 2. c. 8. p. 188. and the rest of the new Methodists, excepting Baromius, grant; but they denie it as to the Fal of Adam and other acts intrinsically evil. So Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 568. But if it be said, that God predefined and predetermined that Adam should at that very time eat, abstracting from the object which he did eat of, that cannot be. Then he gives his reasons, why God could not predefine and predetermine Adam to the act of eating, abstracting it from the reference it has to its object. And then he addes: Moreover

we denie, that it belongs to the Perfection of God or of Divine Providence, that he absolutely predefine al free acts, and predetermine the Wil unto them. The Arguments he urgeth for this his Antithesis we shal endeavor to solve, and demonstrate our own hypothesis in its due place, Chap. 6. §. 1.

6. Prop. Gods predefinition of and predetermination to the substrate 6. Human Li-
mater of sinful Acts destroys not their Libertie. Strangius and his bertie.
Sectators grant, That Predefinition and Predetermination destroyes
not that Libertie which is essential to the Wil, but only that which
consistes in Indifference. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 14. p. 681, 682, 683,
685, 686. and c. 16. p. 711. But how frivolous this opinion is,
and how unapt to serve the designe for which it was coined, we
have already intimated, c. 1. §. 3. and intend more fully to de-
monstrate, Chap. 6. §. 5.

7. Prop. Predefinition in the divine Decree and Predetermination 7. God not the
in time of those entitative Acts whereunto sin is annexed, do not make Author of Sin.
God the Author of Sin. This is the principal point in controverfie,
the Antithesis whereof is strongly urged, though weakly de-
fended by our Opponents. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. But
I judge it no way consentaneous to the natural sanctitie of God, that he
wil and decree sin to be, the vitiositie to exist, and that he predefine
such acts, whereunto the vitiositie is necessarily annexed; specially the
Fal of the evil Angels and our first Parents, from whence al sins sprang.
So c. 5. p. 579. Whether it be said from the permission, or from the
Decree of God permitting, or from the action of which God is the cause,
that sin is necessarily inferred, truely the necessity of sinning is ascri-
bed to God as the Author; namely because he decreed and caused that
from which sin necessarily follows. The like p. 587. Neither hath
God predetermined the wil of Adam to the very act of eating the for-
bidden fruit, which yet as to its entitie is reduced to God as the first
cause: neither was that act or its vitiositie necessarily inferred from
the permission of God. That this Antithesis of Strangius and his
Sectators is most false, and our Hypothesis most true, it remains
on us to demonstrate, Chap. 5.

Thus we have given the true and full state of our Controverfie;
which by reason of the subtile evasions and subterfuges of our
Adversaries lies under so much obscuritie and confusion: and in-
deed it is to me a deplorable case, and that which argues mens
diffidence of the merits of their cause, that they contend with
so much passionate vehemence for their own *Phænomena*, and yet

never explicate the termes, or state the Question in controversie. I have thereby given the Reader as wel as my self the more trouble in this part of our Province, that so what follows may be the more facile both for him and me.

CHAP. III.

Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis.

Scriptural Demonstration, (1) That God is the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things, Esa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Psal. 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. (2) That God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed. [1] Joseph's vendition, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9. [2] The Crucifixion of Christ, Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19. 10, 11. Acts 2. 23. & 4. 28. Our Adversaries Evasions taken off. (3) That God makes use of wicked Instruments to punish his People, Esa. 10. 5, 6. Jer. 16. 16. Psal. 105. 25. Job 1. 21. (4) God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin, 2 Sam. 12. 11. & 16. 22. 2 Sam. 16. 10, 11. & 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31, 37. & 12. 15, 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. & 10. 30. 1 Kings 22. 23. Rev. 17. 17. (5) Gods efficacious permission of Sin, 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16, 17, 20. (6) Gods judicial hardening Sinners, Psal. 81. 12. & 69. 22—27. Rom. 11. 10. Esa. 6. 10. & 29. 10. & 19. 11—14. & 44. 18, 19. & 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess. 2. 11. The nature of Judicial Induration in six Propositions. (7) Gods ordering Sin for his glorie, Exod. 9. 14—16. Rom. 9. 17, 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21, 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8.

HAVING explicated the termes relating to and given the genuine state of our Hypothesis, namely, *That God doth, by an efficacious power and influence, move and predetermine men to al their natural actions, even such as have sin appendent to them; we now procede to the Demonstration hereof. And because al demonstration must be grounded on some first principes, which give evidence, firmitude and force thereto; and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie, but what are originally*

in the Scriptures, we are therefore to begin our Demonstration with Scriptural Arguments, which we shall reduce to these seven heads. (1) Such Scriptures wherein it is universally affirmed, that God is the first Cause of al natural actions and things, and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. (2) Such Scriptures as directly demonstrate, That God doth predefine, predetermine, and foreordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed. (3) Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his People, in such a way wherein they could not but contract guilt. (4) Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those acts whereunto sin is appendent. (5) Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permission of some to sin. (6) Such Scriptures as demonstrate Gods giving up some to judicial Occcation and Obduration. (7) Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and disposing the Sins of men for his own Glorie.

Scriptural Demonstrations.

§. 1. We shall begin our Scriptural Demonstration with such Texts as universally affirme, That God is the first cause of al natural Actions and Things; and more particularly, of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 1. The Scriptures that speak God to be the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things, are many and great: we shall mention some; as, Esa. 26. 12. Thou hast wrought al our works in us, or for us. This Text is urged by Strangius, p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concurse to al actions of the creature, though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church; wherein God predetermines and over-rules many actions of wicked men, which have much sin annexed to them. Again, this universal prime Causality of God efficaciously influencing al natural Acts and Effects is apparently expressed Rom. 11. 36. For of him, and through him, and to him are al things. Of him, as he frames al things; By him, as he operates in and cooperates with al things; and for him, as the final cause of al things. Thus Gods πολυειδής ενέργεια, multiforme energie, as Cyril styles it, reacheth al manner of Natural actions and effects: and if so, then surely such natural entitative Actions as have sin annexed to them. Is there any sin so intrinsically evil, which has not some entitative act or subject as the substrate mater thereof? And if al things are of God, and by him, and for him, must not also the entitative act of sins intrinsically evil be so? Strangius, p. 342. replies thus: Al that God workes must tend to his Glorie: But what

1. God the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things.

Esa. 26. 12.

Rom. 11. 36.

Glorie.

Glorie redounds to God from those Actions of hatred of God, blasphemie? &c. A strange replie indeed for a Divine to make. (1) Was there not much Hatred of God, and Blasphemie in the crucifying of Christ? And yet was there any action more conducing to the glorie of God than this? Yea, (2) Doth not *Strangius* himself, and those of his partie grant, that God *directs, disposeth,* and *over-rules* al sinful acts, even such as are intrinsically evil, so as that they conduce to his glorie? And how can God direct, dispose, and over-rule them, unless he concur, yea predetermine the Wil to the entitative act? Again *Strangius*, p. 561. answers to this Text thus: *None that is orthodoxe ever extended these words to sins; as if sins were of God, by God, and for him, &c.* [1] Neither do we extend these words to sins formally considered: [2] But must we thence necessarily conclude, that the entitative act, whereto sin is only accidentally appendent, is not from God, nor by him, nor for him? Yea, [3] May we not say with Divines, that sin formally considered, although it be not of God and by him as an Efficient, yet it is for him, i. e. conducing to his Glorie, as wisely ordered and over-ruled contrary to the intent of the sinner? Thus much *Augustin* once and again inculcates, as *De Genes. ad liter. lib. Imperfecto*, cap. 5. * *For God is not the Author of our sins, yet he is the Ordinator of them, &c.* And thus much indeed *Strangius*, p. 860. confesseth.

* Nam & virtutum nostrorum non est auctor Deus, sed tamen ordinator est.

Eph. 1. 11.

Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to al natural as wel as supernatural Actions and Effects is, *Ephes. 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil.* We find three particulars in this Texte which greatly conduce to explicate and demonstrate Gods efficacious Concurse to al Actions, and particularly to the substrate mater of sinful acts. (1) We may consider the object, *althings*, i. e. whatever is clothed with the Notion and Idea of real positive entitie: *althings* must be here taken distributively into al singulars: there is no Being, that partakes of real entitie but is wrought by God. (2) Here is to be considered, the *Act, ενεργειᾷ*, who worketh energetically, or efficaciously: for *ενεργειᾷ* signifies to work with an invincible efficacy; and thence it is oft joined with words denoting infinite power and activitie, as before, c. 1. §. 6. It notes here Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse, working in and with althings, according to their natural propensions. Thence (3) follows the original

original principle of this predeterminative efficacious operation, *καὶ τὸ βελλῶν τῷ θελήματι αὐτοῦ*, according to the counsel of his own wil. Which notes, that Gods efficacious predeterminative wil is the supreme and first cause of althings: there is no executive power in God distinct from his Wil: his Concurse in regard of its active attingence is no more than his simple volition: so that divine Predetermination is the same with divine Predefinition, as we have largely demonstrated, *Court Gent. P. 4. c. 7. §. 3.* Whence also it follows, that *Gods working althings according to the counsel of his wil*, has one and the same Idea with his predetermining al actions and effects, even such as have sin appendent to them. *Strangius*, p. 560. replies to the Argument drawn from this Text thus: *From this place nothing more can be collected, than that God has decreed those things that he worketh: as it is certain, that God hath decreed nothing which he doth not execute—not that God worketh sins, &c.* [1] This Text speaks more than what *Strangius* allows it to speake, namely, that God has not only decreed those things that he worketh, but also that he works by his Decree, or omnipotent Volition: for we owne no other executive power in God but his divine Wil, as *Scotus*, *Bradwardine*, and some of the greatest Scholastic Theologues demonstrate. [2] Who saith, that God worketh Sins? surely none but *Marcion* or *Manes*, or such as hold Sin to be a positive real Being. [3] But yet we do with the Orthodoxe affirme and prove from this Scripture, *that God worketh* that entitative natural Act, whereunto sin is appendent: for otherwise, how can he be said to worke althings? Is this good sense or Logic, to say, God workes althings, not only according to their generic or specific distribution, but also according to their distribution into each singular, (for so the Syncategoreme *Al* is here taken) but yet he worketh not al singular entities, namely the substrate mater of Sin? Doth this amount to less than a down-right contradiction? He workes althings, but yet doth not worke althings? What Logic or wit of man can reconcile these Notions?

2. Unto our first Head we may also reduce such Scriptures, as in a more particular manner mention Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to al human actions and effects, even such as are most contingent and dependent on the ambulatory wil of man. Thus *Psal. 33. 15.* *He fashioneth their hearts alike: he con-*

sidereth *Psal. 33. 15.*

sidereth al their works, *היוצר*, who *fashioneth, formeth, frameth*, as the Potter doth his clay: it notes not only, yea not so much the first *Creation* of the human Soul, as its actual *figments, frames, imaginations and thoughts*: this is evident from the scope and contexture of the words: for what is the Psalmists intent and undertaking, but to demonstrate Gods infinite prescience, and its perfect comprehension of al the figments, frames, thoughts, intentions, and affections of the heart, as *vers. 13, 14*? And how doth he prove this? Why, *because he fashioneth their hearts alike*, *i. e.* puts al the first thoughts, inclinations, intentions and movements of the heart into what forme, frame, or fashion he pleaseth. There is also a great Emphase and significance in that terme *קח'*, which we render *alike*, but may be as properly rendred *together*, as it is by the Latine *simul*; neither is it to be referred to the Verbe *frameth*, but to the object *Hearts*: and so it notes an universalitie distributive into al singulars, without the least exception of any. And then the sense wil be; who *fashioneth, formeth, or frameth* the hearts of al mankind in al their very first motions, conceptions, imaginations, resolutions, end, interests, contrivements, ebullitions, affections, prosecutions, and fruitions, or other actions whatsoever. Whence he addes, *He considereth al their works*: what *works* doth he mean? Surely not only the works and labors of mens hands, but also the workings, movements, and figments of their hearts: and how can God consider them, if he did not forme, frame and fashion them? Yea, there yet lies a deeper notion in the coherence of these parts; namely, that Gods forming, framing and fashioning the hearts of al men is the ground and cause of his considering their works: For how God can perfectly consider and know the works of mens hearts, unlesse he be the *former, framer, and fashioner* of them al, as to their real entitative acts, al the wit of man can never devise or make clear unto us. So that Gods *Science of Vision*, or *Prescience* as to the figments of mans heart ariseth from this, that God is the framer, former, and fashioner of mens hearts and al their natural movements; which also implies his predefinition and predetermination of mans heart and al its first motions, inclinations, and affections. So then to forme and sum up our Argument from this Text: Doth God indeed fashion, forme and frame the hearts of al men in al their natural motions, imaginations, and affections? And may we without apparent contradiction to the light of this Text

Text exclude the entitative acts of any sins, though never so intrinsically evil? What is this but to exclude the far greatest part of human acts from being formed and framed by God? Or how can the omniscient God consider al the works of mens hearts, if he be not the former and fashioner of them al, as to their natural entitie? I must confesse the validitie of this argument from Gods prescience is to me so firme and great, as that should it be baffled, I see no way left, but to turne Socinian, and so to denie the certaintie of Gods prescience as to the *contingent imaginations* of mans heart, which implies much Atheisme.

Another Text that proves Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse as to al human acts is *Prov. 21. 1. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whither-soever he wil.* *Prov. 21. 1.* (1) He mentions *the Kings heart*, as the measure of al other mens; because Kings generally have a greater Soverain-tie and Dominion over their own hearts, than other men: if any mens hearts may plead the privilege of exemption from Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse, surely Kings may, specially such as *Solomon* was, who obtained from God such an amplitude of Soul, and self-Dominion: yet he grants, that *the Kings heart* was not exempted therefrom. (2) By the *Heart* we must understand, according to the Hebraic mode, the whole soul, and al its movements, imaginations, ratiocinations, contrivements, purposes, and undertakements. (3) *In the hand of the Lord: i. e.* under his efficacious predeterminative influx or concurse. The *Hand* being the instrument of our most potent operations, it's usually put in Scripture for the energetic, potent and predeterminative Concurse of God: So *Hab. 3. 4. He [i. e. Christ whose brightnesse was as the light] had hornes, [i. e. beams, as יקר notes] coming out of his hands [i. e. most potent wil, the spring of al his efficacious operations: whence it follows] and there was the hiding of his power, i. e. his most potent efficacious predeterminative concurse lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil.* So *Act. 11. 21. And the hand of the Lord was with them, i. e. the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace; the hand being the instrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power.* So *Solomon* saying, *That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God*, it must be understood of Gods puissant predeterminative Concurse, whereby he applies the heart to its acts, conduceth and guideth it therein, and determineth it as he pleaseth. So it

H

follows,

follows, (4) *As the rivers of waters, he turneth it whithersoever he wil.* How easie is it by *Aqueducts* to turne waters this or that way as men please? And is it not infinitely more facile for the wise omnipotent God, to turne the hearts of men, and al their natural conceptions, products, and issues which way he listes? Al this may be evinced from *Strangius's* glosse on this Text, *lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 50.* where having given us the mention of Gods preserving and directing the wils of men even in evil actions, he addes a third and more special mode of Divine influence, *whereby God doth bend, impel, and incline human wils which way he please, not by proper compulsion, but by sweet inspiration and motion: For albeit God doth never take away that libertie which is essential to the wil, yet he doth at times, and when he please, efficaciously move and impel the wils of men: and what Solomon predicates of the Kings heart, Prov. 21. 1. that very same may, on a greater account, be affirmed of the heart of every man.* So *Augustin, de Grat. & Liber. Arbitr. cap. 20.* If the Scripture be diligently inspected, it shews, that not only the good wils of men, but even the bad are so in the power of God, that where he wil and when he wil, he causeth them to be inclined, either to performe benefits, or to inflict punishments, by a most secret, yet just judgement. So again *August. de Corrupt. & Grat. cap. 6.* God hath in his power the wils of men, more than they themselves; without dout having most omnipotent power to incline mens hearts where he pleaseth. What could be said more categorically and positively to evince Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse to al the natural products and issues of mans heart, even such as have intrinsical evil, as they cal it, appendent to them? Yea, *Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 182.* grants, 'That God doth sometimes efficaciously move and pre-determine the wils of men not only to supernatural workes, but also to natural and civil, as oft as it seems good to him, to performe certain ends which he has preordained. So *Prov. 16. 7. He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him.* And how so? Surely by over-ruling their hearts even in the sinful movements. Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of *Esau* to embrace his brother, *Gen. 33.* So he gained the hearts of the Egyptians towards the Israelities, *Exod. 11. 2, 3. & 12. 35, 36.* Thus God determined the wil of *Cyrus* to bring back the Captivitie of the Jews, *2 Chron. 36. 22. Ezra 1. 1.* Thus God bent the mind of *Darius* and *Artaxerxes* to grant the Jews libertie for the rebuilding the Temple, *Ezra 6. 1, &c. & 7. 2. Neh. 2. 4.* So God dealt

dealt with *Jeremy's* enemies, *Jer.* 15. 11. Al these predeterminations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by *Strangius*: whence we argue, That it is impossible, but that God should predetermine to the substrate mater of sinful actions: for al these actions being exerted by wicked men, had nothing of moral or supernatural good in them, albeit God made use of them for the succour of his people, yea they were ful of hatred against God.

To these Scriptures we may adde, *Act.* 17. 28. *For in him we live, and move, and have our being.* *Act.* 17. 28. Not only *Being* in general, and *Life*, which implies more than simple being, but also al our *movements* or *motions* are from God as the prime Motor: which *Paul* demonstrates out of one of their own Poets: *for we are also his off-spring.* As if he had said: Do not your own Poets tel you, that we are the off-spring of God? Is he not then the first Cause and Motor of al our motions? Doth not *Aristotle*, *Phys.* 8. also strongly demonstrate, *That al our natural motions must arise from one first immobile Motor?* And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God? Must not then the substrate mater of al sinful motions, even such as are intrinsically evil, be reduced unto God as the prime Motor?

I shal conclude this first Head of scriptural Arguments with *Jam.* 4. 15. *For that ye ought to say, If the Lord wil, we shal live, and do this or that.* *Jam.* 4. 15. There were a number of Free-willers, who proudly conceited, that they had an absolute and plenary dominion over their own wils and actions; whom *James* rebukes, and tels them, they ought to say, *If the Lord wil, &c.* So that he plainly resolves al the acts of mans wil into the wil of God, as the original Cause and Principe. But let us see how poorly *Strangius* shifts off the force of this Argument, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 10. *pag.* 227. he saith, *Who ever understood these words, if God wil, i. e. if God predetermine my wil to do this or that?* Then he addes his own glosse: *But truly nothing more can be understood by that condition, IF GOD WIL, than this, if God shal permit, or wil permit, as it is elsewhere explicated, Act.* 16. 7. & *1 Cor.* 16. 7. I must confesse I cannot but wonder, that a person of so great reason, and under so many advantages and assistances from Divine Revelation, should satisfie himself with so slender an evasion, which not only Reason and Scripture, but even Pagan Philosophemes contradict. For (1) it is most evident, that *James* here, (as *Luke*, *Act.* 16. 7. and *Paul*, *1 Cor.* 16. 7.) speakes not of a mere permissive wil, but of an effi-

cacious influential concurse, arising from the wil of God, which is the alone principe and spring of Divine concurse: for al actions both natural, civil, and supernatural must be resolved into the wil of God, as their prime cause: so that *If God wil* here, is the same with *οὐδ' ἄλλω* elsewhere, *if God concur, if he assiste*, if he by his efficacious predeterminative wil, without which we can do nothing, concur. And that this is the genuine mind of this Text is most evident by the use of this phrase among the Ancients both Jews and Pagans. *Bensyra*, that ancient Hebrew, *Sent. moral. xi.* thus speakes: *Let man never say he wil do any thing, before he hath prefaced this, If the Lord wil, i. e. assiste or concur, not permit.* So among Pagans, *Hom. Iliad. β. vers. 28.* *Ἄϊκε δὲ τοι γ' ἐθέλωσιν*, &c. The like *Demosth. φιλ. α.* *Ἄν Θεός δέλη*, *If God wil.* But none speakes more fully to this point than *Plato, Alcibiad. pag. 135.* where *Alcibiades* demanding, *How he ought to speak touching Divine efficacious concurse*, *Socrates* replies, *ἐάν Θεός ἐθέλη*, *If God wil:* and in his *Laches*: *But I wil do this and come to thee to morrow, ἐάν Θεός ἐθέλη*, *If God wil.* Whence it's evident, that this formule of speech was ordinary even among the Heathens, as wel as Jews and Christians, noting not only a permissive or Directory, but Decretory and predeterminative wil. So the same Phrase must be understood, *Act. 18. 21.* *If God wil*, and *1 Cor. 4. 19.* *If the Lord wil.* Is it possible that these Phrases should be understood of a mere permissive wil? Do not al mankind need an efficacious concurse and predeterminative wil to conduct them in al their affaires? Again, (2) Gods permissive wil is either *natural* or *moral*: it cannot be meant of Gods natural permissive wil, because that regards only sin, which there is no mention of in these Textes, neither is it necessarily included. Neither can it be meant of Gods moral permissive wil, because that was already declared and manifest in the Laws of God: for al moral permission belongs to Gods Legislative wil declared in his word. It remains therefore that this phrase, *If God wil*, be understood of Gods efficacious wil, whereby al natural motions and so the entitative acts of sin are predetermined.

Si Dii volunt,
volentibus Diis,
Cic. in Offic.

Act. 18. 21.
1 Cor. 4. 19.

God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed.

§. 2. I now descend to the Second Head of Scriptural Demonstrations, namely, *That God doth predefine, predetermine, and fore-ordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed.* I shal mention only two Actions, *The Selling of Joseph, and the Crucifixion of our Lord*, whereof the former was but a Type of the later.

later. 1. I shal begin with the *Selling of Joseph*, mentioned *Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8.* *Joseph saith v. 5. Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with your selves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me before you to preserve life.* *Joseph* here has a double aspect on his Brothers sin; the one regards their hand in the sin, which he, out of a noble generous principle of fraternal Love, passeth by; the other regards the special hand of Divine Providence in this their Sin, which he admires and adores, in that it by an efficacious predeterminative Concurse brought so great a good out of so great an evil; which no finite power could do: men may make good use of what is in it self good, but who can bring so great good out of so great evil, but a God omniscient and omnipotent? (1) Let us remarque their Sin in selling *Joseph*, and of what a black Idea it was. [1] It sprang from Hatred, yea a deliberate rooted hatred, as *Gen. 37. 4. They hated him, and could not speak peaceably unto him.* Their hatred was grounded on his fathers love to him. Yea, [2] There was much Envy and Indignation joined with their hatred, as *v. 8. Shalt thou indeed reign over us? &c. whence v. 11. and his brethren envied him, &c.* [3] There was in like manner bloody Cruelty, yea intended Murther in this sin, as *v. 20, 21, 22, 24.* [4] There was also notorious Lying evident in this sin, *v. 32, 33.* [5] That this sin was of a very crimson bloody guilt is evident by their own Convictions and Confessions, when God began to awaken their Consciences, as it is conjectured about fourteen years after, *Gen. 42. 22. Behold his blood is required!* [6] By al which it is most evident, that this vendition or selling of *Joseph* was a sin intrinsically evil. For certainly if a sin of such bloody Aggravations deserve not the name of intrinsically evil, I know not what sin doth. Hence, (2) We are to demonstrate, that God did predefine and predetermine *Josephs Brethren* to the entitative act or substrate mater of this Sin. And this Province we no way dout but to make good out of the Texte, *Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8.* compared with other Texts. [1] *Joseph saith, v. 5. 7. God did send me before you to preserve life.* שלחני, sent me forth, by his efficacious predeterminative hand, which conducted me hither. The LXX. render it ἀπέμιας, which signifies, to send forth with a mighty hand, as Captives into Libertie, *Luke 4. 18.* also, to send forth with commands, autoritie and power, *Mat. 10. 16. & 11. 10.* as elsewhere: again, to send forth executioners, *Mat. 2. 16.* lastly, to direct the course of a Ship. In al these notions Gods efficacious predeterminative

1 Arg. from
Josephs Ven-
dition, *Gen.*
45. 5, 7, 8.

native concurse in sending *Joseph* into *Egypt*, is necessarily included. This also appears [2] by what is added *v. 5. God did send me before you to preserve life.* Note here, that God certainly and absolutely foresaw the Famine and *Josephs* being sold into *Egypt*, which he intended to turne for good, even for the preservation of *Jacobs* Familie and the Elect seed in him. Now how could God foresee this absolutely and infallibly, but in the predefinition or fore-ordainment of his own Wil? And *Strangius* grants this, *that where there is Predefinition, there also follows Predetermination:* Must we not then conclude, that this Vendition of *Joseph* was both predefined and predetermined by God? Yea, [3] *Joseph* addes *v. 8. So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God, &c.* You see here *Joseph* makes a three-fold mention of Gods over-ruling hand in this their sin, and that for their as well as his good: And he tels them plainly, *that it was not they that sent him, but God.* As if he had said, You indeed sent me to be a poor Vassal in *Egypt*; but did not God send me to be a Ruler over *Egypt*? You sent me to destroy me, but why did God send me, but to preserve both you and me? You sent me out of Hatred and Malice; but did not God send me out of great Love and pitie both to me and you? And what could be spoken more emphatically to illustrate and demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin than this, *It was not you that sent me hither, but God?* Why doth he use this manner of speech? was it not they that sold him? Yes; but because they were but as mere passive Instruments or Midwives to bring forth that great predeterminative Decree, and to subserve Divine Providence in the ushering into *Egypt Joseph* their temporal Savior, and the Type of our Eternal Savior, therefore the entitative action is wholly taken off from them, (albeit the moral vitiositie of it is imputable to none but them) and ascribed unto God, as the principal Agent. This manner of speech is Hebraic, and must be understood, (1) *Ἐλλειπτικῶς*, *it was not you*, i. e. not only you: you were but the Instruments of Divine Gubernation and Predetermination. (2) *Ἐμφατικῶς*, *emphatically, it was not you*, i. e. if we consider the act of selling me in its natural entitative Idea, as the substrate mater of Divine Providence, ye had the least hand in it, *it was not you, but God that sent me hither.* We find the like Hebraisme, *1 Sam. 8. 7. Not thee but me*, i. e. principally and comparatively. So that it's most evident that

that Joseph ascribeth the whole Act considered *entitatively* and *naturally* unto Gods efficacious predeterminative and principal concurſe and conduct, whereof they were but the Instruments; albeit, if we consider the act *morally*, as to its obliquitie, ſo it was wholly theirs, not Gods: it is not his brethrens ſin morally conſidered, but the entitative act that he refers to God. [4] That this is the genuine mind of Josephs words is evident from other Scriptures. So Gen. 50. 20. *But as for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant it for good, &c.* Here we have their *moral evil* ſeparated from Gods *natural and moral good* in and by the Vendition of Joseph. Their Act proceeding from hatred, envy, and attended with Murder, was intrinſecally evil, and deſigned nothing but evil againſt Joseph: but the ſame Act conſidered phyſically and entitatively as proceeding from the efficacious predeterminative conduct of God, was *naturally good*; and as it tended to the deſigned exaltation of Joseph, and rendered him a temporal and typical Savior of *Iſrael*, ſo it was *morally good*. The aggravation of their Sin, and efficacy of Gods predeterminative Concurſe may be both greatly illuſtrated by an inſpection into the native import of the Hebraic חשב, uſed here to note their malitioſe plotted evil, and Gods plotted predeterminative concurſe in and about the ſame act. (1) He ſaith, *Ye thought evil against me, חשבתם*, ye plotted, contrived evil againſt me. חשב properly ſignifies to *excogitate, deliberate, conſult, compute, calculate, contrive, reaſon*. It is oft uſed to ſignifie plotted, machinated evil, as *Pſal. 10. 2.* The ſame word is uſed to note Gods determinate counſel and wil about the entitative act of their Sin; but God meant it unto Good, חשבה, i. e. from al Eternitie contrived and predetermined it for good. Their plotted contrived evil, was counter-plotted and contrived by God for good: Which notes that it was not a thing caſual or accidental, but fore-ordained and predetermined by God, according to the determinate counſel of his wil. The like may be deduced from Stephens words, *Act. 7. 9. And the Patriarchs moved with envy, ſold Joseph into Egypt; but God was with him.* Here we have their Moral evil aggravated from its original Spring, and Gods natural and moral good in the ſame Act. *How was God with him?* Not only in his *paſſive Vendition*, or paſſing into Egypt and continuance there, as ſome would perſwade us; but alſo in the very *Active Vendition*, or act of ſelling him to the *Iſhmaelites*, conſidered.

Non refert in Deum peccatum fratrum, ſed tranſitum ſuum in Aegyptum. *Erasm.*

Gen. 50. 20.

Act. 7. 9.

dered naturally and entitatively: for God was with *Joseph* in causing the *Ishmaelites* to pass by at that very time, in determining his brethrens wils to take him out of the pit and sell him to the *Ishmaelites*, and inclining or determining these to accept the bargain. In sum, *God was with Joseph* by an efficacious predeterminative conduct, determining every circumstance of this Vendition naturally considered.

*The Objections
against Joseph's
Vendition an-
swered.*

I am not ignorant what Responses or Answers are framed by the Jesuites, Arminians, and New Methodists against our Argument deduced from this Vendition of *Joseph*: *Molina*, (the Head of the Jesuites as to their Pelagian Dogmes) *de Concord. q. 19. Disp. 2.* tels us, that this Vendition of *Joseph* is ascribed to God, as merely permitting it. The like *Ruiz, de Volunt. disp. 18. Sect. 2.* and *Lessius, de Efficac. Grat. Sect. 2.* and others. *Arminius, de Efficac. Provid. Disput. 11, 12.* over and above this mere Permission of the Jesuites, addes Gods oblation, direction, and determination of Arguments and Occasions, yea some kind of concurse in this Vendition of *Joseph*, &c. But al these frivolous subterfuges to avoid the force of this Text are incomparably wel blowen off by *Rutherford, de Divina Provident. c. 16. p. 192, &c.* I shal therefore only give the solution of such as have been coined since by the New Methodists, which indeed are much the same with those of the Jesuites and Arminians. A Divine of name among us, gives this replie to our Argument, That the *Venditio activa*, the active Vendition of *Joseph* was not willed by God, but only *passiva*, the passive, or effect and consequents; which are only mentioned in the Text. I must confess this answer gives me some amazement, but no difficultie to answer it. For, (1) What this Reverend Author means by his *passive Vendition* I cannot divine: I know that in the Aristotelean Scholes Action and Passion have been really distinguished and so distributed into two distinct Predicaments; but I think this imaginary distinction is now generally his'd out of the Scholes by al awakened Disputants; yea, how many of those, who are zelose Sectators of *Aristotle* in other points, have subscribed the banishment of this distinction? So that to distinguish *active Vendition* from *passive*, what is it but to distinguish one and the same Act from it self? But (2) grant there be such a distinction in Nature, yet is it not most apparent, that it can have no place here? Doth not *Joseph* ascribe the very *active Vendition* or action of Selling him, unto God? Is it not said

said v. 8. *So now, it was not you that sent me hither, but God?* Can this, with any tolerable sense be applied to the *passive Vendition*, or the effects and consequents of the selling *Joseph*? Must it not necessarily be understood of the very same active Vendition, which, considered in its natural entitative act, they were the Instruments of, but God the principal Agent and Conductor?

(3) This Distinction of Active and Passive Vendition was not indeed forged by the Reverend Author before mentioned, but taken up from *Bellarmino*, who *de Amiff. Grat. l. 12. c. 11.* distinguisheth the *Action* of selling *Joseph* and crucifying Christ from the *Passion*, and grants, *that God willed and decreed the Passion, but not the Action, which inferred the Passion*; and because the said Author has so great an esteem for *Strangius*, whom he generally follows in this point, I shal give him the answer which *Strangius, l. 4. c. 11. p. 772.* gives to this distinction of *Bellarmino*, thus:

‘However it be, in the Text there are two things to be observed,
 ‘[1] That *Joseph* there cannot distinguish the Action from the
 ‘Passion, as if the *Passion* were to be ascribed to God, not the
 ‘Action: for it’s plainly said and repeted in the Text, according to
 ‘the Hebraic veritie, *Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. that God sent him.* [2] Thence
 ‘c. 50. 20. he doth plainly distinguish between the good work of
 ‘God and their evil in the same mater, from the diversitie of the
 ‘Intention: *You designed evil against me, but God designed that for*
 ‘good—— Then he addes: ‘Here the various operation and pro-
 ‘vident administration of God is seen, that he might bring to pass
 ‘what he had presignified before by the dreams of *Joseph*, &c.
 And p. 773. he subjoins: ‘There is no incommoditie if it be said,
 ‘that God elected and also procured the Vendition of *Joseph* as a
 ‘means to the end fore-ordained by him, and that may be un-
 ‘derstood not only of *passive* Vendition, but also of *active*, which
 ‘truely can never be separated. For if God willed that *Joseph*
 ‘be sold, he willed, that some one should sel him, and that no
 ‘other should sel him but his brethren. For neither was that Ven-
 ‘dition a thing in it self evil, if it be considered apart from the
 ‘vitiositie and defect of the second Causes. Then he concludes:
 ‘The Permission of God here was not otiose, but an efficacious
 ‘operation in the tradition of *Joseph*, subministration of occasi-
 ‘ons, out of the concurse which he made both by the direction
 ‘of al circumstances, and moderation of the wil of his brethren,
 ‘that their purpose of killing him being changed, they might

'do no other than what God intended. And the same efficacy
'and force of Divine providence shines brightly in working, dis-
'posing, and directing al other things that relate to this Historie.
This Answer of *Strangius* to *Bellarmino* I have been the more pro-
lix in reciting, (1) because the fore-mentioned Divine of so
much repute among us makes great use of this distinction touch-
ing *active and passive vendition* or *crucifixion*, endeavoring thereby
to solve al our Arguments from the vendition of *Joseph* and cruci-
fixion of Christ; whereas *Strangius*, one of his own partie, re-
jectes it as spurious and frivolous. (2) Because the concessions
of *Strangius* in this his Answer to *Bellarmino* do indeed give a
mortal wound to his own cause: For if the active vendition of
Joseph was from Gods efficacious providence and wil decreeing
the same, then actions intrinsically evil are as to their entitative
act or substrate mater naturally considered from God, albeit their
moral vitiositie is to be ascribed to no one but the sinner.

2. Arg. from
the Crucifixion
of Christ.

Mat. 26. 24.

2. I now passe on to demonstrate, That God doth predefine, or
foreordain and predetermine such natural actions whereunto sin
is necessarily annexed, from the *Crucifixion of Christ*. And the
Textes that confirme this part of our demonstration are so great
and illustrious, that I cannot but greatly wonder how any Chri-
stian, that assentes to the veracitie and authoritie of Scripture, can
evade the evidence thereof, or dissent from our Hypothesis. (1) I
shal take the Scriptures as they lie in order, and begin with *Mat.*
26. 24. The Son of man goeth, as it is written of him; but wo unto
that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed. [1] Note here that
Christs death was *infallibly predicted* or *foretold*: so much, *as it is*
written of him, necessarily infers. Now how could the death of
Christ be infallibly predicted, if it were not predefined and preor-
dained by God? Yea, if the death of Christ were not necessarily
predefined and preordained by God, how could God infallibly
foreknow the salvation of any one elect soul, which necessarily
dependes on the death of Christ? So that it remains most cer-
tain, that the death of Christ was predefined and foreordained by
God, and that in every the least circumstance thereof: the whole
series of intentions and actions in *Judas's* betraying his Lord, and
the Jews malitiose and bloody crucifying of him was predefined
and preordained by God. [2] Hence also it follows, that al the
bloody contrivements, barbarous and cruel executions, with al
the particular circumstances in the betraying and crucifying of
Christ

Christ were predetermined by God. Thus much reason strongly evinceth, and *Strangius* with others grant, that eternal predefinition or predestination, and predetermination in time are parallel and commensurate each to other : whatever is eternally predefined or preordained by God is predetermined by him in time. Indeed if we wil take the true Idea of Divine *Predetermination*, what is it but the eternal act of the Divine wil, whereby God predefined or preordained al persons, actions, and effects to existe in such or such a period of time ? So that, to speake truth, predefinition and predetermination differ not really and originally as to their active principie ; albeit we may, out of compliance with the Scholes, put this difference between them , by understanding *Predefinition*, *Preordination*, or *Predestination* of the eternal active Decree of God, and *Predetermination* of the execution of the Decree , or its *passive Attingence* in regard of the effect. But take predetermination in what sense you please , it must necessarily be applied to the Crucifixion of Christ and al the most minute circumstances thereof. And so much indeed is implied in those words, *The Son of man goeth, &c.* Where ? or to what ? Surely *to die*, and how ? without al peradventure, as efficaciously conducted, moved, yea predetermined by the Divine wil. There was not the least step he took to the Crosse , the least intention, action, or circumstance in the whole complexe or systeme of Christs Crucifixion, as wel active as passive , but was predetermined by God. But [3] note also hence , that this Crucifixion of Christ, although it were predefined and predetermined by God, yet this Divine predefinition and predetermination did not at al diminish the guilt of those bloody instruments , who had their hands embrued in that immaculate blood. This is particularly specified in those words : *but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed.* *Judas* neither did nor could justly plead Divine preordination or predetermination , as an excuse for his treachery. No, his own conscience told him , that he had voluntarily, yea malitiously betrayed innocent blood : neither could the Jews plead the same, in as much as their own malitiose and bloody wils were as deeply engaged in this Crucifixion, as if there had been no predetermination , which doth no way diminish the libertie of the wil. Hence, [4] it is most evident, that this Crucifixion of our Lord was *a sin intrinsically evil*. For was there not a world of enmitie and hatred of God in it ? Did there not

much blasphemie attend their wicked deeds? Is not the shedding innocent blood, yea the *blood of God*, as it is stiled, *Act. 20. 28.* a sin intrinsically evil? And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate, that the substrate mater of an act intrinsically evil is predefined and predetermined by God?

Luk. 22. 22.

(2) Another Text that evidently demonstrates the Crucifixion of Christ to be *predefined* and *predetermined* by God, is *Luke 22. 22.* *And truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined; but wo unto that man by whom he is betrayed.* This Text is the same, and refers to the same passage with that before of *Matthew*, yet with this difference; *Matthew* saith, *As it is written of him*; but *Luke*, *As it was determined*; which puts it out of all doubt, that *Christ's crucifixion* was *determined* or *predetermined* by God. And for the more full explication and demonstration hereof, we are to remark, that *Luke* being a Physician, was most intimately versed in the Greek Tongue: for a Physician in those days was of little repute, if not well acquainted with the Grecian Monuments relating to medicine. And thence we find, even by the confession of some Atheistic spirits, that *Luke's* Greek both in this his Evangel, as also in the Acts of the Apostles, is most pure, elegant, and significant. And among other this notion here used gives us a specimen of his accurate skill in the Greek. For *τὸ ἀποσφύρον* here is a philosophic notion, of much use among the Grecians to signify that which is *defined*, *determined*, *predetermined*, *predestinated*, *decreed*, *constituted*, and *ordained* by an *unalterable Decree*, as we have more copiously demonstrated from the genuine import of *οὐρίζων*, cap. I. §. 6. Of *determinative Concourse*. And that *τὸ ἀποσφύρον* here may be properly rendred *predetermined*, is evident from the use of *προορίζων*, *Act. 4. 28.* *To do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.* Where it is in the Greek *προορίσας*, *predetermined*. And indeed *Determination* and *Predetermination* as to the Divine concurrence admit not so much as any mental distinction, according to the confession of some Adversaries. The Syriac, *Luk. 22. 22.* renders it, *ראתפרש*, *it is defined*. *פרש* in the O. T. signifies *to expand*, *to make clear*, *to explicate more fully and clearly by the distribution of all parts*, &c. Whence it is rendred by the LXX. *Ezech. 37. 12* *חפרש*, *to separate*: and *Num. 15. 34.* *עצרו*, *to decree*: which sense agrees with the mind of our Lord, *Luk. 22. 22.* So that it is most evident, that this notion *τὸ ἀποσφύρον* here considered in itself, and in all its synonymies, notes the

Act. 4. 28.

Cruci-

Crucifixion of Christ in al its circumstances both active and passive, to be determined, predetermined, and foreordained by God. Yea, we have for this a great concession of *Strangius*, lib. 3. cap. 13. pag. 665. *But that the workes of Christ, specially his Passion and voluntary death were absolutely predetermined by God is manifest from Scripture, Luk. 22. 22. Act. 2. 23. & 4. 28.* Whence I argue, that if the death and crucifixion of Christ were absolutely predetermined by God, then the substrate mater of a sinful act, yea of an act intrinsically evil was absolutely predetermined by God. How poor and evanid the evasions of *Strangius* and others are as to this Text we shal examine and lay open when we have explicated the following Texts, which demonstrate the same.

(3) I passe on to the Conference between *Pilate* and our Lord, *Joh. 19. 10. Then saith Pilate unto him, Knowest thou not, that I have power to crucifie thee, and have power to release thee? Pilate having power of life and death committed to him by Tiberius Cesar, he threatens our Lord therewith: and what replie doth our Lord make? vers. 11. Jesus answered: Thou couldest have no power at al against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin.* We find several particulars here very remarquable for the demonstration of our Hypothesis. [1] Whereas *Pilate* boasted of his power to crucifie, or release our Lord, he tels him plainly, that he could have no power against him, except it were given him from above. The power that *Pilate* pretendes unto was legal Autoritie backed with an executive power committed to him: so much *ἐξουσία* notes: our Lord doth not denie his claim of legal Autoritie, as commissioned by *Cesar*; but yet confines and restrains the execution thereof to Gods predeterminative Concurse. As if our Lord had said: I grant thy power and autoritie of life and death as *Cesars* Commissioner and Minister; yet know, thou couldest not execute this thy power on me, unlesse the providential concurrence of my Father did efficaciously move and predetermine thee thereto. [2] Observe here the double negative, *οὐδὲν δύναμαι*, which among the Grecians implies a more vehement negation. As if he had said: Alas! thou hast not the least umbrage or shadow of power to execute against me, but what is dispensed forth unto thee by the efficacious predeterminative hand or providential concurse of my Father; whose wise and omnipotent hand has put in every bitter ingredient into the Cup I am to drink of. [3] Neither doth

Joh. 19. 10, 11.

al this excuse *Judas*, the *Jews*, or *Pilate* as to their guilt in crucifying the Lord of Glorie: no, Gods predeterminative concurse is so far from excusing these Traitors, as that it aggravates their sin. So it follows: *Therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin.* Therefore, *διὰ τούτο*, for this very reason, because my Father hath left that traiterous wretch *Judas* to be hurried, by his own avaricious lust, into this horrid Treason of betraying me, and predetermined thine execution thereof, his guilt is the greater. [4] Lastly, hence also we may argue, that this sin of crucifying our Lord was intrinsically evil. So much that last clause, *hath the greater sin*, implies. As if he had said: Oh! what a world of treason, murder, blasphemie, hatred of God and al manner of sin is involved in the wombe of this sin?

Act. 2. 23.

(4) We find the predefinition and predetermination of Christs crucifixion more expressely explicated and demonstrated, *Act. 2. 23.* *Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel, and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.* What could more plainly be said for the predefinition and predetermination of our Lords crucifixion, as to its substrate entitative act, and yet for the aggravation of their sin in acting their parts in this bloody Tragedie? Let us examine the particulars. [1] It's said, *he was delivered by the determinate counsel*, *τῇ ἀεισμελῇ βουλῇ*. The Greek *βουλῇ* primarily notes *counsel with a decree*, or a decreed fixed counsel, from *βολῇ* the cast of an arrow, or the like. Whence the formal act of the wil is termed *βέλησις*, which is but a derivation from *βουλῇ*. But *Luke*, to expresse *Peters* mind more significantly, addes, *τῇ ἀεισμελῇ*, by that determinate, defined, firme, immutable, decretive, predeterminative counsel of God, as the word importes, according to our former explication of it, on *Luk. 22. 22.* whereto this Text seems to answer. *Ὅειζεν* is by Glossaries made fynonymous to *τάττειν*, to ordain; *προτάττειν*, to preordain; *τιθεῖναι*, to constitute; *ισθῆναι*, to establish; *προορίζεν*, to predetermine. Among the LXX. it answers to *קָבַץ*, to termine, determine, predetermine, as *Num. 34. 6.* *Josh. 13. 27.* and elsewhere. By which it is most evident, that it is here by *Luke* used to denote Gods efficacious, absolute, predeterminative counsel and purpose touching the crucifixion of our Lord. [2] Then he addes: *καὶ προγινώσκῃ τὸ θεῷ*, and foreknowledge of God. Note here, that Gods foreknowledge or Pre-science of Christs crucifixion, and so by consequence of the sin annexed thereto, follows the predetermination or determined counsel of

of his own wil: God therefore foreknew, because in his determined counsel he foreordained or decreed the Passion of our Lord. And yet [3] this necessary predefinition and predetermination of Gods wil with his infallible prescience touching the crucifixion of Christ, did no way lessen their sin: for addes *Peter*, *Him ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.* Albeit he was predefined and predetermined by God to go (as himself declares, *Luk. 22. 22.*) to the Crosse, yet they, by their wicked bloody hands, took him as voluntarily, yea with as much bloud-thirsty greedinesse, as if there had been no predefinition and predetermination of the act by God. Lo! what a plain conciliation is here of efficacious predefinition and predeterminative concurse of the substrate mater of sin, with the voluntary and free election of the sinner as to his part in this bloody Tragedie. [4] Note that phrase, *διὰ χειρῶν ἀνθρώπων*, by wicked hands, i. e. sacrilegious, bloody, God-murdering hands. Which certainly denotes their sin to be of the first magnitude, and intrinsically evil. And that this Text fully demonstrates the predefinition of Christs Passion, *Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 3. pag. 563.* freely acknowlegeth. So *lib. 4. cap. 2. pag. 768.* he saith, *That it is not to be doubted, but that the whole humiliation and passion of Christ flowed from the decree and wil of God; and what God from Eternitie decreed, the same he executes and procures in time.* But what his replie is to the force of our argument from this absolute Decree of God we shal examine anon.

(5) I come now to that other parallel Text, which fully demonstrates the predefinition and predetermination of Christs crucifixion by God, *Act. 4. 28.* *For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.* He speaks of the gathering together both of Jews and Gentiles for the crucifying the Son of God, as *vers. 26, 27.* he saith, *They did nothing but what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done.* [1] By the counsel of God we may here understand his *Decretive counsel*, or the counsel and purpose of his wil, whereby he predefined and predetermined the crucifixion of our Lord. Thus some terme Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse, *quoad attingentiam activam*, as to active attingence, which is nothing else but the very wil of God, according to his eternal counsel predetermining and foreordaining all future events, as *Scotus* and others assure us. Thus *βουλὴ* must be understood, *Act. 2. 23.* as before. Whence [2] by the *Hand of God*,

God, we are to understand his *most efficacious* and *potent execution* of his decretive counsel, predetermining the whole substrate mater, or al entitative acts and circumstances in the crucifixion of our Lord, which they terme his predeterminative Concurse, *quoad attingentiam passivam*, as to *passive attingence*. For mans *hand* being the instrument of operation, whereby he puts forth his power and force, it is thence applied to God, to denote his most potent execution of his Decrees in predetermining and applying al second causes to their act, as before §. 1. of this Chapter. We find a very good glosse hereon in *Strangius*, lib. 4. cap. 2. pag. 769. 'In the other place, saith he, *Act. 4. 28.* there is mention made not only of the counsel of God, but also of the hand of God; that counsel may be referred to the Decree, and hand to the execution. To decree is presupposed the wise counsel of God, and to execute the power of the Divine right hand. And here truly what God hath decreed in his counsel, he also by his hand hath executed: For in this whole work the hand of God hath appeared, howbeit many wicked hands did concur. So the Hand of God here is opposed to wicked hands, *Act. 2. 23.* The hand, I say, of God appeared in moderating, ordaining, governing, and directing al the machinations, endeavors, sayings and deeds of his enemies, that they should wil and perfect that very same thing which he willed, though with a far different counsel and purpose, whatever their malice were. Lo! what a ful testimonie is here? who would not think *Strangius* orthodox in this point, did he acquiesce here? But there lies a Snake in the grasse: he elsewhere starts off from what he here grants, as hereafter. Only this note, that he here, as elsewhere, strongly impugnes and opposeth that *passive crucifixion* which *Bellarmino* and a reverend Divine of repute among us only ascribe to God: for he expressly saith, *That the very act of crucifixion was executed by the hand of God*; yea al the machinations, endeavors, sayings, and deeds of Christs enemies, moderated, ordained, governed, directed by the same Divine hand. What could be said more for the predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of an act intrinsically evil? But I passe on to the act of Divine predetermination expressed in the Text before us by *προβόλῃς*. What the genuine import of *προβόλῃς* is, we have shewen, *Chap. 1. §. 6.* In the general it signifies to predefine, predestine, predetermine: it's applied in the N. T. both to persons and things, and these both good and evil. It is here limited and confined

fin'd to Gods predefining, predestining, and predetermining the substrate mater or entitative act of Christs crucifixion, which was a sin of the first magnitude, containing in its pregnant wombe blasphemie, hatred of God, murther, yea God-killing bloud-guiltinesse. The Syriac turnes it by ܥܫܪ, to seal, constitute, and make firme any thing. And surely if the blessed God ever sealed, constituted, made firme, or predetermined any thing in the world, it was the crucifixion of his Son, on which the salvation of al his Elect dependes. *Augustin* renders *predestinavit* here *prædestinavit*, he has predestined. So the old Latin renders it, 1 Cor. 2. 7. And *Strangius*, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 582. is herein (as in some other points) very ingenuous and free in confessing, 'That *Augustin* doth use the words to predestine, predefine, determine, constitute, ordain, and dispose, indifferently, so as they may be extended to all things which God hath decreed. So that it's clear by his own confession, that the crucifixion of Christ taken actively was predestined, predefined, constituted, foreordained, and predetermined by God. Whence by a paritie of reason we demonitrate our Hypothesis, that the substrate mater or entitative act of that, whereunto intrinsecal sin is necessarily annexed, is predefined and predetermined by God. The inference and conclusion to me is so natural and evident, that I cannot see how the wit of man can evade it.

But let us examine what subterfuges and evasions our Opponents frame to evade the force and evidence this second Head touching Christs *Crucifixion* gives to our Hypothesis. Our Adversaries evasions examined.

1. *Bellarmino* and from him a reverend Divine of name among our selves replie, *That the passive crucifixion of Christ was from God, not the active: i.e. Christs Passion and the effects of it was from God, but not the actions of those that crucified him.* (1) How poor and shiftlesse this shift is we have already demonstrated on the vendition of *Joseph* from *Gen.* 45. 5, 7, 8. (2) But more particularly as to this Head, I cannot but wonder how any, who have not quite banished Reason and Religion from their minds, can satisfie themselves with such jejune notions and evasions: Did not the blessed God predefine and predetermine the very act of Christs crucifixion? how else could he certainly foreknow that he would be crucified? Or what certain prescience could he have of the salvation of any one elect soul, which wholly dependes on the death of Christ? Again, what fine-spun nonsense is this, God

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prede-

1. Evasion touching active and passive Crucifixion.

predetermined the *Passion* of Christs crucifixion, but not the *Action*? as if God predetermined that Christ should be kissed and so betrayed by *Judas*, but not that *Judas* should kisse and betray Christ: again, that Christ should be mocked, blasphemed, scourged, &c. by the Souldiers and Jews, but that these should not mock, blaspheme, scourge, &c. Christ. Lastly, that the Spear should be thrust into the side of Christ, but yet not that any thrust it in. What Logic, Reason, or sence is this? Do not the very Aristoteleans grant us, *That action and passion are not really, but only modally distinct*? As the way from *Athens* to *Thebes*, and so back again from *Thebes* to *Athens*, is but one and the same way, diversified only from its relation to different termes; so the same fluxe as it procedes from the Agent is called *Action*, and as it termines on the patient, *Passion*. Is it possible then that God should predetermine or concur to the *passion* and not to the action of crucifixion? But enough of this, which is so strongly refuted by *Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 11. pag. 772.*

2. *Evasion.*

2. Another reverend Divine of esteeme among us for parts and pietie evades thus: [Christs crucifixion] 'was a thing which
'Gods hand and counsel had determined before to be done, *Act.*
'4. 28. *i.e.* foreseeing wicked hands would be prompt and ready
'for this tragic enterprise, his sovereign power and wise counsel
'concurred with his foreknowledge, so only, and not with lesse
'latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that
'malignitie, than to let it procede to this execution. And to
'deliver him up (not by any formal resignation or surrender, as
'we wel know, but permitting him) thereunto. Though the
'same phrase of *delivering him*, hath elsewhere another notion of
'assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the sins of
'men, by dying; which was done by mutual agreement between
'both the parties, &c. This replie of this learned pious Divine (so
far as I can penetrate and understand it, which seems involved
under much obscuritie) may be resolved into the following parts.
(1) He makes Gods prescience or foreseeing the crucifixion of
Christ by wicked hands, to procede or go before the concurrence
and determination of Gods wise counsel or predefinition there-
of. Wherein he fals in with the Jesuites *middle Science*, making
Gods prescience precedent to his predefinition or decree, and so
dependent only on the mutable wil of men as to the act of sin;
which he elsewhere seems to intimate: whereas the Scripture,
which

which he refers to, *Act. 2. 23.* makes the foreknowledge of Christs crucifixion subsequent to the predefinition of his determinate Counsel or Decree. And certainly al the wit of man summed up in one cannot conceive or demonstrate, how God should have a certain prescience of Christs crucifixion, which dependes wholly on the contingent uncertain wil of man, and not on the determinate counsel of his own wil. (2) He makes Gods determinate counsel or hand *only to determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie, &c.* As if the bounding and limiting of the malignitie, and not the substrate mater or act itself entitatively considered were from God. Whereas the Text saith categorically, *That the hand and counsel of God predefined and predetermined whatever those wicked hands of theirs executed.* (3) He gives us a new Glosse or Paraphrase on that phrase *delivering him, Act. 2. 23.* as if it implied only an *assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation, &c.* But how little this glosse wil accord with the sence of these Texts is evident. For that assigning and appointing him to be a propitiation was immanent and eternal in the Divine Decrees, but the *delivering him* here is meant of his being delivered into the hands of those that crucified him, and that according to the determinate counsel of God.

3. We come now to the more plausible subterfuges of *Strangius*, whereby he endeavors to evade the evidence of those Texts, which mention Gods predetermining the crucifixion of our Lord. *Strangius's Evasions.* He answers, *lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 573.* thus: 'The occision and crucifixion of Christ, also the kind of death were from God: and 'as they were from God, they were good and greatly gloriose, 'and properly the means to procure our salvation: and God is 'deservedly judged the Cause and Author of them, *Who by his 'determinate counsel and precognition delivered his Son to them, whom 'with wicked hands they killed on the crosse, Act. 2. 23.* Here truly 'in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from 'their evil action: therefore their wickednesse and malice was 'not from God; neither was it willed or predefined by God, who 'cannot be said to be the Cause and Author of any sin. There- 'fore speaking absolutely, the occision of Christ was not sin; (o- 'therwise God should be the Author of sin:) as to kil a man is 'not sin. And truly if God had commanded men to kil Christ, and 'they out of conscience to that command had obeyed God, they 'had not sinned. But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is

'intrinsically evil, neither can that be any way wel done, or commanded by God.

Answer.

Observe here (1) he grants that the crucifixion of Christ, with al its natural circumstances entitatively considered were from God, as the God of nature, and so naturally good: yea, that they were morally good and greatly gloriose as means to procure our salvation; and therefore *God is deservedly judged the cause and author of them*, as *Act. 2. 23.* And (2) we denie with him, that the wickednesse and malice of those acts was from God. (3) He also grants, *That the occision or killing of Christ considered absolutely was not sin.* Whereunto we retort, That neither the hatred of Christ considered absolutely without relation to its object is sin. But, (4) he concludes: *But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsically evil, &c.* Whence we argue, That the crucifying of Christ was a sin intrinsically evil, and yet as to its substrate mater and entitative acts from God. For did not the Jews prosecute Christ out of hatred and malice, yea malice blowen up to the sin against the Holy Ghost in some of them? And was not, in this good work of crucifixion, the good action of God, and the evil action of the Jews the same as to the substrate mater or natural entitative act? This pincheth *Strangius* closely, and therefore he seems to make the natural entitative act of God distinct from the natural entitative act of the wicked Jews: For he saith, *Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action; and therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God.* Here we grant, [1] his consequence or conclusion, *That their malice was not from God.* [2] We thus far also grant his Antecedent, That the good action of God, considered both naturally and morally, was distinguished from their evil action considered *formally* and *morally*: for the malice and vitiositie which formalised the action as theirs, is no way imputable to Gods act considered either naturally or morally. [3] But yet we stil avouch, and no way dout but to demonstrate in its place, that in the crucifixion of Christ the act of the wicked Jews considered *materially*, *naturally*, and *entitatively* was one and the same with Gods act: So much al these Texts clearly evince; so much also reason dictates: For if there were two acts, the one primarily, yea only from the wicked instruments, the other from God the prime Efficient, then how could they be said to be the instruments of Gods Efficiency? Must we not then also suppose
two

two Crucifixions, one from God, and the other from the Jews? What a world of absurdities would follow this Hypothesis, That the action of God in the Crucifixion of Christ considered *entitatively, materially, and naturally*, was really distinct from the action of the Instruments considered *entitatively, materially, and naturally*? But to conclude, we find an excellent solution to all these evasions and subterfuges in *Augustin*, Epist. 48. *ad Vincetium*, thus: *When the Father delivered his Son, and Christ his own Bodie, and Judas his Lord, why in this Tradition is God just and man guilty, but because in one and the same thing which they did, the cause was not one and the same.* A solution sufficient to satisfy any sober mind: Wherein note, (1) That the act of Tradition and so of crucifying Christ, was one and the same *entitatively* and *physically* considered both in regard of God and the sinner. (2) That the difference sprang from the Causes: God delivered his Son to Death, thereby to bring about the greatest good that Sinners could wish for, their Salvation; but *Judas* and the malicious Jews delivered the Lord of Glorie to death, with *wicked hands*, out of an avaricious humor, malice, &c. Hence, (3) The Action was most just and glorious on Gods part, but most unjust and wicked on the Sinners part. This answer of *Augustin* is so great, that it might serve to answer all the objections against our Hypothesis, were not men bent to cavil against the truth.

Quum Pater tradiderit Filium, & Christus Corpus suum, & Judas Dominum, cur in hac traditione Deus est justus & homo reus, nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt, causa non est una ob quam fecerunt. *August. Epist. 48. ad Vincetium.*

§. 3. I come now to a third Head of Scriptural Arguments, namely such, wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing or afflicting his people in such a way, wherein the Instruments could not but contract guilt. I shall divide this Head into two members; (1) Such Scriptures, wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing his sinful people. (2) Such as mention Gods afflicting his righteous People by sinful Instruments.

1. We shall begin with such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his sinful people. So *Esa. 10. 5, 6.* *O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, I will send him against an hypocritical Nation.* The Assyrian is sent by God as his rod to punish his sinful people; and every stroke of this rod was from God; his hand guiding, ordering, and actuating the rod in all its motions. And yet, how much sin was there committed on the Assyrians part in punishing *Israel*? How little did he intend

1. Gods punishing his sinful People by wicked Instruments. *Esa. 10. 5, 6, 7.*

tend to serve God herein? were not Pride and Ambition the main springs of his action? Thence it's added *v. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so, &c.* whence *v. 12.* God threatens to punish him for his sin. So that it's evident, this sending of the *Assyrian* by God, mentioned *v. 6.* cannot be meant of any legal permission or commission given him by God, but of the secret efficacious predeterminative concurse and Providence of God, ordering what should come to pass. So *Jer. 16. 16. Behold, I wil send for many fishers, saith the Lord, and they shal fish them, and after wil I send for many hunters, and they shal hunt them from every mountaine, &c.* Note, (1) That these words contain not a promise but threat, begun *v. 9.* This is evident from *v. 17.* (2) By *Fishers* and *Hunters* in the general we must understand enemies to the Jews. *To fish and to hunt*, is to take and destroy. War has a great resemblance with fishing and hunting, which is a kind of war against bestes; as war is a kind of fishing and hunting of men: whence *Nimrod* the first Warriour after the Flood, is stiled *Gen. 10. 9. a mighty hunter*, i. e. of men. Ay, but more particularly, (3) Who are these *fishers*? Why, as it is supposed, the *Egyptians*, who are called *Fishers*, *Esa. 19. 8.* (4) And who are the *Hunters*? The *Babylonians*, as it is generally said: But, (5) Who is it that sends for these Fishers and Hunters? It is God, *I wil send, &c.* (6) Why doth God send for them? To punish his sinful People, and that by those very Nations in whom they had so much confided, and to whom they had so much conformed, as is intimated *v. 17.* And what more just, than that Professors should be punished by such Instruments, as have been the ground of their confidence, and the exemplars of their sins? (7) How doth God send for these Fishers and Hunters? Surely, not by any legal Act or formal Commission given to them, but *providentially*, by exciting their minds, applying their wils, and drawing forth, yea determining the same to the substrate mater or material entitative act of afflicting the Jews, whereunto there was much malice, murder, and hatred of God and his People annexed. Yea, God did not only send *Nebuchadnezar* to afflict *Israel*, but also give him a reward for his service; as *Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon, my servant.* God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his service against *Israel*. The like *Jer. 43. 10.* Multitudes of Texts might be added

added to shew, how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people, and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally considered, and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin.

2. To mention one or two Scriptures, which speak of Gods *using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People.* So Job 1. God makes use of the *Sabeans*, and *Caldeans*, yea of Satan himself, to afflict Job; and yet he saith, v. 21. *The Lord taketh away.* He saw by faith Gods hand moving, yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs *materially considered*, albeit not to the vitiositie. So Psal. 105. 25. *He turned their heart to hate his people, to deal subtilely with his servants.* Here it's said expressly, *that God turned*, i. e. efficaciously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People *Israel*. God's *turning their hearts* doth expressly and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurrence to the entitative material natural act of hatred, albeit not to the vitiositie and malignitie thereof. So much also the next clause importes, *and to deal subtilely with his servants*, i. e. al their subtile stratagemes, machinations, and politic contrivements for the extirpation of *Israel*, by putting to death their Males, oppressing them with hard labors, &c. al these were, as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God, who turned their hearts thereto: And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurrence to the substrate mater of sin?

2. *Gods afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Instruments.*

Job 1. 21.

Psal. 105. 25.

Let us now see what our Opponents replie to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawn thence. *Strangius*, l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus: *What is said Psal. 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people, it must be understood, that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians, but by doing good to his people, whence the Egyptians took occasion of hatred.* (1) We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians; that's the commun odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us. But, (2) We avouch, that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating, by his doing good to his people. Is not this a strange Comment, *God turned their heart to hate his people*, i. e. gave occasion of hatred, by doing good unto his people? Doth not Gods turning the heart

heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his efficacious pre-determinative concurse in applying the wil to its act? When it's said, *Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he wil*, is it not meant of an efficacious concurse? Do not also the following words, *Psal. 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants*, clearly impie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts, predetermining them to their act? Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts. As for the other Texts, *Strangius's* general answer p. 774, 775. is, *That God is the Cause of the act in those sins, but not of the pravitie of the Instruments, &c.* And what do we say or desire more? But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his: for he addes, p. 774. *That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure, but what he approves as Good.* i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin, because he doth not approve of it. Wherein note, [1] How he doth, with the Pelagians and Arminians, confound Gods *Decretive Wil*, with his *Approbative complacential Wil*. [2] We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts; but the Question is touching objects, *Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit?* This we peremptorily denie, and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place.

4. Gods immediate hand in the Acts of sin. §. 4. Another Head of Arguments, contains such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent. We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan, that for his folie committed with Uriah's wife, and murder, *Behold, I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house, and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour, &c.* This threat we find fulfilled, 2 Sam. 16. 22. *And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel.* What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of Absalom's Sin? Here *Strangius*, l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth, (1) *That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact.* But, (2) then he answers, *that this was acknowledged for the reason above-mentioned, namely, by reason of Gods efficacious Gubernation, Moderation, and Direction, which he afforded, according to the modes already explicated, about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel, and their actions in this wickedness; which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20, &c. For this is usual, that the effect,*
which

which ariseth from two causes, whereof the one is effective, and the other directive, be ascribed to both, but in a different respect, &c. This is the commun answer, which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures, which speake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of sin; let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer.

(1) Take notice, that he allows Gods *Gubernation*, *Moderation* and *Direction* of the Act whereto sin is annexed, but not the *production* of the act. This is evident by the Conclusion, wherein he makes the Sinner to be the *effective* cause, but God the *directive* only. But I reple, how can God *efficaciously Govern*, *Moderate*, and *Direct* the Act, unless he be also the effective Cause thereof? Take his own instance, the sinful wils of *Absalom* and *Achitophel*, how is it possible, that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wils, but by influencing their wils, and efficaciously predetermining them to act? If God did, as he grants, *efficaciously govern*, *moderate*, and *direct* their sinful wils in those immanent acts of Lust, certainly he must necessarily produce those acts. (2) Neither wil this answer at al solve the Difficultie: for suppose we grant, that God doth only efficaciously govern, moderate, and direct the sinful act, not produce the entitative mater thereof, yet this *efficacious directive* influence doth as much make God the Author of sin, as our *effective predeterminative* concurse. For Gods efficacious Moderation and Direction of the sinful act, denotes his efficacious Preservation of the act, which is as sinful as the effectio or production of the Act. But more of this hereafter, Chap. 5, 6.

Another Scripture which speaks Gods immediate predeterminative concurse in the entitative act of Sin, is 2 Sam. 16. 10. where David saith of Shimei, That the Lord said unto him, Curse David. And v. 11. Let him curse; for the Lord hath bidden him. Now the force of this argument dependes on the explication of this word or command of God to Shimei, which must be here taken either *morally*, for a divine precept and injunction, or *physically* for an efficacious Concurse and influence. (1) That it cannot be here taken *morally* for a preceptive word, is most evident; because had God commanded Shimei to curse David, he had been the moral cause and so the Author of his sin. (2) Therefore it remains, that it be here taken only *physically*, for Gods efficacious Concurse secretly and powerfully inclining and applying

Shimei's cursing
David, how
from God.
2 Sam. 16. 10,
11.

ing *Shimei's* wil to the entitative act of this curſing. And in this ſenſe the *Word* of God is frequently taken in Scripture, namely, for his efficacious predeterminative concurſe, in the Creation, Conſervation, and Gubernation of things.

Now what doth *Strangius* reſplice to this? Why, *l. 4. c. 4. p. 786.* he ſaith, *That Shimei's Curſings being intrinſecally evil, we may not ſay, that God did move or impel him thereto in a proper manner of ſpeech, neither that Shimei was the Inſtrument of God in theſe actions, as they were determined to ſuch an object; but only as directed by God to his juſt judgements: and that moſt certain direction of God, with the adminiſtration of Circumſtances and Occaſions was as a Precept.* In which Reſponſe note, (1) That he grants, *that Shimei his curſing was an action intrinſecally evil:* which is a great conceſſion, and wil clearly overthrow his own Hypotheſis, and prove ours, *That God doth predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of actions intrinſecally evil.* For if *Shimei's* Curſing was an action intrinſecally evil, then ſurely ſuch alſo was the Vendition of *Joſeph* and the Crucifixion of our Lord, which were both as to their entitative acts predetermined by God. But (2) he denies, *that Shimei was the Inſtrument of God in theſe actions, as determined to ſuch an object.* In the laſt claule of this Antitheſis lies the ſpirit and force of al his objections againſt predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin; which we intend more fully to examine *Chap. 6. §. 1.* at preſent, we ſay, [1] That *Shimei* was not the inſtrument of any *moral* but *phyſic* influence from God: the *precept* or *bidding* here ſpecified was not *moral* but *phyſic* and *real*: God did not *morally* command *Shimei* to curſe *David*, but *phyſically* and *naturally* incline him to the entitative act of Curſing him; which was as a Precept: this *Strangius* grants in the cloſe as to Gods direction. [2] Hence if we conſider *Shimei's* curſing as *phyſically* determined to ſuch an object, it was not *morally* evil but good, and ſo from God: It's true, as it was *morally* determined by *Shimei* the moral Agent to its object *David*, ſo it was intrinſecally evil, but as it was *phyſically* or *naturally* determined by God, for the puniſhment of *David*, ſo it was both *naturally* and *morally* good and from God. (3) He placeth the whole of Gods Influence to this act, *in directing his Actions to his juſt judgements, &c.* To which I anſwer. [1] How could God direct theſe actions of *Shimei*; ſpecially, the immanent acts of his wil, (which were the worſt part of his malediction) but by an efficacious

acious predeterminative influence on his wil and its acts?

[2] He grants, *that this Direction of God was moſt certain and efficacious*: if ſo, then certainly predeterminative: and if the direction be predeterminative, is not Gods concurſe to the ſinful act conſidered materially and entitatively, predeterminative?

[3] If Gods directive concurſe be predeterminative, as *Strangius* muſt by his conceſſions grant, wil not thoſe ugly conſequences which he lodes our Hypotheſis with, be al retorted on him? Did not Gods efficacious direction termine on *Shimei's* curſing as determined to ſuch an object, namely *David*? And was he not the Inſtrument of this efficacious direction?

Baronius, *Metaph. S. 8. Diſp. 3. p. 158.* answers this Text thus: *To that malediction of Shimei it is answered, That God commanded Shimei to curſe David, not by bending his wil, but by opening to him the way to this evil, and by ſhutting it to al other evils, i. e. by permitting him to act this only, whenas he was ready for many other evils.* A poor evaſion indeed, and ſuch as if admitted would make the whole Scripture but as a Noſe of Wax. (1) Doth not *David* ſay categoricly, *that God bid*, [i. e. not morally but phyſicly] *Shimei to curſe*? And what can this implice, but the bending his wil to the ſubſtrate mater, or entitative Act? (2) Can it be imagined, that *David* could mean only a mere otioſe and ſpeculative permiſſion, and not an active concurrence to the act it ſelf entitatively conſidered? (3) Doth not *Baronius* confeſs, *that God opened to him the way to this evil*? And if ſo, muſt he not then open *Shimei's* heart to the mater of it? Did not the main act of malediction ariſe from his wil? And if that were not opened to the entitative act, would the way to this evil have been ever opened?

Again, Gods immediate predeterminative hand in thoſe acts, whereunto ſin is neceſſarily appendent, may be demonſtrated from *2 Sam. 24. 1.* *And again the anger of the Lord was kindled 2 Sam. 24. 1. againſt Iſrael, and he moved David againſt them, to ſay, Go number Iſrael and Judah.* Here it is expreſſely ſaid, *that God moved David to number the people.* ויסת, *and he moved or excited, i. e. efficaciously determined and applied his wil to the ſubſtrate mater of this command to number the people.* Hence *Strangius*, pag. 790. answers, (1) *That the He here muſt be meant of Satan, who is ſaid, 1 Chron. 21. 1. to ſtir up David to number the people.* And he cites for this Comment *Junius* with others. But alas! what poor

1 Sam. 26. 19.

subterfuges wil men flie unto to avoid the force and evidence of Divine light? Doth not Grammatic construction, as wel as the mind of the words utterly reject such a glosse? The Particle *He* here is not a distinct Pronoun, as our English Version reads it, but included in the Verbe *וַיִּחַר* which is by the Copulative *ו* joined to the former part, and *the anger of the Lord was kindled*: so that if the passive, *was kindled*, belongs to the Lords anger, then also must what follows, *and he moved*. Neither is this sense aliene from other Scriptures: for 1 Sam. 26. 19. *David saith, That God had stirred up Saul against him, i. e. efficaciously moved him to the entitative act of persecuting David*. Thence (2) *Strangius* fearing the ruinous downfal of this refuge flies to another, thus: *But if we follow the commun interpretation, it appears, that the same fact is ascribed to God and Satan; and therefore it must be on a different account: and here also the varietie in the end and mode makes the unspotted Justice of God to shine forth, and the malice of Satan and pravitie of man to discover itself. For [1] the action of numbering the people was not in itself evil. [2] Divines distinguish between tentation of probation and seduction. [3] Here the same things concur, which were before explicated of the same sense, whereby God is said to incline to evil, namely the permission and laxation of the reins to Satan, the oblation of occasions and irritaments, impediments being removed, and the suspension of Divine Grace: which things concurring with the pravitie of nature, sin necessarily follows.*

(1) We grant, that the same fact is ascribed to God and Satan on different accounts: God put the thought entitatively considered into *David's* heart, but Satan stirred up his heart to the act of numbering the people; God in judgement gave over *David* to this sin, that it should be at this time when God was angry with *Israel*: There is a special providence of God even in the ebullitions of lusts in the hearts of his own people. Thus also in the wicked; who put that thought of murder considered materially into the heart of *Esau*, *When my father is dead I wil slay my brother Jacob*? Was it not from God? Whence came that motion into the heart of *Judas* to betray Christ, with al the circumstances materially considered referring thereto? were they not from God? Thus here, God put the entitative thought of numbering the people into the heart of *David*, albeit Satan stirred it up; and God was the Orderer, albeit Satan the Abettor and in some sense the Author of it: for God is only the prime physic cause of the natural entitie,

entitie, but Satan the moral cause or Author of the vitiositie: again, the concurse of God to the natural entitative act is immediate, efficacious, and predeterminative, but Satans concurse only mediate, objective, and suasive, though with more or lesse degrees of moral efficacitie, as *Eph. 2. 2.* Again, (2) we grant, that the different ends and modes of operating make Gods unspotted Justice and mans pravitie to shine forth. (3) We are glad, that *Strangius* wil grant, the action of numbering the people not to be in itself evil. Whence, by a paritie of reason, we argue, That no action, though never so intrinsically evil, is in itself, i.e. as considered in its phylic entitative act, and according to its substrate mater, sinful: for certainly if *Dauids* numbering the people, which was a sin attended with so much pride, vain glorie, and confidence in an arme of flesh, with other aggravations, which so greatly provoked God, were not in itself evil, no other sin considered in its mere entitative and phylic act is such. Yea, I as yet see no reason why this sin of *David* considered in its individual circumstances and moral relation to its object and principles, may not be esteemed a sin intrinsically evil, as wel as *Shimei's* cursing *David*. But (4) *Strangius's* summary conclusion, That Gods concurse to *Dauids* sin was only an idle permission, laxation of the reins to Satan, and oblation of occasions, with suspension of Divine Grace, is very contradictory both to the letter and mind of the Text, which saith positively, that God moved, or excited, and stirred up the mind of *David*, not morally, but physically, to the entitative act of numbering the people. Certainly, when the Scripture speakes so categorically and positively of Gods moving the wil to its act, to restrain such moving influences and causalitie, only to mere idle permission, or objective oblation of occasions, or negative suspensions of Divine Grace, what is this but to make the Scripture contradictory to itself, or affirmation and negation applicable to the same words? How easily might an Atheist hence take advantage to elude al Scripture!

But to passe on to other Texts, that clearly expresse Gods immediate predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts. *1 Kings 11. 31.* the Lord saith, *I wil rend the kingdome out of the hand of Solomon.* So *vers. 37.* to *Jeroboam*, *I wil take thee and thou shalt reigne, &c.* Whence *1 Kings 12. 15.* it's said, that the cause why *Rehoboam* hearkened not unto the people, was from the Lord, that he might performe his saying, &c. So *vers. 24.* God

*1 King. 11. 31,
37. & 12. 15,*

24.

God saith expressely, *The thing [i. e. the revolt of Israel] is from me.* So of *Jehu*, God saith, 2 Kings 9. 3. *I have anointed thee King:* and chap. 10. 30. *Jehu is said to do unto the house of Ahab al that was in Gods heart.* From these Texts it's most evident, that the holy God assumes to himself the production of such entitative natural acts, which had sin necessarily appendent to them.

Now let us examine what response *Strangius* gives hereto: l. 4. c. 4. p. 793. rejecting the answer of *Bellarmino*, (which to me is as good as his, yea not really different) he answers, *It is not unlikely but that Jeroboam and Jesu, albeit in taking the Kingdome they sinned not as to the thing itself and substance of the act, because instructed by Gods command, yet in manner of acting, as they were profane men, they variously sinned by mingling their own ambition and depraved affections with the worke of God.* Thence he concludes, *That whatever their sins were, yet the justice of God sufficiently shines forth in the whole of this Administration, because God used both the Kings and people in this worke only as instruments to execute his just judgments, &c.*

Answer.

To give a brief replie hereto, it is very evident, that al that *Strangius* hath given us in answer to these Texts, doth but more confirme us in the true sense we give of them. For (1) it is manifest, that *Jeroboam* and *Jehu*, with the Revolters their Adherents, sinned not only in the *mode* or manner, but in the very *substance* of their acts: For is not High treason against a lawful King an act sinful as to its substance? And were not *Rehoboam* and *Ahab* both lawful Kings? Was not *Rehoboam* *Solomons* Son, whom God made King? It's true, *Jeroboam* and *Jehu* had private prophetic Instructions and Unctions, but yet those gave them no real title before the people, but only secret intimations what God would in his providence bring to passe. *David* had a promise of the Kingdom and also Divine Unction; and yet he confesseth, that God gave him no actual title to the Kingdom in the eyes of men; but he stil ownes *Saul* as his Soverain King, and the Lords Anointed: and so ought *Jeroboam* and *Jehu* their lawful Soverains, til God had given them a legal title before men. (2) But suppose *Jeroboam* and *Jehu's* sin were only in the *manner*, not in the *substance* of the act, yet certain it is, that the peoples sin, before God had declared his soverain wil to them, was high Treason, and so substantially evil. (3) Yea further, grant that they al sinned but in the *mode*, not in the *substance* of their acts, yet whether the act
be

be substantially or modally only sinful, it comes al to one in this case of Divine concurse and predetermination: For if God concur to the substrate mater of acts modally sinful, why may he not as wel concur to the substrate mater of acts substantially sinful? Do not our Adversaries hereby, according to their Principes, make God the Author of *modal* sins? Or, is not the entitative act of *modal* and *substantial* sins the same as to kind, namely a real physic or natural good? and therefore if God concur to the one, why not also to the other? Assuredly, the most refined Wits wil never find out a sufficient disparitie between acts *modally* and *substantially* sinful, so as to allow God an efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of the one, but not of the other. (4) *Strangius* grants in the close, *That God used both these Kings and their mutinous Adherents as instruments in this worke, to execute his just judgements, &c.* Did he so indeed? Did he not then also make use of their politic contrivements, ambitiose wils, and rebellious affections as instruments in this worke? And if so, did not God also move, excite, applie, yea predetermine their wils to the substrate mater of their traitorous rebellious designes and exploits? Do not al these consequences hang together in an indissoluble chain of invict Reason? To close up these arguments with that of *Calvin, Institut. lib. 1. cap. 18. §. 4. pag. 78.* ‘But now how it may be from God, and governed by his secret providence, which men wickedly undertake, we have an illustrious document in the Election of King *Jeroboam*; in which the madnesse and temeritie of the people is severely condemned, because they perverted the order established by God, and perfidiously departed from the familie of *David*: and yet we know, that God would have him anointed; whence in the words of *Hosea, c. 8. 4.* there appears a kind of repugnance; because God there complains, *That that Kingdome was erected contrary to his wil and knowlege; and yet c. 13. 11.* he declares, *That he gave Jeroboam to be King in his wrath.* How can these things agree? Thence he concludes, *We see therefore that God, who nilled the perfidie or treacherie, yet, for another end, justly willed the defection.* And if God justly willed the defection, he also justly moved and predetermined them to the substrate mater thereof; for predetermination answers adequately to God predefinition or absolute volition, as *Strangius* grants.

We adde to the fore-cited Texts, *1 King. 22. 23. Now there-fore* *1 Kings 22. 23.*

fore behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of al these thy Prophets, and the Lord hath spoken evil concerning thee. (1) The Lord hath put, *נָתַן*, hath given forth, delivered, or put. LXX. *ἔδωκε*, hath given. It notes here an efficacious enthusiastic infusion, which of al kinds of predetermination is most prevalent and irresistible. (2) Note also the sin, it is a lying spirit, which certainly denotes an act intrinsically evil: For is it not a sin of the first magnitude to forge lying Prophecies, and impose them on men as the Oracles of God, thereby to delude their souls into Hel? Such was the case here: and yet, lo! it's said, that this very sin was, as to its substrate mater or entitative act, from God: can any thing be spoken more nakedly and clearly to evince and demonstrate the truth of our Hypothesis?

What doth *Strangius* replie to this? His answer we find, *lib. 4. cap. 4. pag. 788.* We must note, that this oration from the Prophet Micaiah is parabolic, in which various things are spoken *ἀνθεκνωταῶς*, to our capacitie; and in a Parable althings are not to be cut open to the quick, but that only must be regarded, which belongs to the scope of the Parable— But in that God said, *vers. 22.* Go forth and do so, it must be understood of Divine permission: for we use the Imperative Mode not only in commanding, but also in permitting, or giving licence. And albeit there be mention made of a Divine precept, yet that is not otherwise to be taken, than for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his just judgement, that God delivered Ahab and his false Prophets left by God to be deceived by Satan: of which Tradition afterward.

In answer hereto, (1) what *Strangius* means by his parabolic Oration is not easie to divine. For we know, that al Parables consist of two parts, the Proposition and Reddition or moral: and what is there to be found of these in this Text or Contexture? But this seems most like to *Strangius's* design, to bring this Text to a parabolic image, thereby to elude its argumentative force: for Divines grant, That parabolic or symbolic Theologie is not argumentative, further than the scope and mind of the Symbol reacheth. That here is something spoken *ἀνθεκνωταῶς*, or according to human capacitie I easily grant, but this doth not at al invalidate the argument, but rather confirme it. The wise God speaks according to the manner of men, *inquiring, examining, and expecting* what the issue would be, thereby the more fully to demonstrate his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater

of

of this sinful act. (2) As for the command of God, *vers. 22. Go forth and do so*, it can in no sober sense be understood of a mere permission. For al permission is either *moral* or *physic* and *natural*: it cannot be meant of a moral permission, which *Strangius* seems to incline unto: for if God had given the lying spirit a licence, or legal permission to deceive, how could he be vindicated from being the Author of the sin? Is not lying a sin intrinsically evil? Should not the holy God then, according to this sense, be the Author of a sin intrinsically evil? Neither can it be meant of a mere speculative physic permission, as to the substrate mater: for it's expressed in a terme of the most active import, *the Lord hath put*, *נתן*. This Divine precept therefore must denote an efficacious real influence, such as predetermined those lying spirits to the substrate mater of their sin. Yea, (3) is there not so much included in the last clause of *Strangius's* replic, wherein he grants, *This Divine precept to be taken for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his just judgement?* Now what is Gods efficacious direction, but a part of his efficacious predeterminative concurse? And how could God efficaciously direct these lying spirits in *Ahabs* false Prophets, but by a predeterminative influence applying their minds and wils to the substrate mater of their false prophetic inspirations?

I shal conclude this Head with *Rev. 17. 17.* where speaking of *Rev. 17. 17.* the *ten Hornes*, which gave their power to the Beste, he saith, *God hath put into their hearts to fulfil his wil, and to agree and give their kingdom unto the Beste.* That phrase *ὁ Θεὸς ἔδωκεν εἰς τὰς καρδίας*, is very emphatic, and notes not the infusion of any vitiositie, but the efficacious predetermining their wils to the substrate mater or entitative act, and permission of the vitiositie. *ἔδωκεν* here exactly answers to *נתן*, *1 Kings 22. 23.* which the LXX. render *ἔδωκε*, and here signifies, *to cause the mater effectually to be brought about*, as the same word signifies, *Mat. 12. 39. & 16. 4. & 24. 24. Mar. 13. 22. Act. 2. 19. & 14. 3. Rom. 15. 5. Rev. 3. 4.* and elsewhere. Whence it follows: *ποιῆσαι ἢ γνώμῳ αὐτοῦ*, *to fulfil his wil.* *Ποῆσαι* here signifies, *powerfully to effect, or to performe with singular efficace*, in which sense it is used also *Mat. 7. 22. & 13. 58. or to effect with labor and industrie*, as it's used, *Act. 9. 39. & 19. 24. Heb. 8. 5. γνώμῳ* signifies properly *a decree, sentence, or confirmed purpose*; so here. So that the mind of this Text seems this: The blessed God passed an absolute irreversibile decree or

purpose, that the Adherents of Antichrist should give up their Power and Kingdome to him; and thence he, by an efficacious concurse, predetermined their wils to the substrate mater of those acts, whereunto sin was annexed, for the glorifying of his Justice, on Antichrist, and his power and mercie towards his afflicted Churches.

Now let us examine the subterfuges men shelter themselves under, to avoid the force of this Text. A reverend Divine of name among us replies thus: '(1) He that readeth Dr. Hammonds Exposition applying this to *Alaricus* sacking *Rome*, with the effects, will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark, as not fit to found such a Doctrine on. (2) It was the effect of sin that God willed, and not the sin. (3) He is not said to put the sin into their hearts,— but only to do his pleasure, and agree to give up, &c. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, which with their own sins, would have that effect, which he willed: if a thief have a wil to rob, God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way, where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way. Thus that reverend Divine.

In answer hereto we say, That whatever mens Comments may be, yet certainly the subject is not so dark, but carries evidence enough with it, that it can be meant of no other than of the ten hornes, which give up their Kingdome to the Antichristian Beste. (2) Whereas he saith, *It was the effect of their sin that God willed, and not the sin*, this seems contradictory to the very letter as wel as to the mind of the words: for it's said, [1] *God hath put it into their hearts, i.e.* not only the effect, but the very material entitative act. Then [2] *to fulfil his wil, i.e. his decree*, so *γρῶν* here must note. Now God decreed the very act, and not only the effect; and therefore his predetermining concurse must also reach the very act: according to that great theologic Axiome allowed by *Strangius* and others, *That predetermination necessarily follows predefinition, or Gods absolute Decree*. Yea [3] it's said, *That God put into their hearts, not only to fulfil his wil, but also to agree and give their Kingdome to the Beste*. To agree, *πρὸς αὐτὰς γρῶν*, unanimously to make one Edict or Decree, and that at a Council table. Which clearly denotes a deliberate, firme, unanimous consent of giving up their power to the Beste. And doth not this clearly speak the act of their sin, as wel as the effect? And is not this act

as

as to its entitative mater, said to be put into their hearts by God? So much also the next Verbe *ſūu* importes, namely their deliberate free donation of their power, wherein the formalitie of their sin lies: and yet this very act, as to its substrate mater, is said to be from God. Whence (3) whereas he saith, *God is not said to put the sin into their hearts,— but only to do his pleasure and agree, &c.* I easily grant, [1] That God did not put the sin formally considered into their heart; for *God temtes no one to sin*; but yet he put the material entitative act of the sin into their heart. For wherein lay the malignitie of their sin, but in this, that they unanimously and peremptorily agreed or decreed to give up their power to the Beste? And is not this very act, entitatively considered, said to be put into them by God? And was it not also Gods pleasure or stated Decree, that they should thus agree? &c. And [2] whereas he saith, *God could make them do his pleasure most easily, by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, &c.* is not this a very slender evasion? what the least mention is there of any such thing in the Text? Yea, is it not expressely said, *That God put into their hearts to agree, &c?* And did not the poison of their sin lie in this maligne bloody agreement? Albeit the holy God be sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation of any hand in this conspiracie, in that he decreed and produced only the entitative act, not the vitiositie. [3] His instance or similitude from *the Thief that hath a wil to rob, &c.* is extreme lame and nothing to the purpose; for it's evidently said in the Text, that God not only concurred to the externe acts and effects, but *that he put it into their hearts to agree, &c.* So that the very wil and consent, entitatively considered, was from God.

Let us now examine what *Strangius* replies to this, who *lib. 4. cap. 10. pag. 855.* acknowlegeth this Text *Rev. 17. 17. to be meant of the ten hornes giving their power to the Beste*; but yet so as that if we understand the words (1) *of Gods putting it into their minds to agree, &c.* 'then the sense must be no other than, *2 Thes. 2. 11. Rom. 1. 28.* and like places, which speak of Gods delivering 'men up to a reprobate mind, and sending the efficacy of error, 'that they might serve Antichrist. And here the distinction 'must always concur, when in the same action sin and punishment 'concur, that not mens sins, but Gods judgements and punishments must be ascribed to God. In this sense God is said to 'excite, impel, and incline to sin. Before we passe on to *Strangius's*

second answer, let us a little examine this. [1] He grants, that God judicially may and doth concur to sin, yea *excite, impel,* and *incline men to it.* And doth not this fully overthrow his own Hypothesis and confirme ours? For if God in judgement *impel, excite,* and *incline* men to one sin, as a punishment of another, is he not then as much the Author of sin in this way, as in ours? [2] How doth God judicially punish one sin by another, but, to use his own words, by delivering such up to a reprobate mind and the efficacy of error? And if so, then must not the substrate acts of such judicial dereliction be from God? Of this hereafter, §. 6.

But (2) I passe on to his second answer, whercon he seems to lay the most weight, though indeed most feeble: 'But, saith he, 'because those words, *Rev. 17. 17.* are immediately subjoined to 'vers. 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle 'γὰρ, which points out the reason of that which next follows, 'namely, that those ten Kings having changed their opinion, 'should destroy the Whore and Antichrist, it seems to me more 'commodious, if in that *vers. 17.* there be a reason given of this 'famous change, that they who were before the friends and vassals of Antichrist, should be afterwards enemies and adversaries 'to him, namely, because God hath put this into their heart. 'And the first words of *vers. 17.* sufficiently accord to this Exposition— But what is subjoined, *That they might give their 'Kingdome to the Beste, until the word of God should be consummate,* 'I should think ought to be expounded negatively, &c. Thus *Strangius.*

A strange comment indeed! let us a little inquire into it. (1) How infirm is his argument from the rational particle γὰρ, to make what follows, *the fulfilling of Gods wil,* to refer only to the destroying of Antichrist? whereas the particle γὰρ seems rather to refer to the whole verse, and more particularly to the last clause, *until the Word of God shall be fulfilled;* and so it notes, *that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Wil,* [1] In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beste, and [2] When *the words of God were fulfilled,* i. e. Antichrists reign expired, then *to hate the Whore, &c.* And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident. So that *v. 17.* is not only a reason of the change, mentioned *v. 16.* but also an account of the whole series of their actions both whiles friends to, and enemies against Antichrist.

christ. (2) As for what is subjoined v. 17. *That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste*, I cannot but admire with what shadow of reason *Strangius* can understand this *negatively*, as if they should not give their Kingdom to the Beste: certainly if such glosses should be admitted, we might easily find in Scripture subterfuges for the worst Heresies and Immoralities? Why may not the most profane debauched wretch, when he is pressed with those Commands, *Thou shalt not commit adulterie, Thou shalt not kill, &c.* replie, that these Scriptures must not be taken negatively but affirmatively, *Thou shalt commit adulterie, &c.*? But *Strangius* saw full well, that the affirmative sense of those words, *That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste*, would quite subvert his forced sense of the foregoing words, and therefore he saw no way left, but to secure himself by reducing this later affirmative clause to a negative, though contrary to the expresse letter and mind of the words. But (3) being after all his glosses sensible of the infirmity and invalidity of this response, he p. 856. flies again to his old refuge, telling us, 'That if any shal think this exposition of the last member not sufficient, but that beyond it there must be also signified, *that God did put it into their hearts to give their Kingdome to the Beste*, I have no mind to contend about this mater, sithat the sense is sufficiently sane, which ever way the words be understood. In evil works God is not the cause of the moral evil, but of the substrate act and punishment, or Judgment which is annexed to the sin; but in good works, not only of the substrate act, but also of the moral Bonitie, &c. Who of us denies this? would our Adversaries but stick here, how soon would our Controversie be ended? But here lies the sting, even in this plausible concession, *Strangius* with the rest would fain perswade us, that there are some acts of sin so intrinsically evil, as that you cannot separate the phisic natural act from its moral Vitiositie.

§. 5. We descend now to such Scriptures as mention Gods *efficacious Permission of sin*. The former Heads regard only the *substrate mater* or *entitative act* of sin, but this sin in its *formal nature*. Our Adversaries, the *Pelagians, Jesuites, Arminians* and *Semi-Arminians* or *New Methodists*, all grant Gods permission of Sin, but only such as is *otiose, speculative, negative* and *naked*, without any efficacious active Influence for the production of its entitative act, or direction of it to its proper ends: But the sacred Scriptures

1 Sam. 2. 25.

Scriptures ascribe to God a *positive, efficacious, directive, and ordinative* permission of sin, arising from his positive absolute volition to permit it. So it's said of *Eli's Sons*, 1 Sam. 2. 25. *They hearkened not to the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them.* The conjunction *ו* here is *Causal*, and resolves their sin into the efficacious permissive Wil of God: The Sovereign Lord had, by an absolute peremptorie decree, predetermined to leave the Sons of *Eli* to this sin of Disobedience both against their Father and God, which should prove the cause of their temporal and eternal ruine; and thence it's said, *they hearkened not, because the Lord would slay them*: the wil of God was not properly the cause of their sin or slaughter, yet their sin was a consequent of Gods Wil efficaciously permitting it to be. I am not ignorant, that some of late have endeavored to give the causal particle *ו* a more soft, as they phrase it, Version; and among these some make it conclusive, and so render it *ideo, idcirco, quapropter*: others render it *quamvis*, as *Turnovius*; others otherwise: But certainly our English Version, which renders it *causally, because*, seems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and al the ancient Versions: So the LXX. who render the words thus, *ὅτι βούληται ὁ θεὸς ἀποθνήσκει αὐτοὺς*, *because the Lord in willing willed to destroy them.* In willing willed, i. e. according to the Hebraic Idiome, *peremptorily, efficaciously, immutably and absolutely willed.* Thus also the ancient Syriac and Arabic Versions, with some later, *Munster, Pagnine, Arias Montanus, Junius and Tremelius, Osiander, Piscator, Malvenda*, with the *Tigurine and Belgic Versions*; yea *Castalio* not excepted, render *ו* *causally, because*, according to our sense and interpretament.

Let us examine now what *Strangius* returns in answer to this Text, *lib. 4. cap. 6. pag. 809, &c.* He answers, (1) *That the sons of Eli were, for their flagitiose impieties, destined and devoted by God to ruine.* (2) *That the punishment of death here mentioned, seems properly and directly to be understood of temporal, not eternal.* (3) *That however it be, as it is manifest, that sin precedes damnation and the inflicting of punishment, so it's necessary that the prescience of every sin be presupposed in the eternal purpose of God, of damning and inflicting punishment, whether temporal or eternal.* (4) *That the particle Quia Because, here used, doth not alwayes denote a proper cause, but a reason of consequence, which may be taken from the effect, and other arguments besides the cause, &c.*

Strangius

Strangius here raiseth a great deal of dust, to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text; but to answer briefly: (1) We say, that his first answer smells too rankly of Pelagianisme, in that it makes the sins of men the cause of the Divine Wil: The Sons of *Eli* were not for their flagitiose Impieties destined by God to ruine, as if their flagitiose Impieties were causative of and influential on Divine destination; but the Soverain God destined, by an absolute decree, to leave them to those flagitiose sins, and for them to destroy them. What are the dangerous consequents of such a conditional Reprobation, we intend more fully to shew hereafter, c. 5 § 3. (2) That the Death here intended and inflicted was only *temporal*, is too crude a notion for a Divine instructed in the knowlege of divine wrath: Yea, *Strangius* confesseth, that they merited eternal wrath; and how then could they be exempted from it, who had rejected the Merits of their *Messias*? (3) What he addes, touching the prescience of every sin to be presupposed in Gods eternal purpose of damning men, has a tincture also of rank Pelagianisme: for if the prescience or prevision of actual sins, yea of final Impenitence, be that which moves the divine Wil to decree the Damnation of men, then it wil, by a paritie of reason, necessarily follow, that the prescience or prevision of mens Faith and final Perseverance is that which moves the divine Wil to elect men: for if Reprobation be conditional, Election must be so also, as our Divines on Scripture-reason strongly demonstrate. *Davenant* in his *Animadvers.* against *Hoard*, invictly proves, p. 226. and elsewhere, That Decrees purely conditional are very much unbecoming the Divine Wil. But of this more in what follows, c. 5. §. 3. (4) As for the Particle *Quia*, *Because*, [1] We grant, that it doth not alwayes denote a proper Cause, but a reason of Consequence, and that taken sometimes from the effect. But, [2] that it cannot denote a reason of Consequence taken from the Effect in this Text, is most evident; because Gods Wil to slay them was not the effect of their disobedience, but their disobedience was the consequent of Gods wil to slay them. [3] Take notice, that we do not say, that Gods wil was the cause of their disobedience or ruine, but only that the later was the consequent of the former: God in his most sverain wise and efficacious purpose decreed to leave the sons of *Eli* to such flagitiose sins, as should prove the cause of their ruine, both temporal and eternal:
and

and hereupon their sin and ruine followed, as Darkneſſe is the conſequent of the Suns retirement into the inferior Hemisphere.

Again, Gods efficacious permiſſive wil about ſin may be demonſtrated from Job 12. 16. *The deceiver and deceived are his.* Job 12. 16, 17. *h. e. Juſto judicio permittit errare & ſeduci, Vatablus.* לו שונן ומשנה, *His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived,* i. e. he doth in juſt judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived, as *Vatablus* on this Text. Which *Mercer* thus more fully explicates: ‘I underſtand this not only of falſe Worſhip, ‘but alſo of al errors that are committed every where; although ‘more ſpecially in Politics and Cities to be governed, where ‘God ſtirſ up ſome who draw others into error, that they might ‘follow their fallacious counſel, and enter on a pernicioſe courſe ‘for their own dammage.— God therefore impels and draws ‘ſome into error: not that the Lord is the Author of Error or ‘Sin; but that their ſin and defection from God leads them there- ‘to, God not only merely permitting, but alſo ordaining, &c. Whence it’s added, v. 17. *He leadeth counſellers away ſpoiled, and maketh the Judges fools; ſpoiled, שולל, i. e. of their wiſdom and counſel, as it follows. So it’s taken, Pſal. 76. 6. The valiant are ſpoiled of their heart, i. e. deprived of their courage. And maketh the Judges fools, יהולל, infatuat, or ad infaniam adigit, as Mercer. He infatuates them. Again, v. 20. He removeth away the ſpeech of the truſty, and taketh away the underſtanding of the aged. טע, the Judgement, Diſcretion, Counſel, Prudence, Senſe: Hebr. the ſavor or-experimental taſt. So v. 24. He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth, and cauſeth them to wander in a Wilderneſſe where there is no way. The like Deut. 28. 28. and Eſa. 19. 11, 12, 13, 14.*

Now let us ſee what answer *Strangius*, l. 4. c. 9. p. 836. gives hereto: ‘It muſt be obſerved, ſaith he, that Job in this Chapter ‘doth in an illuſtrious manner diſcourſe of Gods Providence ſo ‘ordering things, that nothing comes to paſſ caſually or fortui- ‘toully, nothing without his deſtinated counſel, *that nothing is* ‘done but what he wils, either by permitting that it be done, or by ‘doing of it, as *Auguſt. Enchirid. c. 95.* ſo that God doth effect ‘and procure whatever things are good, and alſo wiſely fore- ‘knowing the future event, doth permit ſins, which he directs ‘to good ends ordained by him.— Deſervedly therefore Job ‘among other things obſerves, that it is from Divine Providence, that

‘ that some erre, and draw others into error ; and that both as to
‘ maters of Religion , and in other maters of this life ; not that
‘ is he the Author of seduction and errors , but because God, for
‘ the contemt and abuse of his light, delivers them destitute there-
‘ of into a mind void of judgement , and presenting objects and
‘ occasions, opens a way, wherein they wander, &c.

Though this Paraphrase be far short of the mind of the Text, yet there is enough in it to confirme our Hypothesis, and subvert his own Antithesis. For (1) he grants, *That nothing happens casually, without Gods destinated counsel, according to that of Augustin, That nothing is done but what God wils, &c.* Now certainly Gods destinated counsel or determined wil is most efficacious and irresistible : so that if the permission of sin be from Gods destinated counsel, it must be also determined by his efficacious wil. (2) He grants, that God wisely foreknows al future events, even the sins of men : and how this can be without the efficacious predetermination of his own wil to permit the same, neither *Strangius* himself, nor any of his sectators, could ever yet make out. (3) He grants also, *That God directs those aberrations and sins to good ends appointed by him.* And how can God direct the immanent aberrations of the mind, but by an efficacious predetermination of the substrate acts, and permission of the vitiositie ? (4) He yet further grants, *That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement :* and what do we say more ? Doth not this evidently denote an active efficacious permission of sin ? But then (5) his last clause, *presenting objects and occasions, &c.* overthrows al his former concessions : for the wise God doth not only present objects and occasions, and thereby open a way to mens infatuation , but he also predetermines the mind to the entitative act , and efficaciously permits the vitiositie, without the least finger in the sin.

There are other Scriptures which demonstratively prove Gods efficacious permission of sin ; as *Esa. 63. 17. O Lord, why hast thou made us erre from thy ways , and hardened our hearts from thy fear ?* *Strangius*, pag. 839. grants, that the Verbe in both Members being in *Hiphil* oft notes a double action , as when we say , *That one makes another to do a thing ;* though he pretends, *that sometimes it only notes a permission of the action.* But it is certain , that it cannot here denote a mere naked permission , but such as procedes from the efficacious wil of God. The like *Jer. 20. 7. O Lord, thou hast deceived me and I was deceived.* Whereto answers, *Ezech. 14. 9.*

And if the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that Prophet. Which Texts speak certainly more than a mere idle speculative permission, namely such as resultes from the active, efficacious, directive and ordinative wil of God, as *Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 9. pag. 840---844.* grants. What this permission of God is, and how far it extendes, see what follows, *Chap. 5. §. 6.*

Gods judicial
hardening Sin-
ners.

Psal. 81. 12.

§. 6. Let us now passe on to such Scriptures as mention Gods tradition or giving up some to judicial excecation and induration or hardnesse of heart; which will give a more evident demonstration of Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin. Not to insiste on Gods hardening Pharaohs heart, *Exod. 4. 21.* which has been already solidly and demonstratively explicated by a judicious Divine, in his *Letter to a Friend, &c. pag. 28---30.* I shal begin with *Psal. 81. 12.* So I gave them up to their own hearts lusts, or to the hardnesse of their own hearts, as *Kimhi.* Hebr. **וַאֲשַׁלַּחְהוּ בַשְּׂרִירוֹת לִבָּם**, and I sent them away in the depraved cogitation of their heart. *LXX.* render it, *Deut. 29. 19.* **ἐσπαλάγησιν**, and *Jer. 3. 17.* **ἐσθυμήματα**. Whence it follows: *and they walked in their own counsels.* **בְּמוֹעֲצוֹתיהֶם**, in their own depraved imaginations. It's just with God to give up men to that spirit of hardnesse which they affect: his way of hardening is mysterious and invisible: he delivers sinners up to the bent of their own lusts, and then lets them enjoy what they lust after: when men adde acquired hardnesse to natural, God justly inflicts on them judicial hardnesse. And oh! how righteous is it with God judicially to harden such as sinfully, yea voluntarily harden themselves! And then the heart which is an Adamant towards God and things spiritual, is as wax towards sin and Satans tentations. And what is the effect of this judicial hardnesse, but to seal up sinners from the darknesse of mind to the darknesse of Hel? Thus God, albeit he be not the Author of sin, yet is the Orderer of it, and the cause of the substrate act unto which sin is annexed.

Psal. 69. 22.

The like *Psal. 69. 22.* Let their eyes be darkened that they see not, and make their loins continually to shake. Let their eyes [*i. e.* their minds] be darkened. **וַחֲשַׁכְנָה**, be made so obscure and dark, as that they may not see their way: let al true wisdom be taken from them, and make their loins continually to shake: *i. e.* take from them al force, vigor and abilitie of acting as they ought; let them stagger

stagger and reel like to a drunken man. The shaking of the loins argues imbecillitie and want of force, which is chiefly seated in the loins. Thus he procedes, and then *vers.* 17. brings Divine wrath to a black conclusion: *Adde iniquitie to their iniquitie*, &c. חנה עון על עתם, which implies, that God addes the punishment of judicial hardnesse to the iniquitie of their voluntary acquired hardnesse. We find this piece of judicial hardnesse cited by *Paul*, Rom. 11. 10. *Let their eyes be darkened that they may not see, and bow down their back alway.* The Heb. המער is here rendred by *Paul* σὺγκραμψον, *bow down*; the sense being the same; for the bowing down of the back argues the defect of strength in the loins.

To these Texts we may adde, *Esa.* 6. 10. *Make the heart of this people fat:* בל השמן *make the heart fat, or grosse, i. e.* stupid and senselesse: for the fat of animals has little sense. It alludes to the heart in the animate bodie overgrown and oppressed with fat. These words are six times repeted in the N. T. Whence it follows: *and shut their eyes.* עשה, which is rendred by some, *dim them*, or *make them dim*; by others, *daub them*, as with plaister, or other like mater: by others, *close them*: al which notes the efficacy of error and blindnesse, that follows on judicial hardnesse.

The like curse we find, *Esa.* 29. 10. *For the Lord hath poured out upon you the spirit of deep sleep, and hath closed your eyes.* LXX. ὅτι παύσαται ὑμᾶς κύβητος πνεύματος κατανύξεως. The Heb. תרדמה is rendred by *Aquila* κατασπῆξας, and by *Theodotion* ἐκείσας, which *Act.* 10. 11. notes a deep sleep or ecstasie: and the radix כרס signifies *to overwhelm with deep sleep*; and it's rendred κατανύσσω, *Dan.* 10. 9. So that by the spirit of deep sleep, must be understood such a stupor of spirit as leaves men without al sense. The allusion is to some soporiferous stupifying wine, or potion, or medicine, which, being given to a man, or sprinkled on him, casts him into a deep sleep. Hence the Prophet ushers in these words with a direful exclamation, *vers.* 9. *Stay your selves and wonder-- they are drunken, but not with wine, &c.* i. e. the Lord hath made them drunken with a soporiferous stupifying potion. As for κατανύξις it is not derived from καταλύειν, *to pricke*, *Act.* 2. 27. but from the ancient word κατανύω. The simple νύω being put for νύω, which also remains among the Latins, as *nuo, nutus, nutare*. Thence νύξω and νυσάζω, which signifies *to nod*, or *shake the head*, as they are wont to do who have drunk any stupifying potion. So that

Rom. 11. 8.

πνεῦμα καταρτίζων here is such a *spirituouse, stupifying* potion as deprives men of their senses, makes them shake the head, stagger and reel as drunken men. Thence it follows: *and hath closed your eyes.* When God judicially pours out a spirit of deep sleep, how soon is the heart stupified and made senselesse! This Text is cited and explicated by *Paul*, Rom. 11. 8. *According as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, &c.* The first part, *God hath given them the spirit of slumber*, notes the stupor of their minds, unto which they were judicially delivered up by God.

Esa. 19. 14.

Thus also *Esa.* 19. 11--14. He begins *vers.* 11. *Surely the Princes of Zoan are fools, &c.* Thence he proceeds to give the reason of it *vers.* 14. *The Lord hath mingled a perverse spirit in the midst thereof, &c.* *The Lord hath mingled, סם, poured out, or given them to drinke.* Gods judicial excecation and induration is here, as elsewhere, compared to a cup of intoxicating liquor, which being very strong and heady distempers men, and makes them to reel and stagger: so much the following phrase importeth, *רוח עריות*, a spirit of perversities. The Hebrew word, not elsewhere to be found in the O. T. is derived from a Verbe that signifies *to pervert, turne away, or make crooked*: it's here plural of a duplicate forme, and notes al manner of perversities both extensive and intensive. They boasted of their wisdom, *vers.* 11. but God made them drunk with a spirit of error and perversities. The Chaldee and LXX. render it, *with a spirit of error or seduction*; the Latin, *with a spirit of giddinesse.* The sense is the same.

Esa. 44. 18, 19.

We may adde hereto, *Esa.* 44. 18. *They have not knownen nor understood; for he hath shut their eyes, that they cannot see, and their hearts, that they cannot understand. He hath shut,* Heb. *סם* he has daubed; *Skindler* renders it, *crustavit, aut obduxit parietem.* God did as it were *plaster their eyes* with a spirit of slumber: whence it follows, *vers.* 19. *and none considereth in his heart, &c.* Those profane Idolaters did shut their eyes, that they might not see, and the righteous God comes and as it were daubes or plaisters them over, that they shal not see.

Esa. 60. 2.

This judicial excecation is also lively expressed, *Esa.* 60. 2: *For behold darknesse shal cover the earth, and grosse darknesse the people.* The Prophet having exhorted the elect among the Jews, *vers.* 1. *Arise and shine, for thy light is come, &c. i. e. the Messias is come and shineth on thee with the gloriose beams of Evangelic light;*

light ; in this *vers.* 2. he gives us the dreadful curse of those that should wilfully shut their eyes against this light. *For behold-- thick darknesse.* Heb. *ווערפל*, which seems compounded of a word that signifies *to drop or destil*, and another that signifies *a mist or fog* : so that the compound notion here properly notes *a mist or fog so thick, that it even drops again* ; such as the Egyptian mist was, that filled the earth with darknesse, *Exod.* 10. 22, 23. When men wilfully shut their eyes against Evangelic light, God judicially leaves them to wander up and down in the thick mist of their own darknesse, so that they stumble at noon day.

Thus God dealt with the Gentiles, even the wisest of them, for the abuse of natures light, as *Rom.* 1. 28. *And even as they did* *Rom.* 1. 28. *not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not convenient.* They did not approve of or acknowledge God in their practic judgements or consciences, and therefore God did not approve of or owne their practic notions, but delivered them up to a *reprobate, spurious, drossie, vain, adulterine, rejectaneous mind* ; so much *אֲדֹנָיִם* notes. A Divine of note among us saith to this Text, *Here is nothing at al but a penal desertion and permission, &c.* So that by this Tradition he understands only a negation of Grace, and mere permission of men to sin ; but *Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 7. pag. 813.* is more ingenuous, and grants, *that this Tradition importes something positive* : though what that positive is he doth not, neither indeed can by his Hypothesis, explicate.

The like Tradition or delivering up to a reprobate mind we find foretold touching the Sons of Antichrist, *2 Thes.* 2. 11. *And* *2 Thes.* 2. 11. *for this cause God shal send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie.* When secure Professors wil not receive the Truth in the love thereof, that they may be saved, it is just with God to send them strong delusions, that they should believe a lie ; that they might al be damned, &c. as *vers.* 12. The fore-mentioned reverend Divine answers to this Text thus : *Here is nothing signified, but (1) That God wil permit Magicians and false Teachers to vent deceits. (2) And permit wicked men to believe them : which is mentioned as a permitted consequent, and not as an end intended by God. And the word sending is mentioned, because the permission was penal for their sin, &c.* But this response is too slender and jejune for so great a Text : For (1) whereas that reverend Divine makes mention of Gods permitting Magicians, &c. this favors too much of

of a *Grotian* and *Cassandrian* spirit, which I presume, he has no kindnesse for, whereby al those prophetic predictions about Antichrist are fixed on *Simon Magus*, or some other false Teacher in the Primitive Churches: whereas it is most evident, that this *sending them strong delusion* is ascribed immediately to God, as a righteous Judge. (2) Neither is this only a mere *permitted consequent*, as he phraseth it; but the terme *sending* importes *active efficacious influence* on Gods part that sends, not on the sin formally considered, but on the substrate mater, or act entitatively considered. But *Strangius*, lib. 4. cap. 10. pag. 853. is here also more candid, granting, *Gods sending the efficacy of error*, to be the same with Gods *pouring out a spirit of slumber*, *Esa.* 19. 14. and *Jerome* thinkes, that *Paul* took his words from *Esa.* And pag. 855. *Strangius* addes, 'That this sending strong delusions may be ascribed to God, as a punishment of their former sin, in not receiving the truth in the love thereof: which sufficiently proves our Hypothesis, That the substrate mater of sin is from God, as hereafter.

The false Comments of Adversaries refuted.

But let us a little more fully examine the general solutions which our Adversaries give to these Texts touching Gods *active execration and induration*. 1. A Divine among our selves, whom I love and honor, thinkes, that those Texts in the O. T. which speak of Gods *hardening men*, &c. might, according to the Hebrew Idiome, have a *softer sense*; so (as I suppose he must mean) as a mere permission is intended thereby. But to answer hereto in the words of *Strangius*, lib. 4. cap. 9. pag. 839. The Hebraic forme is oft in *Hiphil*, which denotes a double action, *to make a man to do a thing*; yea sometimes this induration is expressed by Verbes in *Piel*, of an active import, as *Exod.* 4. 21. & 9. 12. & 10. 20, 27. & 11. 10. & 14. 4, 8. *Deut.* 2. 30. *Josh.* 11. 20. Whence *Strangius* concludes, *That this phrase of Scripture oft occurring denotes much more than a mere naked permission*. Though what this should be he is at a great losse.

2. *Baronius*, *Metaphys.* Sect. 8. *Disp.* 3. §. 99. pag. 159, 160. answers, 'That there are four actions of God in induration; (1) He 'punisheth former sins by permitting men to fall into greater. (2) 'He offers to them an occasion of repentance, &c. (3) He gives 'them not grace to improve the occasion; whence they are said 'to be blinded and hardened. (4) He offers to them occasions 'of greater sins, by such things as objectively move them to sin.

But

But al this, which *Baronius* allows God in judicial excecation and Induration, comes far short of what the forecited Scriptures mention. For besides the mere permission of Sin, privation of Grace, and offering occasions and objects, the Scripture mentions a *Tradition and delivering up to the very act of sin*, yea, *Gods immediate efficacious hand in the very act of sin, considered entitatively and materially.*

3. But we come to *Strangius*, who, in his concessions goes beyond the former Divines, yet comes short of the genuine mind and spirit of those Texts, which speak of Gods judicial Excecation and Induration. (1) He grants, (contrary to the sentiment of a reverend Divine among us) *that active excecation is ascribed unto God.* So l. 4. c. 8. p. 819. *Active excecation*, saith he, *is ascribed to God, Satan, and the Sinner himself. Satan and the Sinner in that action do greatly sin, but God actes most justly. God can as justly punish Sinners with excecation of mind, as he punished Elymas the forcerer with corporal excecation, Act. 13. 11.* (2) Thence p. 822. he addes: *Herein the whole difficultie lies, that in this action we rightly distinguish that which is sin, and the cause of sin, whereof God is not the cause, from the punishment, which God in just judgement inflicts.* So p. 829. *In al vitiose action, the action substrate to the vice, or whatever there is of entitie and positive therein, must be reduced to God as the first cause, who doth concur therewith, as considered separate from the vice or defect annexed thereto; and therefore whatever entitative or positive is found in any obduration, in like manner it must be referred to God, albeit he hath no commerce with the vice of the action.* This ingenuous concession of *Strangius*, did he not overthrow it by other positions, were sufficient to period our controversie: for what do, or need we desire more than what he here grants? If whatever be *entitative* or *positive* in obduration be from God, then surely the substrate mater or entitative act of that whereto sin is annexed, is from God. But here lies the point of our Controversie with *Strangius*, he holds that there be some acts so intrinsically evil, as that you cannot separate the entitative act from the sinful reference it has to its object. But, (3) *Strangius* addes, p. 831. *That in the same Induration the sin and punishment are conjunct, &c.* This indeed is a great concession, that which overthrows *Strangius's* Antithesis; for, if in the same Act the sin and punishment be conjunct, then how can God concur to the act as a punishment, and not concur to

to the substrate mater or entitative act which has sin annexed to it? This Knot the acutest of *Strangius's* Sectators will never untie. Again, (4) He addes, p. 831. *That the very Permission of God is the act and effect of the wil of God.*—For to wil to permit, and advisedly to permit is also to act. What is done by God negatively in regard of his transient act, is done also positively, in regard of his interne immanent act. Herein also he lays before us a pregnant Truth, which is directly contradictory to his own Hypothesis: for, [1] If Gods permissive Wil as to sin be not only negative but also positive, then it must be efficacious. Again, [2] If Gods permission of sin be positive and efficacious, then also his Decree of Reprobation to permit sin must be positive and absolute, which directly impugneth *Strangius's* Opinion. (5) He addes, p. 832. *That other actions also concur with Gods Permission, because he also rules, moderates and ordains what he permits, and concurs to the actions substrate to the sin it self.* Is it so indeed? What then do we contend so vehemently for? what made *Strangius* write such a voluminous discourse, and oppose *Rutherford*, *Twisse*, and other *Calvinists* with so much violence, when as here he grants whatever they contend for? But to speak the truth, there yet lies a Snake under the herbe; albeit *Strangius* seems to grant so liberally Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate act of sin, yet indeed, when he comes else-where to state this concurse, he makes it be only a remote concurse to the act considered *in genere*, in its generic nature, not to the individual particular act as so or so circumstantiated. And herein he is followed by a Divine of Name among us: wherein lies the spirit of al their solutions and oppositions. But how inept and evanid this subterfuge is, will be very evident, if we consider the nature of al physic or natural acts. Is not every natural or entitative act individual or singular? Are not al natural Acts the effluxes of singular *Supposites* or persons? and if the subject be singular, must not the Action be also singular? To talk of a natural action *in genere*, or *specie*, what a wild conceit is this, that which al true Logic and Philosophie both new and old contradicts? It's true, human acts, as to their moral consideration, may be distinguished into generic, specific, or individual: but if we consider human acts in their natural entitative Being, so there neither is nor can be any such thing as *actio in genere*, action in general; but al are singular and individual. So that if God concur to the act of sin, it must be

Gods Concurse to
the individual
act which is sin-
ful.

be to the act in its individual singular nature, not *morally* but *physically* and *entitatively* considered; of which more hereafter, Chap. 6. §. 1.

But to give a distinct and Theologic Idea of Gods Judicial Excecation and Induration, with the Vindication of his Sacred Majestie from being the Author of Sin, the following Distinctions and Determinations may be of use to us. (1) We are to distinguish Gods concurse in *Judicial Induration* or Hardnesse, from that of the Sinner. (2) Gods Concurse in Judicial Hardnesse may be considered either in regard of his *Decree*, or in regard of his *Providence* and *actual execution*. (3) Induration may be distinguished into *Moral* and *Natural*: or into *sinful* and *penal*. These things being premised, the true nature of Gods judicial excecation and Induration wil appear in the following Propositions.

How God judicially hardens men without being the cause of sin.

1. Prop. *Gods Decree is not properly the cause of mans Hardnesse of heart or Damnation, but only of the Negation or withdrawment of preventing Grace, which God is no way bound to give.* The Decree of Reprobation is not the proper *efficient* or *formal* cause of the Sinners Induration or Condemnation, but his own wilful obstinacie. This sufficiently clears the Sanctitie and Justice of God.

2. Prop. *Yet supposing the Decree of Reprobation, the sinners Induration or Hardnesse follows infallibly, and in some sense necessarily; i. e. by a modal hypothetic necessitie, not brutish or coactive, such as should destroy Libertie.* The holy God doth not infuse hardnesse, or by any compulsion hurrie men into it, but leaves them to the swinge of their own lusts, which violently hurrie them into such courses as necessarily harden. This also cleareth Gods Justice from the imputation of sin.

3. Prop. *Gods Providence in Judicial excecation and Induration is very efficacious and illustrious.* (1) God leaves men to the Blandishments, Allurements, and Ensnarements of an heart-bewitching world, which insensibly harden. (2) He delivers up men to the power of Satan, the God of this world, whose subjects and vassals they willingly become, 2 Cor. 4. 3, 4. and so are taken alive captive at his wil, 2 Tim. 2. 26. (3) God so disposeth and orders al his Providences, as that they do al accidentally, by reason of mens lusts, conspire to harden them: Mercies be-

come Curses to them, *Rom. 11. 9, 10, 11.* Yea, (4) The very means of Grace, become the means of their hardening, their Food and Physic become Poyson to them, *2 Cor. 2. 16. Esa. 28. 12, 13, 14, 15.* (5) Christ himself, the chief Corner-stone of salvation becomes to them *a stone of stumbling and offence, Esa. 8. 14. a stone of stumbling, סֶלֶן* of smiting, such as lying in the way the foot may smite against, and thence stumble and receive hurt. It answers to *σκάνδαλον*, scandal in the New Testament: Thence it follows, *and for a rock of offence. Heb. מכשול*, not a bare *Stumbling-stone*, or *block*, such as a man may make a shift to avoid or get over, or if he stumble, yet recover himself again; but he is a *rock of offence*, which notes, [1] The Offence to be inevitable and unavoidable, as the removing of a rock: [2] The ruine to be certain, as that of a Ship falling on a rock. Whence he addes: *for a gin and for a snare*, such as men should neither by power, wit, or craft escape. Whence it follows, *v. 15. And many among them shal stumble and fal, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken.* The like *Rom. 9. 33.* (6) God puts a period to the day of Grace, and leaves men to the plague of their own heart, *Esa. 22. 14. Surely this iniquitie shal not be purged from you til you die. Hebr. יָסֹף עָלֶיךָ*, *If this iniquitie be purged.* It is the concise forme of an Oath, frequently used in Scripture, as *Chap. 5. 18.* whereby God sweareth, that their iniquitie should not be purged. So *Luke 19. 41, 42. Heb. 3. 7.* (7) God doth positively, yea efficaciously concur to al that is positive, material, entitative, and natural in judicial hardnesse, without the least hand in the obliquitie or vitiositie.

4. Prop. *The suspension of restraining Grace in Judicial excetation is not properly a privation of any Grace due to the Creature, but a negation or withdrawment of undeserved and abused Grace.* For the clearing whereof we are to consider, the difference between Man and God in this particular: No meer man may or ought to permit or deliver up another to sin or hardnesse, if it be in his power to hinder: (1) Because al men are under a Law and obligation of subjection to their Creator, whereby they are obliged to promote his Glorie, and prevent sin and rebellion against him the most they can. (2) Because al men are under a communion of Natures, and therefore bound to afford assistance each to other, so far as they may for their natural and moral good.

good. But now the soverain Creator of man is under no such obligation, and therefore may as he please dispose of his own grace, or suspend it, specially when abused by sinners.

5. Prop. *God doth not deliver up men to judicial hardnesse simply as hardnesse, under that reduplication, but penally, as it conduceth to the vindication of his Justice.* For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we are to remember, that there is nothing in the world of itself, purely, and simply evil: for if there were any pure and chiefeft evil in the world, then God, who is the chiefeft good, could not wil it: but the greatest evil has something of good mixed with it; and this God wils. Thus in judicial hardnesse there is a penal vindictive good, which God wils for the illustration of his Justice.

6. Prop. *In judicial hardnesse, that which is morally evil in regard of man and his transgression, is naturally good in regard of God and his Providence.* For albeit God doth concur with the sinner, who is deficient as to his dutie, yet God is no way deficient. (1) Al moral evil of sin is only such to him whose it is, or to whom it doth belong, as the Author thereof, by virtue of some Law he offends against: But now this judicial hardnesse or sin doth not belong to God as the proper Owner or Author of it, but only to the sinner; neither doth the holy God offend against any Law. (2) The specific qualitie of an effect is not to be ascribed to the universal first cause, but to the second particular cause, from which it receives specification. (3) The sinner is only the moral cause of his own hardnesse; because he is the meritorious cause thereof, and also a voluntary, yea wilful Agent therein. Al his hardnesse is voluntarily contracted, albeit judicially inflicted by God: he suffers his heart voluntarily to be defloured by sinful objects: God threatens to suspend his Divine influence, and the obstinate sinner cries, *Content: Satan comes and blinds his eyes, and he hugges him for it.* So that the whole deficiency or moral causality is on the sinners part, not on Gods. The sinner wants Divine influence and is willing, yea glad to want it: therefore his depraved wil is the sole *formal, vital, subjective* and *moral efficient cause* of his own hardnesse and sin.

§. 7. We come in the last place to such Scriptures as mention *Gods efficacious ordering, disposing, and directing the sins of men unto his own glorie*, which evidently demonstrates his immediate con-
Gods efficacious ordering mens sins for his own glorie.
 curse and predetermination to the substrate mater or entitative

Exod. 9. 14,
15, 16.

Vitiorum no-
strorum non est
auctor Deus, sed
tamen ordina-
tor, August.

Rom. 9. 17.

act thereof. Thus *Exod. 9. 14, 15, 16.* God threatens *Pharaoh, vers. 14. to send al his plagues on his heart, i. e.* in a way of judicial excecation and induration. And why? *That thou mayst know there is none like me in al the earth: i. e.* that I may magnifie my vindictive Justice and Power on thee. Whence he addes, *v. 15. For now I wil stretch out mine hand, that I may smite thee, and thy people with pestilence, and thou shalt be cut off from the earth.* It runs in the Hebrew in the time past, *שלחתי את ידִי, I sent out mine hand, i. e.* by the pestilence or murrain among the bestes, as *v. 3, 6.* and so it follows: *and I had smitten thee, with the same pestilence; and thou hadst been cut off, deservedly; but for another cause (which is mentioned vers. 16.) I have spared thee.* This seemeth the genuine meaning, namely, that God spared *Pharaoh* in this plague, thereby to magnifie his vindictive Justice and Power the more in his final ruine. God let him alone to run on in ful career in his way of sin, yea, concurred to the substrate mater of al his sins, and caused al his plagues to meet on his heart, in order to his final obduration; thereby to render his vindictive Justice more illustrious in his ruine. And so *vers. 16. And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared thorowout al the earth. ואולי, in very deed, or verily: it notes a great asseveration, such as with God amounts almost to an oath. For this. The Apostle Paul, Rom. 9. 17. addes a Pronoun of intention, οὗ αὐτὸν ἕνεκα, for this very same, i. e. cause or purpose, as the Greeks expound it, for this cause have I raised thee up. The LXX. render it, thou hast been preserved or kept alive; but Paul more emphatically, Rom. 9. 17. ἐξήγειράς με, I have made thee stand up, or, have constituted, or set thee up, as on a Theatre before al the world, to be a vessel of wrath, and an exemple of Divine vengeance. The Syriac renders it thus: אקִימתיך, I have made thee to stand up; which emphatically paints forth Gods absolute wil in his Reprobation. So in the Hebraic Verbe, העִמַּדְתִּיךָ, I have made thee stand up, as a monument of vindictive Justice. This making to stand up, notes the constitution and being of a thing, as elsewhere in Scripture: the righteous God gave being and constitution to *Pharaoh* for this very end, to magnifie the glorie of his vindictive Justice on him. So it follows: בעבור הראותך, for to shew, or that I may shew in thee, or shew thee. But the LXX. adde the Particle In: so Paul, Rom. 9. 17: ἵνα ἐδείξωμαι ἐν σοί, That I may give a specimen, or demon-*

stration

stration of my power in thee. Hebr. אֶת־כְּחִי, *my power, or my force, my omnipotent severitie.* Thence it follows: וּלְמַעַן סַפֵּר שְׁמִי, *for to declare, or tel my name.* The righteous God suffered *Pharaoh* to run on with a vehement impetuositie in his sinful rebellion, that so the world might ring of Gods vindictive Justice in his ruine. From al this the Apostle strongly demonstrates our conclusion, *Rom. 9. 18. Therefore God hath mercie on whom he wil, and whom he wil he hardeneth.* Observe here, (1) the Apostle ushers in this inference with the conclusive note, *ἀρα οὖν, therefore.* He layeth the premisses in Gods judicial proceedings with *Pharaoh* for the manifestation of his vindictive punitive glorie in *Pharaohs* ruine: whence he infers this universal conclusion. *Therefore God, &c.* (2) He resolves Gods hardening men into his absolute wil or decree of Reprobation, which he in this regard, makes parallel to his absolute decree of Election: for as God *bath mercie on whom he wil, i. e. according to his absolute purpose or decree; so in like manner, he hardeneth whom he wil, i. e. according to his absolute decree of Reprobation.* And it is most certain, according to the Scripture, no man can maintain absolute Election, but he must also maintain absolute Reprobation: and if Reprobation be absolute, then also Gods concurse to the entitative act of that which is sinful must be efficacious and predeterminative, as hereafter, *Chap. 5. §. 3.*

There are other Texts that make expresse mention of Gods efficacious ordering and disposing of wicked men and their sins for his own glorie. So *Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made althings for himself; yea even the wicked for the day of evil.* Note here (1) the end of Gods making althings, which is *for himself, לְמַעַנְהוּ, i. e. for the manifestation of his own glorie.* (2) The manner of Gods making althings for himself, included in the Verbe *פָּעַל, hath made,* which signifies [1] Gods *active effieience,* or his energetic, architectonic Decree, whereby althings are made. [2] Gods *passive creation,* or his effieience in time. [3] Gods *conservation* of althings in their beings and wel-beings. [4] Gods *efficacious actuating* and governing althings to their ends. Thus *Psal. 46. 9. Eccles. 11. 5. Esa. 5. 12.* The LXX. generally render it by *ἐργάζομαι,* which *Joh. 5. 17.* our Lord useth to expresse Gods efficacious concurse and predeterminative influence. And *Strangius, pag. 804.* grants, that whether we understand *פָּעַל* here of Gods production in time, or of his eternal Decree to produce man, or

of his ordination and constitution of man to punishment, the difference is not material. I would therefore take it in the largest notion as comprehensive of al its significates before specified. (3) Whence follows the particular object, *even the wicked, i. e.* considered not only in their *substance* as men, but also in al their *Modes, Adjuncts, Accidents, and Operations*. There is not the most minute accident or action of a wicked man but God *makes it, i. e.* decrees, influenceth, and orders it for himself. Whence (4) the wicked are said to be made by God, *for the day of evil, יום רעה, i. e.* for the day of vindictive wrath, or punishment inflicted for the illustration of Divine Justice: which includes also their being left to sin; for the forest piece of Divine vengeance is mens being given up to their own hearts lusts.

Rom. 9. 21, 22.

Adde hereto Rom. 9. 21, 22. *Hath not the potter power over the clay, &c?* Here Paul refutes the proud Pelagian blasphemies by an argument taken from Gods absolute Dominion and Soveraintie over his creature. As if he had said: Has not the Potter an absolute dominion over the clay, to forme it into what shape he please? and shal we not allow the great Creator of althings the same absolute dominion? Did he not make althings? and therefore may he not assume the Prerogative of ordering althings to the ends for which they were made? As he gives to every creature what shape he please, so cannot he appoint them to what end he please, and direct them infallibly to that end? Is it not an end sufficient for the being of any creature, to be the glorie of any Attribute? and therefore if God make a creature to be a vessel of wrath fitted to destruction, is there any injurie done to the creature? The Pythagoreans have an effate, *That τὸ χείρον ἔνεκα τοῦ βελτίονος*, *the worse is made for the service of the better*, which holds most true here of the vessels of wrath or wicked men, who are made for the better, *i. e.* their Makers glorie, as Prov. 16. 4. Thus Paul concludes, vers. 22. *Vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, κατασκευασθέντες εἰς ἀπώλειαν καταρτίζωντες*, signifies primarily *aptly to fit, frame, or set together*: thence, *to ordain, decree, or constitute*. Whence among the LXX. it answers to *יָדָה*, *to found*, as Psal. 8. 2. *Out of the mouths of babes he hath founded or ordained praise*: also to *יָדָה*, *to ordain, decree, establish*, as Psal. 67. 10. & 73. 17. Thus it signifies here, namely Gods eternal ordination or absolute Decree of Reprobation founded on his absolute Soveraintie. Observe here the difference between the *vessels of mercie*, and the *vessels of wrath*:

wrath: of the former he speaks actively, *vers.* 23. *That he might make known the riches of his glorie on the vessels of mercy, which he had prepared unto glorie*; but of the later he speaks only passively, *vers.* 22. *fitted to destruction*. The reason of this difference seems this: The *vessels of mercie* are wholly from God, both as vessels, and as vessels of mercie; they receive from God both their *natural good of being*, and their *moral good of grace, wel-being, and happiness*: but now the *vessels of wrath* are such partly from God, and partly from themselves: That they are vessels, and vessels of wrath ordained to destruction, they are from God; but that they are vessels deserving wrath, this they are from themselves: their sins and punishment *morally* considered are from themselves; but consider them *entitatively* and *penally*, and so they are from God. I am not ignorant of the many false and Pelagian glosses which are affixed to this Text, without shadow of reason.

Another Text that evidently demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse in ordering mens sins for his own glorie is, 1 Pet. 2. 8. *And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even to them that stumble at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they were appointed.* This Text is taken partly from *Esa.* 8. 14. Here Christ the chief Corner-stone of the Church, is said to be a stone of stumbling and rock of offence to wilful unbelievers. The Greek λίθος προσκυμαλῶς καὶ πέτρα σκανδάλου are synonymous, and of the same import here; though σκανδάλον be in its general notion more extensive: It notes originally *any thing that may offend the foot, or other part, from σκᾶω, to halt, or from σκαμβῶν, distorted*: more particularly, it signifies (1) that *rigillum, or crosse piece of wood in your traps for Mice, Foxes, or the like*: (2) a *sharp stake, whereby the foot is hurt*: and so it is the same with σκαῶλον, interpreted by *Hesychius* ξύλον ὀξύμυρον: and so σκανδάλον is by him made to be the same with ἐμπόδιον, *an impediment*: it was called also by the Greeks τεῖβελος, denoting a military instrument, like a sharp stake, whereby they annoyed their enemies: in which sense the word σκανδάλον is used in that Apocryphous book, *Judith* 9. 1. καὶ ἔθηκεν ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις σκάνδαλα. (4) *A stone that offends the foot*: and so it answers with the LXX. to גִּישׁוֹן, *Lev.* 19. 14. in which regard it is made synonymous to πείραγμα, both by *Peter*; and *Rom.* 14. 13. by *Paul*: and this they both denote here, 1 Pet. 2. 8. the great offence which sinners took at Christ, to their own ruine. Whence it's added: *Whereunto also they*

they were appointed, ἐτιθέναι. What doth this note? why take Grotius's Note on this Text, who was no friend to Calvinists: 'Unto this, saith he, Unbelievers were destined by God, that they might most grievously fall— For τῶν αἰώνων, which answers 'to שׁוֹן, oft signifies to ordain, destine, or decree, as Job. 15. 16. 'So. ἔθετο εἰς ὀργάνω, 1 Thes. 5. 9. The Syriac in this place renders it סִימִין, they were designed; the Arabic نَصَّبُوا, they were constituted, namely by the Divine Decree. Thus Grotius, who here speaks like a Calvinist, though generally no friend to the sentiments of Calvin. The like 2 Pet. 2. 11. *As natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed.* Is not absolute Reprobation here, and that by the concession of Grotius, no friend thereto, clearly and fully asserted? And if Reprobation be absolute, must not also Gods concurrence to the substrate mater of sin be efficacious and predeterminative? The immutable connexion between absolute Reprobation and predetermination to the substrate mater of that which is sinful we intend to demonstrate hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3.

But a reverend Divine of name among us answers to this Text thus: Resp. 1. 'This [1 Pet. 2. 8. *wherewith also they were appointed*] hath respect to Luke 2. 34. And no more can be hence gathered, but that God hath decreed, that as a punishing Judge, (1) he wil leave the rejecters of Christ to go on in their own sinful way; (2) and that their opposition to him shal be their ruine: 'So that [1] he doth not speak this of any but the rejecters of Christ, that deserved it. [2] He speaketh not at al as willing their sin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace. [3] But the thing that he is said to ordain them to, is not sin, but ruine the consequent of their sin: The word [stumbling and falling] signifying their destruction. Thus that reverend Divine.

And now let us a little examine this his Response to our Argument from this Text, which wil serve for a replie to most of his subterfuges. (1) In answer to his first particular, we assert, that more may be gathered from this Text, than what he allows, namely, *That God hath decreed, that, as a punishing Judge, he wil leave the rejecters of Christ to go on in their own sinful way.* For he himself grants, (which cannot be denied) *That they were appointed to stumble on the rock of offence:* And if so, then surely they were destined or appointed to the entitative act of sin: for stumbling doth not only implice their destruction, as he insinuates, but also their

their sin. Whence, (2) there is something more also implied, *than that their opposition to him shal be their ruine*. For it's expressly said, *That they were appointed*, not only to their ruine, but also to *their stumbling at the word, and being disobedient*, which notes the Decree of Reprobation to be absolute and positive; yea predeterminative of the substrate mater of sin. (3) Whereas he saith, *That he speaks not at al as willing their sin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace*, this seems also against the expresse mind of the Text, which saith, *They were appointed*, *ἰτι-θισαν*, i. e. according to Grotius, *they were ordained, destined, or decreed to stumble at the word, &c.* This certainly denotes more than Gods penal denial of further grace. (4) Whereas he saith, *That the thing that he is said to ordain them unto, is not sin, but ruine, the consequent of their sin, the word [stumbling and falling] signifying their destruction*, it seems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words: for both *πείσχυμα* and *σκάνδαλον* signifie, according to our precedent explication of them, primarily their sin, and then their ruine or destruction, as the consequent of their sin. This also is evident from that parallel Text, *Jude 4. For there are* Jude 4. *certain men crept in unawares, who were of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse, and denying the only Lord God.* These ungodly men are said to be *παρακαταρτισμένοι*, *designed*, and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination, to be given up to *this condemnation*, of turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse, &c. So that it is evident, that God foreordained and decreed, not only their destruction, but to leave them to those sins, which should cause the same.

But to sum up the whole of this Head, we grant, (1) That absolute Reprobation is not the cause either of mens sins, or damnation. It's true, elective Grace is the cause of faith and salvation, but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cause of sin or damnation. (2) That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the person reprobated. Yet we denie, [1] That it is unjust for God, by an absolute, efficacious Decree, to reprobate some, for the glorifying of his own Justice: For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of justice, yet it is not unjust for God to reprobate any. [2] We denie also, that there is any motive, cause, or condition of Reprobation, as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence also [3] we denie, that the act of Reprobation is

merely negative; but affirme, that it is *positive and absolute*; of which see *Davenant Dissert. de Elect. & Reprob.* p. 113. Hence, [4.] It necessarily follows, that when God predestines and preordains any unto Damnation, he predestines and preordains in like manner, by an efficacious act of his own soverain Wil, to leave men to their own sinful courses, and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins. See more *Chap. 5. §. 3.*

CHAP. IV.

An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Anti-predeterminants.

The Affertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin; (1) Fathers, Augustin, Prosper, Fulgentius. (2) Such as succeeded in the Roman Church, Hugo de Sancto Victore, Aquinas, Scotus, Ariminensis, Holcot, Altissiodorensis: Bradwardine, his Conversion, Parts, both natural and acquired, zeles for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurse, particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin: How God wils Sin: How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse: How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin. The Dominicans, and particularly Alvarez's sentiments conforme to our Hypothesis. The concurrent perswasions of Jansenius and his Sectators: also of the Tridentine Catechisme. (3) The Sentiments of Reformed Divines, Wiclef, Calvin, Zuinglius, Beza, Chamier, Lud. Crocius, the Synod of Dort, and Church of England, Davenant, Sam. Ward, &c. (4) Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin, more ancient: Durandus, his proper Hypothesis, and who may be accounted his Sectators; Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and designe: Arminius, and his Adherents, the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes. The New Methodistes, Camero, Amyraldus, Placeus, Le Blanc, Baronius, Strangius. How these New Methodistes sel into these Sentiments, and who may be esteemed such.

The Affertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin.

§. 1. **H**AVING given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypothesis, touching the efficacious, predeterminative Concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful, we now procede to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Antipelagians

pelagians in al Ages of the Church; and withal to shew who have in al Ages defended the Antithesis of our Adversaries. First, among the Patrons of our Hypothesis none deserves a more illustrious name and mention than *Augustin*, that great Propugnator or Champion of efficacious Concurse. I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries, as *Strangius* by name, are so confident as to cite *Augustin's* testimonie in defense of their Antithesis; but this is too palpable an abuse to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of *Augustin*; whose sentiments touching this subject are sufficiently evident in his Works. Thus, *de Grat. & Lib. Arbitr. cap. 20.* If the Scripture, saith he, be diligently inspected, it wil appear, that not only the good wils of men, but also the bad, are so in Gods power, that he can incline them where and when he wil, to performe his benefices, or to inflict his punishments, by his most secret, yet most just judgement. Again, in the same book, he saith, That God workes in the hearts of men, to incline them which way he please, either to Good, out of his Mercie, or to evil according to their deserts, by his Judgement, sometimes open, sometimes secret, but always just. So *De Prædestinat. Sanct. c. 16.* It is (saith he) in the power of wicked men to sin; but that by sinning maliciousely they do this or that, is not in their power, but of God dividing the darkness, and ordering it; that so hence what they do against the wil of God, might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God. Again, *De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto, c. 5.* Some things, saith he, God makes and orders, other things he only orders; righteous men he makes and orders, but sinners, as sinners, he makes not, but only orders, i. e. In good actions he is both the cause of the good, and of the action, but in sinful acts he is not the cause of the sin, but only of the act ordering it for his glorie. Again, *De Civitate Dei, l. 13. c. 22.* he saith, That Sin as it is justly permitted by God, falls under the Eternal Law, that is, the Divine Wil or Decree. Moreover, *Augustin* frequently asserts, that God punisheth one sin by giving men up to another: So *Contra Julian. l. 5. c. 3.* & *de Civitate Dei, l. 15. c. 6.* & *libro de Natura & Gratia*, from cap. 20. to the end. To these Testimonies we may adde several Hypotheses of *Augustin*, which demonstratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin. As, (1) He asserted, that Reprobation was the act of Gods absolute Wil, and so in it self positive and absolute. (2) He held, That Excecation and Obduration is the consequent of Reprobation: of which see *Jansenius, August.*

de Grat. Christ. l. 10. c. 3, 4. (3) He maintained, That al sins in lapsed Nature are necessary, because punishments, as *Jansen. de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264.* Lastly, that *Augustin* held Gods Efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin, is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians, who imputed to him the same odiose and forged consequences, which have been ever since imputed to the Assertors of *Predeterminative Concurse*. As, [1] They falsely charged on him, that he asserted a fatal Necessitie, and said, that God compelled men to sin. Whereas *Augustin*, l. 1. q. 2. ad *Simpl.* answers (in the same manner as we now adays) That God is said to harden some Sinners, in that he has not mercie on them, not that he impels them to sin, &c. [2] The Pelagians charged on *Augustin*, That he denied to sinners the Libertie of their Wil, &c. It's true, when he discourseth of *Moral Libertie*, consisting in Adherence unto God, he denieth, that sinners have any such Libertie; but yet he fully asserts a *Natural Libertie*, that which is essential to the wil, to belong to al sinners, of which see *Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 7. c. 12. p. 330.* To conclude, there is scarce any imputation falsely charged on those that assert predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin now a-days, but it was also imputed to *Augustin* by the Pelagians of old, and wiped off by him, as by us, which sufficiently demonstrates, that his Sentiments were as to this Hypothesis the same with ours. He that wil see more of *Augustins* mind about this mater, may consult *Rutherford, de Providentia, cap. 30. Chamier, Panstrat. Tom. 2. Lib. 3. c. 8.*

Si ergo servi
sunt peccati,
quid se jactant
de libero ar-
bitrio? *August.*
libr. de Spirit.
& *lit. c. 30.*

Prosper and
Fulgentius.

Next to *Augustin* follow his Sectators and Disciples, *Prosper* and *Fulgentius*, whom our Adversaries would fain make to be of their persuasion, but without shadow of Truth or Reason. As for the sentiments of *Prosper* touching our Hypothesis, they are to be seen, *ad capitula Gallorum*, where, following *Augustin*, he makes God to wil sin as the punishment of sin. So *Fulgentius*, l. 1. ad *Monimum*, c. 26: God, albeit he be not the Author of evil cogitations, yet he is the Ordinator of evil Wils: neither doth he cease to work good out of the evil work of every evil man: neither in the very unjust works of the Wil, doth he relinquish the just order of his own works; because this he hath in that very order, that he doth justly desert the evil Wil—and in the very unjust wil of the sinner, he fulfills his own Justice, &c. What could be said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis? Is God the Ordinator of evil Wils? doth he not then efficaciously

efficaciously, yea predeterminatively move and order them in their very evil acts? And doth he not cease to worke good out of their evil workes? Must he not then applie their wils to the entitative act of those evil workes? And what is this but to predetermine their wils to the substrate mater of those evil workes? Again, if God, in the very unjust workes of the Wil doth not relinquish the just order of his workes, then surely he must of necessitie applie and predetermine the wil of the Sinner to the entitative act of the worke, thereby to maintain his own just order.

§. 2. We now passe on to such as succeded the Fathers, and albe it they lived in the bosome of the Roman Church, yet they stil defended the Doctrine of *Augustin* and our Hypothesis, as to Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin. I shal begin with *Anselme*, Bishop of *Canterburie*, who flourished about the year 1095, an *Italian* by Nation, Monke by profession, of a most acute Ingenie, devotional Sanctitie, conjoined with great Prudence and Humilitie, according to the character given him by *Baronius*. This *Anselme*, de *Concord. Præscientiæ, Prædestinationis, Gratiæ & Liberi Arbitrii*, c. 1. thus speaketh: God worketh althings, which are wrought by a just or unjust Wil, i. e. both good and evil workes; In good workes truely he causeth both that they are, and that they are good; but in evil workes he causeth that they are, but not that they are evil. Herein he gives us the difference between Gods Concurse to good and evil acts, as also the demonstration of our Hypothesis; for if God causeth evil acts that they are, then certainly he efficaciously moves and applies the wil to the act, which is al that we mean by Predetermination.

Such as succeeded the Fathers.

Anselme.

Next follows *Hugo de Sancto Victore*; by Nation a *Saxon*, (and so allied to us,) by profession a Monke, contemporary with *Bernard*, who flourished about the year 1130. This *Hugo*, de *Sacr.*

Hugo de Sancto Victore.

Fid. l. 1. c. 13. saith, *That God wils there should be evil, and yet he doth not wil evil: He wils there should be evil, because it's good there should be evil; but he wils not evil, because evil it self is not good. An excellent description of Gods predeterminative wil and concurse to the substrate mater of sin, so as to vindicate his Sacred Majestie from any hand in the moral vitiositie thereof. (1) God wils there should be evil, i. e. he doth, by an omnipotent efficacious decree, wil the existence of evil, in willing the substrate mater thereof: and yet (2) He doth not wil evil, i. e. he doth

* Malum esse vult Deus, & tamen malum non vult: vult esse malum, quia bonum est malum esse; non vult ipsum malum, quia bonum non est ipsum malum.

Deum malas
voluntates præ-
sidendo, occul-
tâ & invisibili
operatione ad
suum arbitrium
temperare &
inclinare.

doth not with a wil of approbation or any way morally wil evil as to its moral vitiositie or formal reason. (3) *It's good there should be evil, i. e.* as it conduceth to the illustration of Gods glorie; and so God wils it. But (4) *evil itself*, [morally considered as evil] *is not good*, and therefore not willed by God as such. The same *Hugo, de Sacramentis, par. 5. cap. 29.* affirmes, *That God by presiding over evil wils, doth, by an occult and invisible operation, temper and incline them to his own wil.* What could more expressly be said for the asserting Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin? Doth God indeed preside over the evil wils of men, and so, by an occult and invisible operation, temper and incline them to his own wil? how is it possible then, but that he applie and determine them to the entitative act of their sinful workes? And whereas *Hugo* foresaw many would be then, as now also, scandalised at this doctrine, touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of sin, he addes this as the reason of the offense: *Not because that which is spoken is not wel spoken, but because that which is wel spoken is not wel understood.* I wish our Adversaries would wel consider this prophetic reflexion of *Hugo*; of which more hereafter in *Bradwardines* sentiments.

Aquinas.

We passe on to *Thomas Aquinas*, whom some of our Adversaries would fain conjure into their Campe, and make a Patrone of their Antithesis: but this is so great an imposition on the intelligent world, that I cannot but admire at the confidence of those who make use of it. Yet this has been the attempt not only of some lesse conversant in *Aquinas's* Workes, but even of learned *Strangius*, who is oft more candid and ingenuous than others of his persuasion. Thus *Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 14. from pag. 313. to 317.* endeavors to demonstrate, *That Thomas doth not admit that physick predetermination of God to al and singular actions of the wil:* The like a reverend Divine of esteeme among our selves would fain persuade us, namely, *That albeit the Dominicans are for such an universal predetermination, yet Aquinas is not, &c.* But let us a little examine the reason of this subterfuge: (1) Was not *Thomas Aquinas* himself a Dominican, of the Order of *Dominic*? And are not al the Dominicans sworne *Thomists*? Albeit they are in regard of their Order Dominicans, yet are they not al in regard of their Doctrine Thomists? How comes it to passe then that they should contend so hotly for physick predetermination of the wil by God in al its natural actions, even such as are sinful, and yet *Tho-*

mas

mas their Master against it? (2) Take the character of impartial Writers, and who ever denied this to be *Aquinas's* sentiment? See learned and acute Dr. *Samuel Ward*, Professor of Theologie at *Cambridge*, his *Determinations*, pag. 117, 118. where he proves Gods predeterminative Concurse to al actions of the wil out of *Thomas*. But because Dr. *Ward* seems to be our friend, we shal appele unto our Adversaries for the decision of this Controversie, namely to *Le Blanc* and *Baronius*. *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par. 3. thes. 10. pag. 430.* assures us, That *Thomas* and his sectators the *Dominicans*, teach, for the explication of Divine Concurse— That God doth premove and applie the very second causes to their worke: for this the dependence of the second causes on God their first Mover doth require. For, according to their mind, God is therefore said to be the first Mover, because he doth antecedently move and applie al other causes to their operations, &c. What could be said more evidently to explicate *Aquinas's* mind herein? Thus also *Baronius*, who, in his *Metaphysics*, Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 78. pag. 146. imputes this celebrated Opinion of Gods previous predeterminative concurse to al actions unto *Thomas Aquinas*, as the principal Founder thereof. So §. 79. pag. 147. And §. 82. pag. 149. he urgeth, That from the opinion of *Thomas* it follows, that God is the Author of sin: The like §. 85. pag. 151. But (3) to let passe the testimonies of others, if we may be allowed the privilege of believing our own senses, and the reflexions of our own reason thereon, it is to me most evident, that *Aquinas* has copiously and nervosely defended our Hypothesis, and impugned the Antithesis of our Adversaries. Thus, 1. 2. Quest. 79. Art. 2. The act of sin is both Ens and Act, and in both regards it is from God: for it's necessary that every Ens or Being be derived from the first Being, &c. And whereas *Strangius* and a reverend Divine among our selves pretend, that this includes immediate concurse, but not predeterminative, it is most evident, that *Aquinas* owned no concurse but what was predeterminative: For what is predetermination of the wil, but the application of it to its act, as *Strangius*, pag. 244. grants? And is not this the proper notion whereby *Aquinas* describeth the Concurse of God to al acts of the wil? What more commun with him, than this grand Effate, That God applies al second causes to their act? Thus in his sums, par. 1. Quest. 105. Art. 5. he layes down this conclusion, That God actes in every Agent finally, effectively, and formally, yet so as they also act. And then in the explication hereof

Prædetermina-
re voluntatem
est applicare
voluntatem ad
agendum, & fa-
cere ut faciat,
Strang. l. 2. c. 11.
p. 244.

he

he saith, '(3) That it is to be considered, that God doth not
 'only move things to work, as by applying the formes and vir-
 'tues of things to their operations, (as also the Artificer applies
 'the axe to cut, who yet sometimes gives not the forme to the
 'axe) but also gives formes to creatures acting, and preserves
 'them in being— and because the forme is in the thing,— and
 'God is properly the cause of the universal Being in althings,
 'which among althings is more intime, it follows, that God
 'workes intimely in althings; and for this reason in sacred Scri-
 'pture, the operations of nature are ascribed unto God, as work-
 'ing in nature, according to that, *Job 10. 11. With skin and with*
'flesh hast thou clothed me, &c. What could have been said more
 evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis? He saith, (1) *That*
God actes in every Agent, not only finally and effectively, but also for-
mally. (2) *That God moves things to worke, by APPLYING (i. e.*
predetermining) the formes and virtues of things to their operations.
 Yea, (3) *That God applies the second cause to act, as the Artificer ap-*
plies the instrument to worke. Whereby he makes al second causes,
 the wil not excepted, but a kind of instrument of Gods principal
 efficiencie: For the wil, albeit it may be termed a principal cause
 of most of its acts, yet in regard of the Divine concurse, which it
 receives, and in virtue whereof it actes, it may safely be termed
 a vital Instrument. (4) *That God acting most intimely in althings,*
the very operations of nature are ascribed unto him, which notes pre-
 determination in the highest point. So also *Aquinas, Quest. Disp.*
q. 3. de Potentia, art. 7. speakes fully of this *predeterminative appli-*
cation of al second causes by God. And indeed how frequently is this
 Hypothesis demonstrated by him? So that I cannot but wonder,
 that any learned man should urge *Aquinas's* testimonie against
 us.

Scotus.

We descend now to *Scotus*, (the Head of a Sect opposite to the
 Thomists, yet) who hath given evident and strong confirmation
 and demonstration to our Hypothesis. I am not ignorant, that
 a learned and pious Divine makes use also of *Scotus's* name to
 patronise his Antithesis: and I shal not denie, but that *Scotus* has
 in many points too much favored the Pelagian interest, which has
 inclined the Jesuites to follow him rather than *Thomas*; yet this
 I no way dout but to make good, that as to our Hypothesis, *touch-*
ing Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin, *Scotus*
 is fully of our persuasion. This wil appear evident, (1) if we
 consider

consider his notion of *Divine Prescience* of things future, which he makes to arise from the Divine Decree giving futurition to them, as *Le Blanc, de Prescient. thes. 33. pag. 443.* confesseth. And certainly such as hold Gods prescience of sins future to be from his own Decree efficaciously determining their futurition, cannot with any shadow of reason denie Gods predeterminative concurrence to the substrate mater of sin. (2) *Scotus* and his sectators generally hold, *That God efficaciously concurs to all second causes and their acts, not by any influence or impression on the second cause, (which the Thomists assert) but by his absolute and efficacious Decree applying and determining the second cause to act.* Which we judge to be the very truth, as it hath been demonstrated by us, *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 3.* So that the Thomists and Scotists differ not really as to the point of predetermination, but only as to its origine and principe; the Thomists making it to consist in a physick intrinsic influx impressed on the creature, and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God, without any force impressed on the second cause, as our Country-man *Compt. Carleton*, in his *Philosophie, Disp. 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327.* has incomparably well stated it. But (3) *Scotus*, in *4. Sentent. Distinct. 49. Quæst. 6. §. 14. pag. 522. (edit. 1620.)* has these very words: *Est contra naturam ejus, [scil. voluntatis] determinari à causa inferiori, quia tunc ipsa non esset superior: non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori, quia cum hoc stat, quod sit causa in suo ordine, It's against its nature, [namely the wils] to be determined by an inferior cause, because then it should not be superior; but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause, because it is consistent herewith, that it be a cause in its own order.* Wherein *Scotus* doth most acutely, though briefly, state the Controversie about Predetermination both negatively and positively. (1) Negatively, *That the wil cannot be determined, or predetermined, by any inferior cause; because then it were not superior: for whatever cause predetermines another to act, is so far superior to it: it being impossible, yea a contradiction, that the inferior should predetermine the superior.* (2) Positively, *That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a superior cause, i. e. by God the first cause, who gave it being, and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation: and Scotus's reason is invincible; because to be predetermined by a superior cause, is very well consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order: Yea, we*

may

Scotistæ nihil hujusmodi physicum & intrinsicum creaturæ inditum esse volunt, sed eam dicunt per decretum Dei extrinsecum, absolutum, & efficacax ad agendum applicari, ac determinari, Carleton. Philos. Disp. 30. sect. 1. pag. 327.

may raise this reason to a greater height, therefore the wil is a cause in its own order, *i. e.* a particular, proper, principal, or lesse principal cause, according to the nature of its causalitie and effect, because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause: so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil, even such as have sin appendent to them, is, according to *Scotus's* sentiments, so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting, as that it corroborates and confirms the same. (4) Lastly, *Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist. 37. q. 2.* faith expressly, 'That [albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful, yet] the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God, but to the create wil, because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action; but God is not bound by any such obligation, &c. Which is the same with the sentiments of *Zuinglius* and our reformed Divines, albeit opposed by the new Methodists, as wel as Arminians and Molinists.

Gregorius Ariminensis.

Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes, *Thomas* and *Scotus*, we now passe on to their sectators, whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious. To begin with *Gregorius Ariminensis*, who was by profession a Dominican, and great defendent of *Augustin's* Doctrine; whom Bishop *Usher* valued as the *foundest* of the Schole-men, and Dr. *Barlow*, as the *acuteft*: His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find, in *Sent. 2. Distinct. 34. Art. 3.* where he demonstrates Gods *immediate effieience in producing the entitative act of sin thus*: '(1) Every evil act when produced is conserved by God. *Ergo.* The antecedent he proves thus: because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God, but be independent; and so by stronger reason, the wil itself, which is more perfect than its act, should be independent. Again, if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act, neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same. (2) The wil is of itself indifferent to any act, therefore it must be determined to every act by God. (3) If God be not the immediate cause of the act, which is evil, he is not the Maker of al Beings. (4) Al good that is not God, is from God as the Efficient thereof; but the act morally evil is yet naturally good. *Ergo.* Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus: '(1) *If God produce the*

Object. 1.

'the same evil act, which man produceth, then he sins as man sins.
 'Whereto he answers, by denying the consequence, and that on
 'this reason; because man doth not therefore precisely sin, be-
 'cause he doth an evil act, as it is *Ens* or act; but therefore he
 'sins, because he doth it *evilly*, i. e. against right reason; [or the
 'Law of God] but now God produceth the same act according to
 'right reason, and therefore wel. So the same man borne in
 'fornication, is produced by God wel, but by the fornicator evil-
 'ly. But (2) it is farther objected by his Adversaries then, as
 by ours now, thus: *Thou wilt say, that those things that are, per Object. 2.*
se, in themselves [or intrinsically] evil, as the hatred of God, or the
like, can never be wel done: therefore neither by God. 'I responde,
 'saith he, (as we) that there is or can be no entitie which may
 'not be wel done, albeit not by every Agent: e. g. *man envieth*;
 'but God, although he produce the same act of envie with man,
 'yet he doth not envie. For al such acts, beyond the simple pro-
 'duction or motion of such or such a thing, do connote some-
 'thing on the part of the Author, who is so denominated, which
 'agrees not to God: So to *steal*, besides the simple translation of
 'the thing from place to place, connotes the thing stolne not to
 'belong to him that translated it: but God translating the same
 'thing, doth not translate what is not his own; and therefore is
 'not said to be the thief, &c. But here we are to note, that
 whereas *Gregorius Ariminensis* makes God to be a *partial cause* of
 sin, it is not to be understood, as if God were the *partial cause* of
 the entitative act, for so he makes God to be a *total cause*; but he
 calls God a *partial cause* of sin, as he produceth only the entitative
 act, not the vitiositie, whereof man only is the moral cause. Thus
 also *Ho'cot*, our Country-man, *super Sentent. lib. 2. Dist. 1. q. 1. Holcot:*
 makes God to be a *partial cause of sin*, yet not the *Author of it*:
 whereby he plainly means, as he explicates himself, that God is
 the physical cause of the substrate mater, or entitative act only,
 but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also. This I mention,
 because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressi-
 ons of *Ariminensis* and *Holcot*, would persuade us, that they make
 God the partial cause of the entitative act. We might adde to
 these the testimonies of *Alti'siodorensis*, in *Sent. 2.* where he proves *Alti'siodorensis*
 by strong arguments, namely from the Passion of Christ, &c. *That*
the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human
wil; of which more in what follows touching Bradwardine.

Thomas Bradwardine *his character and zeale for efficacious Grace.*

I now come to *Thomas Bradwardine*, our pious, learned and profound *Bradwardine*, whom, might I be allowed my libertie, I should rather reckon among our first Reformers, than among the Sons of Antichrist; for indeed he was a zealous Patron of, and stout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Religion, specially efficacious free Grace, which he with so much courage, strength of argument, and flaming zeale defended against the Pelagians of those days. This *Thomas Bradwardine*, borne at *Hartfield* in *Sussex*, flourished about the year 1350. He was a person of prodigious natural ingenie, which he greatly polished by all manner of acquired Sciences, specially the Mathematics and scholastic Theologie. He was a great Affecter and Admirer of metaphysic Contemplations, which in his first studies he greedily drank in, even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures, because they favored not of a metaphysic style, as he himself informes us, in his Book *de Causa Dei*. When, saith he, in the state of my unregeneracie, I came into the Scholes, and heard Lectures on Pauls Epistles of free Grace, &c. it did no way relish with me, quia non sapit stylum metaphysicum, because it savored not of a metaphysic style. It was with me, as it was with Augustin of old, nothing would please but scholastic discourses for free wil, &c. But after his Conversion he was, as another Augustin, the greatest Champion for free efficacious Grace. *Balaus, de Script. Brit. cent. 5. cap. 87.* tels us, 'That *John Baconthorpe*, that famous Divine and English-man, returning from *Paris* had a great contest with *Bradwardine* about the points of Gods Prescience and Predestination; to whom at last *Bradwardine* assents in all those points; as the same *Baconthorpe* declares, in *Sent. lib. 4. Dist. 1. q. 4.* Afterwards he was called to be Confessor to King *Edward III.* and thence made Archbishop of *Canterbury*, without any desire of his own thereto. He was indeed a good Mathematician, a great Philosopher, and excellent Divine, being communly stiled *Doctor profundus*, the profound Doctor.

His zeale for efficacious Concourse to the substrate mater of sin.

Neither was he lesse renowned for his Pietie and Zeale in the Cause of God, against the Pelagians, which he defended with great fervor, as well as acumen of spirit; which also is greatly illustrious in his defence of Gods efficacious Concourse and Providence about the substrate mater of sinful acts. This he frequently inculcates in his most excellent Book *de Causa Dei*, specially *lib. 1. c. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34.* He demonstrates (1) That all voluntary actions

are

are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence, cap. 30, 31. p. 271, &c. (2) That althings which have any natural Entitie or Being, procede from Gods Providence actually and efficaciously disposing them, and not merely permitting. Which he demonstrates many ways: as [1] Because there is no act simply evil and inordinate, by any inordination precedent to the divine wil. [2] Because otherwise the whole Universe would not be disposed in the best manner. [3] Because the Scriptures both of Old and New Testaments, ascribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names. Thus cap. 32. p. 288. (3) That about whatever Gods Permission is, his actual Volition is also employed about the same. And he gives this demonstrative reason hereof: For albeit those things that are evil as evil are not good, yet it is good that there should be not only good things, but also evil. For unless it were good that evils be, the Omnipotent good would not suffer them to be, as Cap. 33.

Hence, (4) He comes l. 34. to the state of the controversie, *How God wils Sin*. How God wils sin, and how he wils it not. [1] He proves, p. 294; Sin. 295. That God must necessarily wil the existence of Sin, because he permits it: also God doth voluntarily provide for, yea act al the voluntary acts of the wil both good and evil, with al their positive circumstances, which necessarily import sin. Again, 'This Proposition, 'Sin is, is true; and therefore there must be some cause of its 'truth, which can be no other than the divine wil, from which 'al complexe beings as wel as incomplexe have their origination. Again, 'Whatever is good must procede from the first 'good: but that Sin existe, is good, according to *Augustin*. So 'Hugo saith, That God wils that sins existe, because this is good; 'Moreover, he brings in *Hugo* speaking thus; (which deserves 'a great remarque) If it be said, God wils sin, this seems harsh and 'scandalous to the ear; and therefore some pious mind doth refute 'this, not because that which is spoken, is il spoken, but because that 'which is wel spoken is il understood. [2] Thence *Bradwardine* proceeds to refute *Lombard*, who asserts, That God wils sin as a punishment, not under this reason, as it is sin; [i. e. materially or entitatively considered] which Hypothesis of *Lombard* he refutes; by shewing, 'That the punishment of sin is necessarily conjoined with 'the Sin: so that if God wils sin as a punishment, he must necessarily wil the existence of sin. Also whoever knows two 'things to be necessarily and inseparably conjoined, and wils that 'they should be so conjoined, and knowingly and rationally wils. 'one;

'one; the same person wils also the other; specially if about
 'both he employ an act of his wil: But now God knows and
 'wils that those two, *Sin* and *Punishment* be conjoined together,
 'and rationally wils the one, namely the punishment of sin,
 'therefore also the sin. Again, he that wils an Antecedent, wils
 'also the Consequent, at least in an universal, albeit not in a par-
 'ticular: for he that wils a whole, wils al the parts necessary
 'thereto. [3] Thence he procedes, p. 300. to shew, *how God*
wils sin: God, saith he, *doth no way wil Sin simply, but only in some*
limited respect: 'For, to say that God wils something simply, is,
 'according to the commun manner of speech, to say, that he
 'loves it and approves of it as good. Yea, addes he, may it
 'not be said, that in the whole Universe there is no such thing
 'as Inordination, Deformitie, or Sin simply considered, but only
 'Sin in some respect? Because in regard of the prime and su-
 'preme Cause, al Beings both positive and privative are sweetly
 'disposed with the highest wisdome, beautie, and justice. Whence
 [4] He gives us the difference between Gods Concurse to sinful
 acts, and to such as are good, p. 302. God, saith he, *is not the*
Author of sin, as of that which is done wel: 'For of this he is the
 'Author so, as that he alone doth supernaturally create, and
 'give to the wel-doer, Faith, Hope and Love, &c. But it is not
 so as to sin. *i. e.* As to good, God produceth not only the natural
 act, but also the moral Bonitie, but as to Sin, he produceth
 only the natural entitative Act. [5] He thence p. 302. expli-
 cates, how the Apostle *Paul* and the Fathers denied, *that God*
wils Sin: 'When, saith he, *Augustin* and the other holy men
 'denie *that God wils Sin*, the cause of this negation seems this:
 'Because the Apostle and *Augustin*, and other holy men placed
 'Predestination, Prescience, and the like on Gods part, the *Pe-*
 '*lagians* and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins,
 'and retort the cause and blame on God, who so predestinated
 'or foreknew: therefore these holy men would say, that God
 'by his Predestination, Prescience or such like, doth not compel
 'them against their wil to sin, but that they sin freely and by
 'their own wil; and that God by predestinating, foreknowing,
 'or willing sins, doth not sin, nor do unjustly, neither is he the
 'first imputable, or culpable cause of sins; but the first, impu-
 'table, and culpable cause is the proper wil of the Sinner. This
 indeed is the proper state of our controversie at this day. Then
 he

he addes, pag. 303. 'But if it yet be said, that it always
'hears il with many to say, *That God doth any wise wil sin*, it
'is certainly true, and that peradventure according to *Hugo*
'before cited, *not because that which is said is not wel said, but*
'*because that which is wel said, is not wel understood.* I would
'to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine
'wisdome, and favor and understand the truth which is favo-
'ry to a sane tast; and that they would know, that there is
'no evil in the world, which is not for some great good: why
'therefore should we substract from the World, and from God
'the Author of the World, this way of doing good, or of be-
'nefaction, which is so admirable and great? Yea it seems
'more miraculouse and great, to worke good out of evils than out
'of goods, or to worke good only. And without peradventure
'it seemeth so disgustful to many, if it be said, that God wils
'and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daugh-
'ter, of the Son with the Mother, of Parricide, Sedition, Blas-
'phemie, and other like sins: and yet not only the Saints, but
'also the Philosophers speak thus: For who in such an incest pre-
'pares the seed, and moves, creates, and infuseth the soul into
'the *fœtus*, but God? and however it may sound, thus the Saints
'of God speak, yea the Spirit of God, who speaks in them.
What could be said more acutely, demonstratively and di-
vinely for the deciding our controversie, would men but re-
ceive it?

Non quia quod
dicitur non be-
ne dicitur, sed
quia quod bene
dicitur, non
bene intelli-
gitur. *Hugo.*

(5) Again, *Bradwardine*, l. 2. c. 20. p. 542, &c. proves out
of *Altiſſiodorensis*, super 2. sent. 'That the evil action is from God
'operating and cooperating with the human wil. *Altiſſiodorensis's* ar-
'guments are these, [1] From the *Passion of Christ*, which was
'good, and proceeded from a good cause, namely the Wil of God.
'[2] From the act of Fornication, whereby an holy Prophet is
'begotten: which act is the cause of good, and therefore good;
'and yet it is also evil: and therefore an evil action as it is an
'action is good and from God. Thence he addes the Testimo-
nie of *Thomas*, in *Quest. de malo*, q. 19. where he demands,
Whether the act of sin be from God? and he answers thus: 'It must
'be said, that among the Ancients there was a double opinion
'concerning this mater: some said more anciently, *that the acti-*
'*on of Sin was not from God*; attending to the very Deformity of
'Sin, which is not from God: but some said, *that the action of*

How the entita-
tive act is from
Gods Predeter-
minative Con-
course.

'*Sin.*

‘*Sin is from God*; attending to the very Essence of the Act, which
 ‘must be granted to be from God, and that on a double reason;
 ‘[1] *Commun*, because God being *Ens or Being by his own Essence*,
 ‘and his very Essence his Being, it must thence necessarily follow,
 ‘that whatever doth *participate* of Being, must be derived from
 ‘him who is *Being* by Essence. [2] *Special*: for it is necessary
 ‘that al motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover,
 ‘who is God, asp. 554

(6) *Bradwardine*, l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher, and proves
 strongly, *That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or*
move without God, of himself, properly, actually, and specially applying
it to act, and moving of it. Which he demonstrates many wayes:
 as [1] Because no natural virtue or forme can operate without
 Gods cooperating therewith. [2] Because al natural things or
 causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause.
 [3] Because the create wil cannot subsist of it self; therefore
 neither can it act of it self, as c. 24. p. 563. [4] Because God,
 by reason of his infinite Actualitie, permits nothing but what he
 wils.

How God spon-
taneously impels
men to the en-
titative act of
Sin.

(8) *Bradwardine*, l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher, and
 demonstrates, *That God, albeit he impel no man violently against*
his wil, yet he impels al mens wils spontaneously, and draws them to
al their free acts, even such as have sin annexed to them. ‘But fur-
 ‘ther, addes he, it may be probably said, that God doth in some
 ‘sense necessitate to the very act of sin, as to the substance of
 ‘the act; yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate
 ‘to sin, or to the deformitie of sin, as it is sin, or the deformitie
 ‘of sin: for the omnipotent God may, as it appears, separate
 ‘the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from
 ‘the Deformitie of sin, and can produce and conserve such an
 ‘effect really positive and good, without such a defect and priva-
 ‘tive malice: Specially, sithat Sin, Deformitie, Vitiositie, or de-
 ‘fect is not essentially the very act, nor of the essence of the act,
 ‘nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act. There-
 ‘fore the good God acting rightly, pre-acting and in some sense
 ‘necessitating to such an act, according to its substance and na-
 ‘ture good, the vitiositie or sin doth not thence necessarily fol-
 ‘low: whence therefore doth it follow, but from the free wil
 ‘of the Creature freely deficient, and from the wil of the Sinner?
 What could be said more acutely, more judiciously, more de-
 monstratively,

monstratively, and more piously, to put a period to this contro-
versie, had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth? I
have been the more prolix in rehearsing these illustrious and de-
monstrative Sentiments of *Bradwardine*, because I find nothing
newly started by our Adversaries, but what I find rationally, so-
lidly, and convictively solved by him, above three hundred years
since. As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by
his Opponents then, and ours now, we shal produce them in
what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis,
Ch. 6. §. 1, 2.

Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient *The Dominicans*
Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis, *sentiments.*
we might now descend to the later Scholemen, specially the *Tho-*
mists; but these lie under the same criminal accusation and im-
putation with our Adversaries, as the orthodoxe *Calvinist*; and
it deserves a particular remarque, that look as the Pelagian Je-
suites oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin
of being *Calvinists*; so the Arminians and New Methodists op-
pose the Calvinists in the same point, under the Bears skin of
being *Dominicans*: and indeed no wonder, sithat the Domini-
cans and Calvinists in this point about Gods predeterminative
Concurse to the substrate mater of sin do greatly accord. And
let our Adversaries say what they list against the Dominicans,
it's certain, that in this mater they have done great service to the
cause and interest of Truth: and particularly *Alvarez*, who is *Alvarez.*
principally struck at by the adverse partie, deserves great ho-
nor and diligent inspection by those who have any kindness for
our Hypothesis, or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace.
I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations, *Strangius*,
and a Reverend Divine of Name among our selves, have laid
upon him in their Oppositions to what he has writ in the defense
of our Hypothesis; but the Jesuites themselves, who are his most
puissant Impugnators, give him a more candid and favorable
treatment: For in the treaty between them and the Jansenists
begun *Feb. 18. 1663.* the Jesuites rejecting the Arbitrament of
Gregorie Ariminensis and *Estius*, whom they judged more severe,
they pitcht upon *Alvarez* as the more moderate, to whom they
required the Jansenists to conforme in those points controverted,
in order to an accomodement: and the reasons they allege are
of moment: 'For, say they, *Alvarez* having assisted at the Con-

‘*gregations de Auxiliis*, there is a grand apparence, that he and those others who writ at the same time and since, took up this mode of speech to salve Libertie, according to the movements and sentiments which the Popes, *Clement 8th*, and *Paul 5th* had; albeit they made no Decree on this mater; of which see *Refutat. de Pere Ferrier*, Chap. 6. and *Idea of Jansenisme*, p. 82. wherein remarque, (1) That the Jesuites, *Alvarez*’s sworne enemies, give him a more favorable character, as one, who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to assist at the *Congregations de Auxiliis*, for the composing the differences in those points in controversie between the Dominicans and Jesuites about Predetermination. Yea, (2) That the Popes themselves, *Clement 8th*, and *Paul 5th*, had the same sentiments with *Alvarez*. Is it not strange then, that the Jesuites, who are professed enemies to Predetermination, and the Popes themselves, who have been generally favorers of Pelagianisme, should have a greater kindnesse for *Alvarez*’s sentiments about Predetermination, than Protestant Divines, whose Doctrine against the Pelagians and Jesuites can never be defended but by those principes on which *Alvarez* bottomes his Predetermination? For mine own part, I cannot but confesse, that in those Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination, I read *Alvarez* with al possible diligence and exactitude of spirit, and found therein so penetrant an acumen, so profound soliditie, and such masculine Demonstrations, as that I never met with his equal, excepting *Bradwardine* and *Ariminensis*. This Justice I conceive my self under an essential obligation to do him, to wipe off those undeserved clamors and aspersions which *Strangius* and another Divine of note among us, have loaded him with. His own Sentiments in the defense of our Hypothesis are laid down in his excellent *Disputations de Auxil. l. 3. Disput. 24.* where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonstrate, *That God doth by a previous motion, truely and efficiently, or according to the mode of a physical cause, premove free-wil to the act of sin, as it is an Act or Being.* His Arguments for the demonstration of this Thesis are weighty and invincible, namely from the Participation, Limitation, and Dependence of every Second cause, &c. Of which hereafter, c. 5. Lastly, that the Scholemen generally, besides such as are *Pelagian*, assert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin, see *Twisse, Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digress. 2.*

I now

I now passe on to *Jansenius* and his Sectators, who are brought upon the Theatre by our Adversaries as Patrons of their Antithesis: but this is so great a mistake in matter of fact, that I cannot but admire any learned man should take refuge under it. Yet thus *Strangius* l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in *Jansenius* opposing *Augustin* both to the Dominicans and Jesuites as to the point of Predetermination. The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of C. T. p. 3. repute among us. But this mistake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers: For (1) It's evident, that *Jansenius* rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the *Dominicans*, not the thing it self as asserted by *Augustin*: Thus in his *August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77, &c.* he proves, 'That there is no manner of speech among the Scholem: men so efficacious and pregnant to expresse Predetermination by, but *Augustin* useth the same to illustrate Gods efficacious concurrence. And *Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343.* he acknowledgeth, 'That those learned men the Dominicans have reached the Marrow of Divine Adjutorie, and thence the true opinion of *Augustin*. Again, cap. 3. p. 346. he saith expressly, that herein Medicinal Adjutorie agrees with phisic Predetermination, that the office of physically predetermining the wil doth truly belong unto it, and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abstract, but also in the concrete. Whence in the same Chapter he useth the very terme of phisic Predetermination to expresse efficacious Concourse by, albeit not in the same manner as it is used by the Scholemen. So that it's evident, he was not averse from the thing, albeit he but seldome used the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholastic Theologues, as also to confine himself to the termes used by *Augustin*. (2) That reverend Divine among us, who makes use of *Jansenius*'s name against phisic Predetermination, doth yet grant, that *Jansenius* held, the existence of sin to be necessary as a Punishment. Wherein he opposeth *Jansenius*, and also *Augustin*, who held, that sin as a punishment, was willed and caused by God, as before. (3) *Jansenius August. de Statu Nat. Laps. l. 4. c. 21. p. 264.* assures us, That men in their lapsed state, before Faith be introduced, are under the captivitie of lust, and can do nothing but sin; which captivitie is the same with that foresaid necessitie and coaction, whereby sins committed by unbelievers are said to be necessary, and therefore they have no power to abstain from sin. And *Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi, l. 10.* he stoutly maintains these following asserti-

The Doctrine of Jansenius concordant with our Hypothesis.

ons about Reprobation, which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin. [1] He proves, *cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is also positive.* [2] He demonstrates, *cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cause of Reprobation, according to its comparative consideration, is the absolute wil of God.* This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter, *Cathol. Theol. part. 3. Sect. 7. §. 22. pag. 93.* in these words: [*Jansenius's Doctrine is that*] *the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute wil, of men in original sin, and the effect of it excecation and obduration.* This being his proper opinion, it necessarily follows, that he asserted Gods predeterminative concurse to the entitative act of sin: for, as it is granted by *Strangius*, and others, efficacious predetermination always follows as a necessary consequent of absolute predefinition: if God absolutely decrees to leave men to sin, it necessarily follows, that he efficaciously determine men to the entitative act of sin. [3] He goes higher than most of our Divines dare do in this point, in asserting, *cap. 5. pag. 424. That damnation, excecation, obduration are the effects of Reprobation.* But yet *cap. 7. pag. 427.* he answers the objection of such, that argue hence, *That God lies in wait to destroy such as are reprobated; assuring us, that the sinner only is the culpable criminal cause of his own damnation.* And *cap. 10. pag. 433.* he demonstrates, *That Reprobates are not created unto damnation, i. e. damnation as such is not the end of their creation: which sufficiently vindicates the holy God from being the cause of their sin or damnation.*

The Jansenists
sentiments.

As for the Jansenists, that they are of the same persuasion with the Dominicans as touching our Hypothesis, is evident from their concessions to the Jesuites in their Treatie begun *Febr. 18. 1663.* mentioned in the *Refutation of Pere Ferrier, Chap. 6.* also *Idea of Jansenisme, pag. 82.* The sum was this: The Bishop of Comenge, a friend of the Jansenists, proposed this as an expedient to reconcile the two Parties, *That the Jansenists declare, that they had no other sentiment about this mater, but what was taught by the Thomists.* And because some of the Thomists flie higher than others, the Jesuites demanded, *That the Jansenists should reduce themselves to the forme of speech used by Alvarez.* So that it seems the Jansenists in the point of efficacious Concurse are looked on by the Jesuites (as indeed they are) as those that went beyond the very Dominicans. The Jansenists replied, 'That the doctrine of *Jansenius* was not different from that of the Thomists, albeit it was
' not

'not his designe to render himself conforme to them, but to *Augustin*. And the true reason why the Jansenists do not maintain greater correspondence with the Dominicans, is, not their difference in doctrine, but because many of the Dominicans have by a *Spirit of Cabal*, or of Faction joined with the Jesuites.

Lastly, that our Hypothesis, touching Gods efficacious Concourse to al actions, even to such as have sin appendent to them, was generally owned, not only by single Sects or Parties, but by the generalitie of the Roman Church, before the rise of the Jesuites, is evident from the Doctrine of the *Roman Catechisme*, published by the command of the Council of *Trent*; where in the explication of the Apostles Creed, about the end of the first Article, *par. 1. cap. 2. §. 20. pag. 23. (edit. 1619.)* we find this great testimonie to confirm our Hypothesis: *God doth not only preserve and administrate althings that are by his providence, but also doth by an intime virtue, impel those things that are moved and do act any thing, to motion and action; so that albeit he doth not impede the effieience of second causes, yet he prevents them, in as much as his most secret force reacheth unto althings; and as the Wise-man testifies, Wild. 8. 1. He reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly doth order althings. Wherefore it is said by the Apostle, Act. 17. 21. For in him we live, and move, and have our being.*

What could have been said more clearly and fully for the asserting a predeterminative Concourse to al actions and motions of the creature, even such as have sin annexed to them? And by whom is this Doctrine taught? By the Council of *Trent*, which is the standard and measure of the Roman Faith, and no great friend to the Doctrine of Christ. Is it not strange then, that Reformed Divines, yea such as would be accounted Calvinists, cannot allow the efficacious Concourse of God so much as *Trent-Papists* allow?

§. 3. We have seen how far the Latin Fathers and those who lived in Communion with the Roman Church have openly espoused our Hypothesis; let us now descend to Reformed Theologues, and examine what their sentiments have been hereof. And here indeed we have an ample field to exspatiate in, albeit our Adversaries the new Methodists would confine us to a smal number of Adherents. We shal begin with *John Wiclef*, our first English Apostolic Reformer, who following *Bradwardine* his Colleague in this, as in many other points about Grace, asserted, *That as God necessitates the futuritions of instants, so also he necessitates al the events which in*

The Roman Catechisme.

Non solum Deus universa quæ sunt providentiâ suâ tuetur atq; administrat, verum etiam quæ moventur & agunt aliquid, intimâ virtute ad motum atq; actionem ita impellit, ut quamvis secundarum causarum efficiëntiam non impediât, præveniat tamen, cum ejus occultissima vis ad singula pertineat, *Sapient. 8. 1. Act. 17.*

The sentiments of Reformed Divines.

wiclef.

those

those instants are futures, Art. Constant. damnat. 278. Again, he held, That God necessitates all active creatures to each of their acts; as *Walden*, tom. 1. cap. 21. pag. 35. & cap. 23. pag. 37. also *Widesford*, pag. 240, 248. Again he asserted, That to whatever Gods permission reached, to that also his actual volition reached; as *Walden*, tom. 1. pag. 39. which clearly demonstrates our Hypothesis.

Calvin.

But we passe on to *John Calvin*, whom some new Methodists, particularly *Strangius*, would force into their Campe. Thus *Strang.* pag. 384, 554. where he endeavors to take off *Calvin* from our Partie: but he that looks into *Calvins* Institutions, l. 1. c. 18. wil find our assertion not only nakedly owned, but fully explicated and demonstrated, and that by a multitude of scriptural instances. Particularly he proves, (1) That God wils the existence

Interdum bonâ voluntate hominem velle aliquid, quod Deus non vult. Rursus fieri posse, ut idem velit homo voluntate malâ, quod Deus vult bonâ, *Calv. ex August.*

of mens sins; so that things repugnant to Gods wil of precept, are yet brought about by his efficacious wil of Decree and Providence. (2) That Gods permission of sin is not otiose, but active and energetic. (3) That Gods providence moderates and orders the sins of men. And he concludes the Chapter with this seasonable caution: 'As for those to whom this Doctrine of Gods judicial induration may seem rigid, let them but a little think, how tolerable their morositie may be, who reject a thing attested by such clear testimonies of Scripture, because it exceeds their capacitie, and count it a crime to bring to light things, which if God did not know to be profitable for our knowlege, he would never have reveled them by his Prophets and Apostles. So in other parts of his Works, as *Resp. contra Pighium*, de *Libr. Arbitr.* pag. 225. also *Tractat. de occulta Dei providentia*, he clearly asserts and demonstrates our Hypothesis. This is wel taken notice of by judicious *Davenant*, in his *Animadversions on Gods love*, &c. p. 322. 'It is, saith he, *Calvins* opinion, de occult. Dei provident. resp. ad 2. *Lapsum Adâ non fortuitum esse, sed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum.* God foresaw *Adams* fal; he had power to have hindred it, but he would not, because himself had decreed otherwise. This is the effect of *Calvins* doctrine. But as for the involving of men in sin and damnation out of his only wil and pleasure, these are consequents falsely inferred upon *Calvins* Doctrine, by himself disclaimed, &c.

Zuinglius.

How much *Zuinglius* favored this opinion of Gods efficacious Concourse to the entitative act of sin, is sufficiently evident from those great reproches which the Papists lode him with for it; which he wiped off with this answer, 'That the same action, which

‘which is sinful in regard of man, is not so in regard of God, because he is not under the same Law with man. Thus *Baronius*, *Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 87. pag. 132.* The third mode, saith he, is peculiar to *Zuinglius*, who teacheth, that God exciting the wil to an evil object doth not sin, because God hath no Law set to him, but man hath. To which *Baronius* answers, That albeit God hath no Law set to him by any Superior, yet he hath a Law set to him by his own nature, not to deal unjustly or cruelly with men. This replie, although borrowed from *Bellarmino*, is now become commun with our Adversaries, yet without the least shadow of reason: for they do but beg the question, in saying, That God hereby deals unjustly or cruelly with his creature. As for *Zuinglius*’s proper sentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wils of men to the entitative acts of sin, they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book *de Providentia Dei*, cap. 6. tom. 1. of his Workes, pag. 365. Seeing a Law is given to man, he always sins, when he actes against the Law, albeit he neither be, nor live, nor operate, but in God, and from God, and by God: But what God workes by man is turned to man for sin, but not in like manner to God: for man is under a law, but God is free—

Therefore one and the same wickednesse, suppose adulterie or homicide, as from God the Author, Motor, and Impulsor, it is a work, not a crime; but as it is from man, so it is a crime and wickednesse: for God is not bound up by law, but man is condemned by law. Thus he proceeds to illustrate by many exemples, of *David*, &c. Thence, pag. 367. he instanceth in the induration of *Pharaoh*, &c. where in note, (1) That he calls God the Author, Motor, and Impulsor of the act; which must be understood, not morally, but physically, as he excites and applies the wil to its act. (2) That he frees God from being the Author or moral cause of the sin, because he actes not against any law: a distinction which was valid in his time, albeit scoffed at now-a-days even by Reformed Divines, yea Calvinists. Neither was this distinction coined by *Zuinglius*, as *Bellarmino* and others would fain persuade, but in use long before *Zuinglius*, by *Scotus*, *Ariminensis*, and other scholastic Theologues, who followed *Augustin* herein. Thus *Scotus*, in *Sent. 2. Dist. 37. Quest. 2.* saith, The same action is sinful in regard of the create wil, but not as to Gods concurse, quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere, Deus autem non debet, because the create wil is under an essential obligation or law, to give rectitude to the action, but God is not, as before.

Unum igitur atq; idem factus, quantum Dei est Autoris, Motoris, ac Impulsoris, opus est, crimen non est; quantum autem hominis est, crimen ac scelus est. Ille enim lege non tenetur, hic autem lege etiam damnatur, *Zuing. prov. cap. 2. pag. 365.*

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Beza.

How deeply *Beza* was engaged in the defence of our Hypothesis is sufficiently evident by his Controversies in this point: as *Tractat. Theolog. vol. 1. pag. 313, &c.* in answer to the calumnies of *Heshusius* about the Providence of God, he saith, (1) *That no event ever happens otherwise than God decrees*: which he demonstrates from the Omnipotence of God. Thence he procedes, (2) to demonstrate, *That albeit God wil, and know, and decree all things in the world, yet that he is not the Author of sin.* So pag. 315. (3) He proves, *That Gods permission of sin is not idle or merely negative.* This he demonstrates, pag. 317. from the vendition of *Joseph*; the robbing of *Job*; the ravishing of *Davids* wives by *Absolon*; *Davids* numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto; *Shimei's* cursing of *David*; the defection of the ten Tribes from *Rehoboam*, &c. (4) He procedes, pag. 319. to the fall of *Adam*, which he assertes to be from the decree and ordination of God, &c. The same Controversie he manageth against *Castellio, de aeterna Dei predestinatione, p. 360.* where he proves, *That Adams fall was decreed and determined by God.* The like, pag. 401. where he proves, *That God doth not compel men to sin, or infuse sin into them, but justly and rightly incite their wils to the entitative act which is good.* This he confirms by the induration of *Pharaoh*, and Gods making use of wicked instruments for the punishment of men. That *Calvin* and *Beza* did fully espouse our Hypothesis is evident not only by the opposition of *Bellarmino* and his sectators, but also by that of *Arminius*, who objectes the very same things against them, as are objected against us, namely, *That God ordained that man should fall and become vitiose*: by which opinion, saith he, *God is made the Author of Adams fall and sin*: of which see *Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 554.* And indeed al the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zelose against al the Arminian Dogmes, in this as in other points; which sufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confession, and signed by their Ministers and Professors, for the condemning the new method of *Amyraldus*, and others in the French Churches.

Chamiers Defence of our Hypothesis.

That not only the German and Helvetian, but also the French Churches in their first Reformation fully maintained our Hypothesis, is most evident by the most elaborate, acute, and demonstrative determinations of great *Chamier*, the greatest light that ever France Reformed had, *Calvin* only excepted, who in his *Pan-*
strat.

strat. Cathol. tom. 2. lib. 3. gives us a copiose, distinct, and convictive decision of this Controversie as then agitated by the Calvinists and Jesuites; which answers exactly to our present Controversie with the new Methodists. He titles this Book, *Of the Author of sin*: and proves, *cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of sin*, albeit the Jesuites accuse Calvin, Martyr, and Beza therewith. Thence, *cap. 2.* he layes down the opinion of the Reformed Divines, namely, *That al actions both sinful and good are to be referred to the actuose providence of God.* Which he demonstrates by Shimei's cursing David, Absoloms incest, &c. Whence, *cap. 3.* he passeth on to the Papists opinion touching the Providence of God about sin, which they make to be only by *speculative, idle permission*, as some new Methodists. *Cap. 4.* he procedes to prove, *That God wils the existence of sin.* Wherein he answers Bellarmines Objections against Calvin and Beza as to this point. *Cap. 5.* he passeth on to the second Argument of the Calvinists, namely, *That men are in their sinful acts the instruments of God.* Thence, *cap. 6.* he descends to their third Argument, *from Gods excecation and induration of mens hearts*: wherein he distinctly opens the Scriptures about induration. Whence, *cap. 7.* he comes to their fourth Argument, *from Gods energie in sinful acts*; which he demonstrates both rationally and scripturally. And thence, *cap. 8.* he gives us *Augustins* opinion consonant to *Calvins* herein. Whence in the following Chapters, 9, 10, 11, 12. he answers the Objections and Arguments of the Papists, whereby they endeavor to prove, *That the Calvinists make God the Author of sin*: which imputations are stil fastened on us by the Arminians and new Methodists.

We may adde hereto the sentiments of *Ludovicus Crocius*, Professor at *Breme*, and a Member of the Synod of *Dort*, who in many points, specially that of *middle Science* and *universal Grace*, follows the new method, yet in this of *Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin*, seems orthodox and concurrent to *Calvins* Doctrine. So in his *Duodecas Dissertat. Exegetic. De voluntate Dei, Dissert. 8. thes. 74. pag. 415.* where he tels us, 'That the fundamen of clearing God from being the Author of sin is the distinction of the material and formal part of sin, namely of the action and the vitiositie, which is in the action: for that, not this, he wils and decrees; and this, not that, he permits. And his reason is invincible: 'for otherwise there should be an action independent

The Testimonie of
Lud. Crocius.

Illam [scil. actionem] non verò hanc, [scil. malitiam] Deus vult ac decernit: hanc, non illam, permittit.

‘as to God, and the efficacious providence of God should be denied, which is Epicurean. And then, *thesf.* 99. *pag.* 426. he tels us, ‘*That as to the act of the Divine wil about sin*, the Scriptures seem to contradict themselves, in that some Scriptures assure us, ‘*that God doth not wil sin, but hate it, with those that commit it*, as ‘*Psal.* 5. 5, 6, 7. ‘*Zach.* 8. 17. and yet other Scriptures say, ‘*that God wils, creates, and effects sins*, as ‘*Esa.* 45. 7. ‘*Lam.* 3. 37, 38. ‘*Amos* 3. 6. Then he solves these seeming contradictions, by distinguishing between the *act* and the *vitiositie* of the act: also between the act as it procedes from *God*, and as from the *Creature*: lastly between the *decreeing wil of God*, and the *preceptive wil of God*. Whence he concludes, *thesf.* 100. thus: ‘For God both wils and produceth the act, as an act, of it self indifferent to moral bonitie and evil, &c. And he addes, *thesf.* 101. ‘That this act in itself essentially good, even as it is contaminated by the creature, God wils it as a punishment, and useth it as an ordained convenient means for the best ends. The like *thesf.* 112. *p.* 430. where he shews, *how God wils sin, not as sin, but as a punishment, &c.* of which more fully hereafter, *Chap.* 5. §. 5. These sentiments of *Lud. Crocius* I rather chuse to cite, because he, in other points, follows the new method, and is cried up by some of that partie.

*The Synod of
Dort.*

As for the Judgement of the Synod of *Dort* touching our Hypothesis, it is sufficiently evident by their Determinations, as also by the oppositions the Arminians made against them in this point, both whiles they sate, and afterwards. I am not ignorant, that some of our Adversaries are so confident as to cite the Synods testimonie in favor of their Antithesis; but this is so false an imputation, as that I judge no intelligent impartial Reader can give credit to it. There needs no more to evince the Synods concurrence with us in this point, than their stout defence of *absolute Reprobation*; of which see *Davenants Animadversions on Gods love*, *pag.* 242.

*The Church of
England.*

We might adde almost an infinitude of Testimonies from Reformed Divines, Churches, and Synods for the confirmation of our Hypothesis: but in what remains we shal confine our selves to the Doctrine and Testimonie of the Church of *England*, and those renowned Professors of Theologie who have maintained and vindicated our Hypothesis. The Church of *England* as to Doctrine imbibed, even in her first Reformation, the sentiments of

Calvin.

Calvin and the Reformed Churches in *France*, *Holland*, *Helvetia*, and *Germanie*; albeit as to Discipline she stuck unto Episcopal Jurisdiction. This is evident by that noble designe of *Cranmer* and our first Reformers, to reduce the Doctrine of al the Reformed Churches unto one Confession. I shal here only cul out a few Testimonies of some great Professors of Theologie both in *Oxford* and *Cambridge*, who were of an Episcopal Judgement as to Discipline, yet stout Champions for our Hypothesis.

We shal begin with *Davenant*, a great Master of Reason, and one that went as far as he could, and I think, as far as any ought, in compliance with those of the New Method; yet he stil asserted, and with great strength of reason defended *absolute Reprobation* and *Gods predeterminative concurrence to the substrate mater of sin*. Thus in his Determinations, when Professor of Theologie at *Cambridge*, *Quest. 22.* 'In evil acts, saith he, God hath decreed to permit the event, to concur with the Agent as an universal Motor, and lastly to order the event itself according to that of *Hugo*, *de sacr. fid. lib. 1. cap. 13.* *God wils that sin be, and yet he wils not sin, i. e.* with a wil of approbation. So *Quest. 25. pag. 118.* he grants, *That Gods decree to permit sin is efficacious, so as to extract good out of it.* But he speakes more fully for the defense of our Hypothesis, in his *Animadversions on Gods love to mankind*, pag. 72. 'But those who derive the evil actions of men from their own free wil as the proper efficient cause, and the existing or coming of such actions *in eventum à Decreto Dei permittente & ordinante*, are in no error at al. But if any shal go about to set mans wil at libertie, and to tie up short the decreeing and determining wil of God, as if this had not the determining stroke amongst al possible evil actions or events, which shal infallibly be, and which shal infallibly not be, he may avoid the suspicion of *Stoicisme* and *Manicheisme*, but he wil hardly avoid the suspicion of *Atheisme*. For the greater number of mens actions being wicked and evil, if these come into act without Gods determinate counsel and decree, human affaires are more over-ruled by mans wil, than by Gods. What could be said more acutely and distinctly for the demonstration of our Hypothesis? He here asserts, (1) *That the existence of evil actions is from Gods decree permitting and ordering of them.* (2) *That Gods decreeing wil doth determine [or predetermine] al possible evil actions or events, which shal infallibly be.* And do or need we assert more than this? And

frequently in that Book *Davenant* asserts and demonstrates, *That the decree of Reprobation is absolute, determining sinful acts and events, yet so as that it leaves no man under a compulsion to sin.* So pag. 253. he saith, *Gods decrees carrie with them a necessitie of infallibilitie as to the event, but not a necessitie of compulsion as to the manner of acting.* And elsewhere he frequently inculcates, *That let Reprobation be absolute or conditional, it leaves the same possibilitie and the same libertie to the Agent.* So pag. 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. Yea, he proves, *That the Arminians must, and do grant immutable absolute decrees, which admit the same objections and difficulties, as those of the Antiarminians.* So pag. 354, 400, 418, 419. Lastly he proves, *That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil, as absolute Reprobation, asserted by the Calvinists.* So p 418, 419, 442, 462.

Ward. *Davenant* was succeeded by *Samuel Ward*, Doctor of Divinitie, and *Margaret* Professor of Cambridge; a person of great natural acumen, and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists, as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. *Seth Ward*. With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination, pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis, *That the concurrence of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation; according to that great saying (though in an apocryphous Book) Wisd. 8. 1. Wisdome [i. e. the wise Providence of God] reacheth from one end to the other mightily, and yet orders al things sweetly.* He first states the Controversie, shewing how the Remonstrants-fall in with the Jesuites, *Bellarmino*, *Molina*, *Lessius*, &c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurrence of God with the second cause upon its action and effect, yet so, that al the modification and determination of the act, specially in free actions, be from the second cause, as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he asserts, (1) *That the concurrence of God with second causes, even such as are free, is an antecedaneous influx upon the very second causes themselves, moving and applying them to their work.* This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason. The Scriptures he cites are *Esa. 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5, 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36.* His Reasons are cogent, namely from Gods prime causalitie, the instrumental concurrence of al second causes, the dependence of the human wil, &c. (2) He asserts, pag. 117. *That this previous concurrence of God the first cause doth, according to its mode, modifie and determine al the actions*
of

of the second causes. This, which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis, he invictly demonstrates, '[1] because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect; therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause, as the influence of the Sun is. [2] Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it, so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it. [3] He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence, whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time, and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself, as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects. [4] Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence; and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular, but only in commun: for, as Thomas, pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth, *The Divine providence extends on'y to those things, unto which the Divine causalitie extends*: wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil, he wil not have a providence, but only a prescience thereof in particular, as pag. 118. Thence (3) he assertes and demonstrates, *That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions, takes not away from them their proper mode of operating*. This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie, and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie, withal shewing, that the Molinists and Remonstrants, with Cicero, make man sacrilegious, whiles they endeavor to make him free. And Determinat. 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith, that it is the antecedent, but not the cause of mens sin. Lastly, what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse, is to be seen in his most acute *Clerum, de Gratia discriminante*.

From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford, and without much difficultie demonstrate, that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants. Our learned and famous George Abbot, in his *Quaestiones sex, Praelect. &c. cap. 6.* discusseth this very Question, *An Deus sit Author peccati, Whether God be the Author of sin?* And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole: 4. In the

the very actions, which on mans part are vitiose, the divine finger plainly shines forth; but so that God be the motor and impulsor [marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination] of the action and worke; but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting: For God excites [i. e. predetermines] the spirits of wicked men to attempt some things, &c. And he cites for it that great Effate of *Augustin*, de Prædest. Sanctior. *Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est; quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt, ex virtute Dei tenebras, prout visum est, dividētis, &c.* What the Sentiments of pious and learned *Dr. Holland*, *Regius* Professor of Divinitie, and *Dr. Prideaux* his Successor, were, is sufficiently evident by their warm zeale against the Arminians. As for *Dr. Barlow* late *Margaret* Professor, he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis, in his *Exercitatio 2^a, de Malo, Conclus. 7. Rat. 3.* where he proves, That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie. And to conclude this Head, it is very evident, that not only the Professors of Theologie, but also the Bishops and Convocation, together with King *James*, were greatly opposit to *Arminianisme*, and so friends to our Hypothesis: Yea in Bishop *Land*'s time, when *Arminianisme* began to flourish, there were but five *Arminian* Bishops, *Land*, *Neale*, *Buckeridge*, *Corbet*, *Howson*, and *Montague*, who espoused that Interest, as *Dr. Heylin*, in the *Life of Bishop Land* assures us. By al which it appears most evident, that not only *Rutherford*, *Twisse*, and *Dominicans*, but the main bodie of *Antipelagian* and *Reformed Divines* have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis, for God's *predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin.*

Dr. Holland,
Prideaux,
Barlow.

Such as denie
Gods Concurse
to the substrate
mater of sin.

§. 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us, let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis, and who they are by whom it has been defended. The Antithesis to our Thesis, namely, *That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin*, is generally ascribed to *Durandus*, as the principal founder thereof, who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions, under this pretext, that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins. But to speak the truth, this Antithesis is much more ancient than *Durandus*. *Capreolus* in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts, That this was the Opinion of the *Manichees*: and *Aquinas* in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith, That it is next to the error of the *Manichees*, who held two Principles, one of Good, and the other of Evil.

And

And the reason why this Antithesis is fathered on the *Manichees* is this, because whoever denies God to be the cause of the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed, must hold, *That there is some real positive entitie in sin whereof God is not the cause*: whence by consequence such must assert, *That there are two first Causes, one of Good, and the other of Evil*; which was the error of *Marcion* and *Manes*, who held, there were two first Principes, the one *αὐτὸς ὁ θεός*, the supreme good, who was the cause of al good; the other *αὐτὸς ὁ κακός*, the supreme evil God, who was the cause of al evil. And certainly, they that maintain sin to be according to its formal reason something positive or real, or that God is not the cause of the substrate mater of sin, wil necessarily fal into the sentiments of *Marcion* and *Manes*. Again, *Hieronymus*, *Epist. ad Ctesiphontem*, makes this Antithesis of *Durandus* to be the Doctrine of *Pelagius*, who, saith he, held, *That God having once conferred free-wil, it is not necessary that he further operate with us*: and he speaks of natural operations, as of the motion of the hand, &c. which was *Durandus's* opinion. Though I cannot but confesse, *Jansenius*, *August. Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119.* tells us, the Pelagians granted, *That God concurs to al the operations of the Wil.* But the Conciliation of these two opposite Testimonies is not difficult, in that the Pelagians granted Gods concurrence to al operations in termes, but denied it in effect and consequences, as our Adversaries now-a-days. *Compton Carleton*, in his *Philosoph. Univers. Disput. 28. Sect. 1. §. 3.* assures us, that the opinion of *Durandus* was asserted and defended before him, by *Nicolaus Bonetus*, *lib. 7. Theol. c. 7.* and it is not improbable but it was also by some others.

Dicebat [*Pelagius*] Deum, collato semel libero arbitrio, ulterius nobis ad operandum non esse necessarium. *Hieronym. ad Ctesiph.*

But yet it cannot be denied, but that the principal Author of this Antithesis was *Durandus*; whence among the Scholastic Theologues it receives the Denomination of *Durandisme*, which they cal a rash, erroneous, dangerous error, little better than *Arianisme*. *Bellarmin. l. 4. de Grat. & lib. Arb.* saith, it is repugnant to the Scriptures, Testimonies of the Fathers, and manifest Reason. *Suarez Metaph. Disput. 22. Sect. 1. n. 7.* saith, *It is erroneous in Faith*: & de *Concursu*, l. 1. he assertes, *That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended, but also rejected by al approved Theologues, as an error in Faith.* Is it not strange then, that Reformed Divines, yea some of great vogue for Pietie and Learning should espouse an error so grosse, and so much decried by

Durandus against Gods immediate Concourse.

Papists.

Papists themselves? But to give a convictive demonstration, that those who denie Gods Efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin really fal under the Imputation of *Durandisme*, we are first to examine what *Durandus*'s opinion as to Gods Concurse is, and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators.

Durandus proposeth his opinion, in *sentent. l. 2. Dist. 1. Q. 5.* in these words, *Utrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Creaturae, Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature?* which he denies; and the principal reasons of his negation are these: (1) *Because then God should be the author of Sin.* (2) *Because such an immediate Concurse destroyes human libertie*, in that it determines the wil, and so puts an end to its Indifference: of which see *Strangius*, p. 142. So that indeed the very same arguments, which were used by *Durandus* against immediate Concurse, are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predeterminative Concurse as to the substrate mater of Sin. And albeit the most of them profess a great displeasure against the Hypothesis of *Durandus*, yet, I must freely declare my mind, I cannot conceive how they can, without apparent contradiction, defend their own, but by espousing that of *Durandus*, which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth; And that the most of our Adversaries, even among the New Methodists, who in profession disown it, fal under the imputation of *Durandisme*, we shal anon make evident, when we come to treat of their particular sentiments: at present take these *Criteria* or distinctive notes of *Durandisme*. (1) Al such as assert a *Divine Concurse to the principe or subject only, and not immediate unto the Act*, fal under the imputation of *Durandisme*. This is wel observed by *Strangius*, l. 1. c. 10. p. 57. where he tels us, *That those who allow only a Concurse to the second Cause, moving it to act, without a continued concurse to the action, fal into the error of Durandus.* Herein *Durandus* is followed by *Aureolus*, a professed abettor of *Durandisme*. Thus also *Amyraldus*, and a Divine of name among our selves. (2) Al those who hold only a *general immediate concurse to the act, such as is determinable by the mater it workes on, as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater*, are deservedly branded with the black note of *Durandisme*. Thus *Baronius*, together with the Remonstrants and Molinists. (3) Al such as denie *every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate effiience*, justly fal under the marque of *Durandisme*. Thus *Camero*, and our Adversaries

faries generally, who denie that God doth efficaciously concur to the substrate mater of Acts intrinsically evil. (4) Al those who affirme, *That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which shal act without immediate concurse*, must necessarily symbolise with *Durandus*. This is acknowledged by *Baronius*, *Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp. 3. S. 61. p. 131.* where he brings in this as the Second argument for *Durandus*, *That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurse, sithat this involves no contradiction.* To which he answers wel, in the Negative, that for God to make such creatures as should not depend on him in operation as wel as in essence, involves a flat contradiction, because dependence in Essence and Operation is essential to the creature. This piece of Durandisme *Strangius* and others seem chargeable with, as hereafter, in our account of *Strangius*.

But we descend to the particular Sects, who oppose our Thesis, with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hypothesis of *Durandus*. And we shal begin with the *Jesuites*, who now generally passe under the name of *Molinists*, from *Ludov. Molina* their chief Captain, who in his *Concordia Lib. Arbitr. cum Gratia donis, &c. Quæst. 14. Disp. 26.* assertes, (1) *That Gods immediate concurse terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act, but only on the act it self and effect.* Whence, (2) *That this Concurse is not antecedent or previous as to the act, but only simultaneous; i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the same act, and conserves the same.* Thence, (3) *That this immediate concurse of God is not predeterminative, at least as to human acts, but only indifferent and determinable, like that of the Sun.* Whence, (4) *That as to the substrate mater of Sin, immediate Concurse doth no way determine the wil, or applie it to its act, but only influence the act in a general indifferent manner, so as the wil stil retains its innate indifference, and libertie of acting or not acting.* Such are the Sentiments of the *Molinists* or *Jesuites*, wherein they are greatly opposed both by *Dominicans* and *Jansenists*: Thus *Jansenius*, *August. Tom. 2. lib. 6. singul. c. 14. p. 58.* where he proves, *That this simultaneous Concurse confers no forces or aide to second Agents, but only accommodates it self to the forces of the create power, &c.* which sufficiently demonstrates the identitie of this opinion with Durandisme, albeit the avouchers of it oppose *Durandus* with great vehemence.

The Jesuites and Molinists.

T

But

Lud. à Dola
his following
Durandus.

But of late there started up *Ludovicus à Dola*, a Capucine Friar, yet learned and acute, who espoused the Hypothesis of *Durandus*, as the only Medium for the reconciling those two opposite parties, the Dominicans and Jesuites. His book he termes, *A Quadripartite Disputation, touching the mode how the Concurse of God and the Creature stand in conjunction for the production of free Acts, of a natural order, specially such as are wicked*: He bends his Disputation both against the *Predeterminants*, as also against the Assertors of *Middle Science*. His first part is general, stating the controversie between the Jesuites, who assert a *Middle Science*, and the Dominicans, the Assertors of *Predetermination*; and withal explicating the origine of the Controversie from the *presupposed Immediation and real Identitie of the Divine and creatural Concurse*. His Second Part is against the Jesuites, to demonstrate, *That a next, immediate and identic concurse of God to al acts both good and bad cannot be defended by the artifice of their Middle Science*. In his third part he disputes against the Dominicans, proving, *That God doth not concur with us to acts of a natural order, specially such as are wicked, by a physic Predetermination, and moreover by an identic and simultaneous concurse*. In his fourth and last part he stablisheth and demonstrateth, (with al the force of Arguments such a ruinous foundation wil admit) the Hypothesis of *Durandus*, *That the general Concurse of God to acts of a natural order, specially such as are wicked, is not proxime, immediate and identic, but remote, mediate, and really distinct from the act of the creature*. This Hypothesis he defends as the only expedient for the conciliation of Divine Concurse with human Libertie, the vindication of Gods Sacred Majestie from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and the putting an end to those endless controversies about Divine Concurse. And I cannot but conceive my self under an essential obligation freely to deliver my mind in this point, that it is impossible for our Adversaries, the New Methodists, or any others, to defend their Antithesis against us from apparent contradictions and inconsistencies with it self, or to free themselves from those blasphemous Imputations they charge upon us, unless they betake themselves to this stratageme and subterfuge of *Durandus* and *Lud. à Dola*: and therefore I do no way wonder, that a Divine of great name and Head of that partie among us, doth openly declare his assent and consent to this Hypothesis of *Durandus*, it being the only refuge to

to preserve him and his Adherents from self-contradiction and condemnation.

Among the Reformed Churches, the first Impugnators of our Hypothesis were the Remonstrants, communly stiled Arminians, from *Arminius*, their first Founder, Professor of Theologie at *Leyden*, who began to diffuse his Pelagian Infusions about the year 1610. His Sentiments about Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts he layeth down *Disputat. publica, Thes. 7. § 8, 9, 10. p. 193.* but more fully, *Thes. 9. de justitia & efficacia Providentiæ Dei in malo, p. 198.* where he distinguisheth Gods effience about the act of sin from that about its vitiositie. This effience of God about sin he makes to be both about the *beginning, progresse and consummation* of Sin. (1) As for Gods effience about the beginning of sin he distinguisheth it into [1] *Impedition*, both *sufficient and efficacious*, whereby God puts an impediment to sin; and [2] *Permission*, which is contrary to *Impedition*, the suspension of al impediments, which might hinder the execution of Sin. The fundamen of this Permission he makes to be mans Libertie, and Gods infinite Wisdome and Power to bring good out of evil. (2) Gods *Effience* about the *progresse* of Sin he placeth in *Direction* and *Determination*. [1] *Direction* of Sin he makes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God doth most wisely and potently direct sin to what end he pleaseth, *passing on from one extreme to the other mightily, and yet disposing althings sweetly*, according to that great effate of apocryphous Wisdome, *c. 8. v. 1.* [2] *Determination* he takes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God puts measures to his Permission, and termes to sin, that it run not into infinite, according to the pleasure of the creature. (3) Gods *Effience* about the *consummation and terme* of Sin he placeth in *Punition*, and *Remission*. As for Gods Concurse to the *Act of Sin as naturally good*, he doth craftily, according to his wonted mode in such cases, wave that difficult point: Yet in his *Articles, De Peccati Causa Universe*, p. 779. he Scepticly urgeth the Arguments of our Antagonists, to prove, *That we make God the Author of Sin.* But to sum up *Arminius's* Sentiments in this point, Albeit he placeth Gods Permission about Sin in a mere suspension of Impediments, which is no way influential on the Act, yet in that he allows also a providential *Direction* and *Determination* of the Act to its end and due measures, we may thence evidently demonstrate our Hy-

pothesis, that God predetermines the Wil to the entitative act of Sin, of which hereafter, Chap. 5.

The Remonstrants and their Sectators.

Arminius's Sectators usually stiled *Remonstrants*, (from their Remonstrances in the Synod of Dort) *Grevincovius, Vorstius, Episcopius, Corvinus, &c.* who being animated by many of the Civil Magistrates of *Holland*, gave themselves the confidence, but those poor Churches the peste, of divulging their Pelagian Poison; which, by the interposure of King *James*, (who was a professed enemy to that faction) occasioned the Synod of *Dort*, An. 1618. where Divines out of *England, France, and Germanie* resorted, to put a period to those Pelagian Dogmes. The Remonstrants in opposition to that Synod, writ their *Acta & Scripta Synodalia Dordracena*, wherein they greatly impugne the Synods Determinations for *Absolute Reprobation*, and *Gods Providence in sinful Acts*, falsely charging on our Divines, (1) *That they held, the Reprobate were destined to Incredulitie, Impietie, and Sins, as the Means and Causes of Damnation.* (2) *That they made God the Author of Sin*, and the like, of which see *Acta Synodalia, Scripta Remonstrantium Dogmatica*, p. 40, 41. I shal here only adde, what is wel remarked by *Le Blanc, Conciliat Arbit. Humani, Thes.* 32. p. 434. 'That these Arminians and Remonstrants directly follow the Jesuites and Molinists in asserting a general 'simultaneous indifferent Concurse, such as is determinable by the 'cooperation of the human wil.

The Anabaptists of Germanie that set in with the Remonstrants.

These Remonstrants, from a spirit of Cabal, to fortifie themselves against the Calvinists, who overpowered them in the Synod, set into a league offensive and defensive with many German Anabaptists, who thereupon drank in many Pelagian and Arminian Dogmes, particularly that of *Free-wil*; which Infusions have been since diffused throughout some, yea whole Churches of that Perswasion in *England*. I am not ignorant, that a great number not only of Professors but also Churches, who are for Re-baptizing, do yet keep themselves unspotted and untainted as to these Arminian Notions; and with these I have no controversie, but particular love and kindness for many of them; albeit I differ from them in the point of Pedobaptisme. But as for those of that perswasion, who fight under *Arminius's* banner, they seemed most forward, after the breaking up of the Synod of *Dort*, to oppose the Calvinists in their sentiments about Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin. And (that which deserves

a particular remarque) the very arguments that are now urged against us by the New Methodists, were urged against the Synod of *Dorts* determinations in this point by them, and that in the same forme. Which is to be seen in a *Dialogue of the Anabaptists*, intituled, *A Description of what God hath predestinated concerning man*, &c. wherein pag. 16. they have this very expreffion, which they impute to the Calvinists, (as our Adversaries impute the same to us) namely, that they say, *That God punisheth man with Hel-torments for doing those things, which he himself hath predestinated, ordained, decreed, determined, appointed, willed and compelled him to do; and that which a man cannot chuse, but must needs do by the force and compulsion of his predestination.* Are not the very same forged calumnies charged on us now-adays? See an excellent replie hereto, as to the rest of their false imputations, by pious and learned *Ainsworth* in his *Censure upon this Dialogue*, pag. 2, 4, 5, &c.

But we descend now to our principal Antagonists, such as *The New Methodists* would passe under the name of Calvinists, and yet are professed, yea vehement oppugnators of our Hypothesis. Thus *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Thef.* 34. pag. 434. 'But of those Reformed Divines, which subscribe to the Synod of *Dort*, some in this part agree with the Molinists and Remonstrants, neither do they acknowledge any other general concurrence of God with second causes, than what is simultaneous and indifferent, whereby God doth not influence the cause itself, but its act, &c. He instanceth in *Baronius*, *Strangius*, *Amyraldus*, &c. And what terme or title to give this new Sect of Adversaries more proper than *New Methodists* I know not, this being the softest title, and that which they seem to recreate themselves in: some terme them downright *Arminians*; and albeit I conceive their Principles directly issue from and tend to Ariminianisme, yet I dare not lode them with this reprocheful style, because they generally assert efficacious Grace. I think we might terme them without injustice *Semi-arminians*, (as the *Semipelagians* of old, who refined Pelagianisme) because they assert conditionate Reprobation and al the consequences thereof: But yet because nothing more becomes an opponent than candor and ingenuitie, therefore to let passe al Titles that may carrie any thing of reproche, I give them only this of *New Methodists*, because they affect and attempt to give us a new Method or Scheme of Predestination, efficacious Grace, Divine Concurrence, &c.

John Camero.

The first that opened the way to this New Method, was *John Camero*, a person of excellent naturals, and those wel improved by acquired literature, but too much addicted to innovation in the doctrine of the Gospel, which he could not dissemble, but too oft made profession thereof; as in a Letter to *Ludovicus Capellus*, where he saith, *That many things occurred to him, which neither his own mind nor the reason of the times would permit him to publish.* He too much abounded in his own sense and words, with too great contempt of such as differed from him, though more deserving than himself, as *Chamier*. There were few Theologic Questions professedly handled by him, specially such as belong to the Doctrine of Grace and Free-wil, but he divulged something of Novitie therein: among which novel opinions this was one, That he denied every real positive Being to be from God immediately as the prime efficient cause, as *Epist. ad Thom. Rhadam*, (oper. edit. 1642.) p. 526. and *Epist. ad Jac. Gallovæum*, pag. 528. Which sentiment of *Camero* laid the foundation, which *Baronius* and *Strangius* his Country-men afterward built their Antithesis on. *Camero* had for his intime Camrade *Milleterius*, who after his death turned Roman Catholic, and publiht many Antichristian Errors, which he professed to have received from *Camero*.

Quod negem,
omne ens est à
Deo tanquam à
causa efficiente
immediata, Ep.
ad Jac. Gallo-
væum.

Moses Amyral-
dus.

But *Camero's* principal Sectator was *Moses Amyraldus*, who succeeded him in the profession of Theologie at *Saumur*, and indeed much out-went him in his propensions and closures with Durandisme and the Arminian Dogmes; particularly with this about Godsconcurse to the substrate mater of sin. And that I may not be thought falsely to accuse so learned a man, one that passed under the name of a Calvinist, I shal faithfully relate the Character given him in this particular by one of his own friends and adherents, *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par. 3. thes. 48. pag. 436.* 'There are not wanting, saith he, among the Doctors of the Reformed Schole some who touching the general Concurse of God necessary to al the acts of creatures, seem to have the same sentiments with *Durandus*, and *Ludovicus à Dola*, Doctors of the Roman Schole. For that illustrious man *Moses Amyraldus* seems not to acknowledge any other general Concurse of God, by which he concurs with al second causes, besides that continued efficacy, whereby he doth preserve and sustain the nature of every thing, and the forces given by nature. Whence he gathers, that such a concurse belongs not to libertie. So *Amyrald. de Lib. Arbitr. sect. 4. pag.*

pag. 246. *Make, saith he, nature and its abilities able to consist without the aide of such a concurse, and they wil truly act freely. Therefore let there be granted a concurse, which performes nothing else, but that these abilities, which would otherwise flag and vanish, consist and be preserved in their natural state, Libertie wil thence receive no detriment.* He had been speaking of Gods concurse to sinful acts, and as *Le Blanc* wel observes, by these words sufficiently indicates, that in this part he has the same sentiments with *Durandus*. Wherein note, (1) that *Amyraldus* grants, that sometimes it is sufficient for God to preserve the subject, and render its faculties habile or capable of acting, without immediate concurse to the act: which is also the opinion of some among us. (2) That this opinion, according to *Le Blanc*, fals in with that of *Durandus*, &c. So *Thef.* 50. pag. 437. *Le Blanc* addes, ' That *Amyraldus* held a double act of providence about evil acts, one *externe*, and the other ' *interne*: as for the *externe* act, he placeth it in two things, (1) ' in proposing objects, (2) in permitting Satan to set home those ' objects with efficacy. The *interne* act of God consistes, according to him, in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil, ' obscure, or remove the one, or cause some other object to be ' offered, which is most taking. In al which there is no violence ' offered to human libertie, nor indeed any efficacious immediate ' concurse asserted. Yea in his *Speciminis special.* p. 468. he saith in down-right termes, *That the wil of God dependes on us, not we on the wil of God*: which is rank *Durandisme* and *Molinisme*. More of his wild sentiments in this as in other *Arminian* points, see *Pet. Molinæi, de M. Amyraldi adversus Spanhemium libro, Judicium, præfat.*

Placens, another *Salmurian* Professor, albeit in other points he *Placens.* stiffely defendes the New Method, yea, in that of original sin is greatly *Pelagian*, yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin, he seems pendulous and in suspense. Thus, *De libero Hom. Arbitr.* p. 174. (edit. 1656.) ' What the dependence ' of the second causes on the first in causing is, the *Papists* sharply ' dispute. It is truly confessed by al, that God doth concur with ' every cause, so as to operate conveniently with its faculties: but ' this concurse some make immediate, proxime, and altogether ' the same with the very action of second causes; but others deny it— But we, according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majesty of God, dare not determine how great the dependence

' pence of the second cause on the first is: it sufficeth us, that,
' provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God, too much
' cannot be ascribed unto God, &c.

Le Blanc.

Le Blanc also, Professor of Theologie at Sedan, though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie, *Concil. Arbitr. thes. 55.* yet *thes. 56. pag. 438.* he inclines to the opinion of *Strangius*, and others, *That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsically evil, without being the Author of sin.* But yet *thes. 57.* he recalls himself, and saith, *That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin, the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted.* And *thes. 58.* he addes this as most certain, *That the aide and efficacy of Divine providence, even about sinful acts, may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurrence, &c.*

Baronius.

But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland, *Baronius* and *Strangius*, who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method, about Gods concurrence to the substrate mater of sin. As for *Baronius*, he is accused of rank Arminianisme; and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts. Thus in his *Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 78. pag. 146, &c.* he endeavors to prove, *That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act.* And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians, Jesuites, and Arminians: namely that this previous motion and predetermination (1) destroyeth human libertie, *pag. 147.* (2) That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts, *pag. 148.* (3) That it maketh God the Author of sin, *pag. 149.* which he endeavors to prove many ways: [1] Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie, *pag. 150.* [2] Because the action then as of such a species must be from God. [3] Because this opinion makes God to be unjust and cruel, as *pag. 151.* [4] That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner. Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments, urged by Pelagians and Arminians, to which we shal answer more fully hereafter, *chap. 6. §. 1, &c.* Thence he procedes *pag. 153.* to answer our principal argument, *That the second cause doth not act, but as moved by the first,* and therein agrees with *Suarez* and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurrence. It's true, *§. 58. p. 129.* he

he argues strongly against *Durandus*, yet in fine pag. 153. falls in very far with him, but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants; which is well observed by *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. Hum. thes.* 35. pag. 434. 'This at least, without all doubt, is the opinion of *Robert Baronius*, in his *Metaphysic*, where touching the Concourse of God, and so of its concord with human liberty, he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with *Fonseca* and *Suarez*, namely that this concurrence is of itself indifferent, and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action: neither is it needful, that God remove second causes, but it is sufficient, that together with them he influence their actions and effects. And indeed *Baronius*'s own illustration, *Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput. 3.* pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion; where he compares the Concourse of God to that of the Sun, which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters, in itself indifferent, but modified and determined by the matter it works upon: which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians. Lastly, pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners, which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowledge. Whence it is to me apparent, that it would not be an act of injustice, should we reckon him among the Arminians, whose sentiments and cause he has espoused; yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists, I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranking him among the new Methodists.

But yet our principal Antagonist is *John Strangius*, Professor at *Glasgow*, who (as they say) having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of *Rutherford*, writ a great Volume in four Books, *Of Gods Will and Actions about sin*: wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans, *Twisse* and *Rutherford*, (who in his influences of the life of Grace, both Preface and Book, oft animadvertes thereon) as if these all, by asserting predestination to the matter of sinful acts, made God the Author of sin. I must confess, he discovers a natural acumen and a nervous vein of Reason in his Book, yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistencies, yea contradictions, that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfy himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions: But this I impute not to any defect in naturals, but in his cause, which admits not any solid reason for its defense. And that which yet seems more strange

to me is this, that he who opposeth with much vehemence *Durandus*, *Molina*, *Bellarmino*, and the Remonstrants in this point of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin, yet at long-run falls in with each of these parties in some one, if not all their sentiments about this mater. (1) That he comes very near Durandisme is evident, in that he holds the Concurse of God not to be necessary to all acts of the creature, particularly to such as are intrinsically evil: For to suppose any real positive Being, that falls not under Gods efficacious concurse, is to me no less than Durandisme. It's true, *Strangius* in words appears against *Durandus*, in owning an immediate Concurse of God to all actions of the creatures, as *lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163.* But when he comes to explicate this immediate Concurse as to actions intrinsically evil, he placeth it only (as some now adays among us) *in Gods conserving the nature and innate disposition of natural Agents, and giving them a self-determining power, whereby they are rendered apt and habile for any congruous action, as they now phrase it.* Thus *pag. 164. Ergo si una Dei determinatio sufficiat, quâ Deus Agentium naturalium naturam ac indolem à se insitam ac conservatam determinavit, quid opus est multiplicibus imò innumeris determinationibus ad eundem effectum, &c.* So *lib. 3. cap. 5 pag. 584.* he layes down this as his Hypothesis, *That God doth not in all things determine the wil, but sometimes permit it a free election, to chuse this or that, to do this or that; and therefore in such acts he has not decreed, that man should precisely chuse this or that, &c.* And he proves it by this argument, *That it is not impossible for God, who hath made man a free Agent, and conserves his nature and forces, to permit something to mans free-wil, ita ut per Deum non stet quin homo possit eligere alterutrum, agere aliquid, aut non agere, &c.* Wherein he proves, that it is not impossible for God to leave some things to mans indifference, without determining him to either extreme: and he proves this is not impossible, because it implies not any contradiction; which is *Durandus's* very argument against immediate Concurse. (2) That *Strangius* conspires with and espouseth the sentiments of the Molinists and Arminians about indifferent simultaneous Concurse is partly acknowledged by his friend *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. Hum. thes. 36. pag. 434.* having shewen the agreement of *Baronius* with the Molinists and Remonstrants, he addes: 'Neither doth *John Strangius* seem to differ much from this opinion: for albeit he thinkes, *lib. 1. cap. 11.* 'That the action whereunto God and the creature concur, is in order of
' nature

'nature first from God, before from the creature; — and moreover, 'l. 2. p. 3. denies, *That God concurs only by a general concurse*; as the 'Sun concurs in the same manner to the generation of a man and 'horse; but determines, *that the influx of God is special to special 'effects, as they are specifically distinguished, not morally but physically*; 'yet he doth by many arguments contend and prove, *that the pre- 'motion and predetermination of God, which the Schole of Thomas 'defendes, to al and singular acts of the creature is not necessary.* Note here, that albeit *Strangius* seems to differ from the Molinists, Remonstrants, and *Baronius* in asserting Gods Concurse to be previous, particular, and special; yet in that he denies Divine predetermination to al creatural acts, *Le Blanc* makes him not to differ much from the Molinists and Remonstrants: which to me indeed is a great observation; for I am under a very strong, and I am apt to persuade my self, rational presumption, that predetermination to good acts can never be rationally defended by these New Methodists, who denie predetermination to the substrate mater of al evil acts; as *Strangius* doth, pag. 167, 584. of which more hereafter, chap. 5. §. 4, 5.

Here it were worthy of some labor to inquire *How these New Methodists fel into those novel sentiments about Divine Concurse, and on what reasons or grounds?* As it was with the Semipelagians of old, so it has befel these New Methodists or Semiarminians: when the Pelagians were by *Augustin* driven from their *πρώτον* *ἔκδοξον*, or *Diana* of Free-wil and the potence of corrupt nature, the Semipelagians come with fresh forces and assault him in the point of Reprobation, and pretend, that he asserted, *That God by a fatal necessitie compelled men to sin, and then damned them for what he had compelled them to*: Just so the Arminians having been suppressed by the Synod of *Dort*, these New Methodists owning absolute particular Election and efficacious Grace with the Calvinists, thought they might more securely fal in with the Arminians in the points of universal Grace, conditional Reprobation, and that of denying Predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. Thus they divide the battel between the Calvinist and Arminian. But as *Fansenius* has wel observed out of *Augustin*, *If there be the least point granted to Pelagius, al wil be at last granted*; so I am very apt to fear, that these New Methodists, by going so far in symbolising with the Arminians, wil at last be wholly drawn over into their Campe. Thus much I am very confident of, they can never rationally de-

How these New Methodists fel into their new Model.

send absolute Election and efficacious Grace against Jesuites and Arminians, so long as they denie absolute Reprobation and Predetermination to the entitative act of al sins. As for the principal grounds, which induce these New Methodists to take up those sentiments, we shal endeavor to lay them down, when we come to treat of their proper Opinions and the consequents that attend them, Chap. 7.

*who of the new
Methodists may
be esteemed ortho-
dox.*

But whiles we are thus characterising the Authors of this new Method, we must do such Calvinists, who incline to them in some points, that justice, as to free them from al imputation or suspicion of Arminianisme: It's wel known, that some of great worth and truly orthodox in point of Grace, have yet somewhat inclined towards the new Method in point of *universal objective Grace*, as pious and learned *Usher*, *Davenant*, and others both in our and the French Churches, who hold, *Christs death to be an universal remedie applicable to al*, but yet are far from asserting an universal subjective Grace, or any velleitie in God of saving al men, which *Amyraldus* and others assert. As for those who hold absolute and particular Election and Reprobation, Original sin in its full extent, mens natural impotence and being dead in sin, efficacious Grace in the conversion of sinners, with Gods absolute, efficacious, immediate, total and predeterminative concurrence to al natural as wel as supernatural actions, as *Davenant*, and some others, who incline to an objective universal Grace, do, I have no controversie with them, but can owne them as friends of Grace, albeit in some modes of explicating it, they differ from us.

C H A P. V.

Rational Demonstration of Gods predeterminative Concurrence to the substrate mater of Sin.

Arguments for Divine predetermination of the Wil to the entitative act of sin. (1) *From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree: the objections against this argument solved.* (2) *From the certitude of Divine Prescience; with the solution of objections.* (3) *From the Decree of Reprobation. Davenants Hypothesis touching absolute Reprobation and Decrees.* (4) *From Divine Concurrence, [1] Its Principe and Origine. [2] Its Nature; Totalitie, Universalitie,*

litie, Particularitie, Immediation, Prioritie, and Independence. [3]

Its Efficace, as to al natural and supernatural Acts and Effects.

Al the Arguments urged against Predetermination to the entitative act of sin, strike as much against Predetermination to what is good.

(5) From the nature of sin, its substrate mater and formal reason.

(6) From Gods permission of sin; which is natural, negative, and positive. (7) From Divine providence about sin, both conservative,

restrictive, gubernative. (8) From the absolute, immediate, essential dependence of al creatures on God, as the first cause.

§. 1. **H**AVING given a scriptural Demonstration, as also the unanimous testimonie of such as undertook to defend efficacious Concurse in al Ages of the Church, for the confirmation of our Hypothesis, we now procede to demonstrate the same by rational Arguments grounded on scriptural principles and evidence; which we shal reduce to the following Heads.

1. Arg. *From the Futurition of al things in and by the Divine Decree; which we thus forme: That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition, necessarily falls under Divine predetermination as to its existence: But the substrate mater of al sin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition: therefore it necessarily falls under Divine predetermination as to its existence.* The major is granted by our Adversaries, particularly by Strangius, who oft asserts, *That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition; so that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree, must necessarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event.* And what more rational than this assertion? Yea, what is predetermination of the event, but predefinition in the Decree? The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree, and predetermination as to actual concurse and execution in time differ only as *active* and *passive* Creation: as *active* Creation gives futurition to things, and *passive*, actual existence; so *predefinition* and *predetermination*; and therefore among the Greeks one and the same Verbe *προορίζω* signifies both to *predefine* and *predetermine*. So that our major seems so clear as to carrie with it its own evidence. Wherefore we passe on to demonstrate the minor, which our Adversaries principally strike at, and therefore needs our strongest forces: This we shal endeavor to make good in and by the following Propositions. (1) Prop. *Nothing is or can be future in its own nature,*
with.

Arguments for Predetermination to the substrate mater of al sin.

1. Arg. from the futurition of al things.

without some cause of its futurition. How is it possible that any thing should passe from a state of mere possibilitie, contingency, and indifference, but by some cause? Do not possible, and future differ? and must there not be some cause of this difference? (2) Prop. *Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal.* This is most evident; because whatever is future was so from Eternitie; for God foreknew it to be so: otherwise, how could his knowlege be certain? Hence, (3) Prop. *Nothing can give futurition to things but God.* For is there any thing but God eternal? (4) Prop. *Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil.* His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things; because possible and future are the same as to the Divine Essence: neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things; for things are not future because God foreknows them, but he therefore foreknows them because future. Hence it follows, that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things, as *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. §. 9.* whence also it necessarily follows, (5) *That the futurition of the substrate mater of al sin is from the Divine wil and decree.* For what can make sinful acts future and so the object of Divine foreknowlege, but the wil of God, which gives futurition to althings? And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the substrate mater of sin, must not his predeterminative wil also give existence to it?

Objections against this Argument solved.

But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against this Argument by Responses and Objections. (1) They reple to our minor, *That the futurition of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God, but from the wil of man, that gives existence to it.* Thus Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavors to prove, *That it is not repugnant that something should be future, which God hath not absolutely predefined, but left to the wil of man to effect.* So cap. 9. pag. 628. he peremptorily asserts, *That God hath not decreed al futures, namely, the Fal of Adam, or the sin against the Holy Ghost, &c.* So pag. 631. he saith, *Nothing hinders, but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God, namely the create wil.* The like *Le Blanc, Concord. Libert. Hum. p. 1. thes. 55--57.* where he endeavors to prove, *That what is the cause why things existe in time, the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternitie: but mans wil only is the cause why sin existes in time, ergo, &c.* A poor Response indeed, or rather begging of the Question! For is it possible that the

the second cause lodged in time should give futurity to a thing from Eternitie? Is it not an approved Maxime in Philosophie, yea in Nature, that the cause is ever, at least in order of nature, before the effect? and is the second cause confined by time, before the eternal futurity of its effect? (2) But *Le Blanc* answers hereto, *thes. 56. pag. 454. That Futurity is nothing else but a respect of reason, and an extrinsec denomination of the thing, which is said to be future, not something really distinct from the thing future, &c.* But the vanitie of this subterfuge is most evident; for hereby it follows, that the thing is not future before it is existent: can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence? How many absurdities would follow hereon?

But our Adversaries have one grand Objection, which they lay much weight on, against our minor, and that is this: *If the wil of God gives futurity to sin, then sin as future hath one and the same Idea with the wil of God: and so the futurity of sin must be God.* This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by *Strangius, Le Blanc*, and a Divine of name among us. So *Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 631, 632.* having *pag. 626, &c.* recited *Twisses* argument from the eternal futurity of sin, he replies thus: *Herein, saith he, lies the whole force of the argument, that there can be no other cause of a futurity made from Eternitie, but what is eternal.* To which he answers with a scoffe thus: *A pretty argumentation indeed! why may we not by the same reason prove, that the futurity of sin is God?* The same is urged by *Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par. 1. thes. 55, 56. pag. 454.* where he endeavors to prove against *Twisse*, *That if the futurity of sin be from the wil of God, it is God; which makes God manifestly the Author of sin.* The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us. But in answer hereto, I must confesse, I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned, and in other points judicious, on such infirme and rotten grounds: For when we speak of the futurity of sin, which is a complexe aggregate thing, we must distinguish its material from its formal part. (1) If we speak of the material entitative part of sin, which is in itself a natural good, so we may without the least violation of Gods sacred Majestie affirme, that its futurity is the same, or not really distinct from Gods wil the cause thereof: and why not? is not the futurity of al natural Beings good? And whence procedes al good but from the immense Ocean of good?

Yea;

Yea, was not al good from Eternitie lodged in the bosome of God, and sonot really distinct from him? So that indeed this objection of *Strangius* and *Le Blanc* against the futurition of the material entitative act of sin from the wil of God strikes at the futurition of althings, even the most gratiose acts from the same wil: for if the futurition of any one natural act may be resolved into the wil of man as its first cause, why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel resolved into the same human wil, specially in *Adams* innocent state, who had then perfect free-wil? But yet (2) if we speak of the futurition of sin in regard of its *formal nature*, consisting in its vitiositie and obliquitie, so we utterly denie, that its futurition is the same with God: for the futurition of sin as to its vitiositie is not from the effective wil of God, but permissive; God decrees to effect the entitative act, but only to permit the vitiositie appendent thereto, which follows on the act, as other privations do on the absence of their habit. To make this evident by a parallel instance; God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun, and that at night it shal retire into the other Hemisphere, whence darknesse necessarily follows: may we thence argue, that the futurition of darknesse, or darknesse itself is the same with God? Would not any Fresh-man in Logic hisse such a consequence out of the Scholes? And yet who dares denie, but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemisphere into the other is from God, as also its futurition? The like may be instanced in al other privations, which have no real being, and therefore no real efficient of their existence or futurition: for nothing can admit a real efficient cause of its futurition, but what has a real efficient cause of its existence: what is the first efficient of the existence of things? Is it not the wil of God? and is it not also the same Divine wil that gives futurition to things? Yea doth not the very same act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition, give them also, in their appointed periods of time, their existence? So that in this regard the Rule of *Strangius* and *Le Blanc* is most true, That the same cause that gives things their existence, gives them also their futurition: this I say holds true of the first cause, but not of second causes, as they would needs persuade us. So that, to conclude this argument, in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al sin, the effective wil of God to the entitative act or substrate mater of sin, and the permissive wil of God to the formal reason, or vitiositie

sitie of sin, hence it necessarily follows, that the predeterminative Concourse of God, (whereby I understand nothing else but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative) gives existence to the substrate mater of Sin.

§. 2. Our second Argument shal be taken from the *certitude of Gods Prescience*; and we may forme it thus: *God can certainly foreknow nothing, but what he certainly decrees, predefines, and predetermines to be: But God certainly foreknows al sin.* Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adversaries and denied by none, that I know, except Atheists and Socinians: Thus *Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he seeth al his goings.* Our principal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major; which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propositions: (1) Prop. *Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God, but what has some certain Reasons, Principes, and Causes of such a foreknowledge.* Now there are three causes that give certitude to al Science and Prescience: [1] *A certitude of the Object*: for if the object be uncertain, the Science can never be certain: can the Structure or Edifice be firme, if the foundation be infirme? [2] *A certain Medium*, which is the principal fundamen of al Science. [3] *A certitude of the Subject*: for be the Object and Medium never so certain, yet there can be no certain Science, unless the Subject apprehend the same. And doth not the Prescience of God include al these degrees of Certitude? Must there not be a certitude of the Object, Medium, and Subject? (2) Prop. *The Divine Prescience as to future sins admits not any of these degrees of certitude, but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree.* [1] How can Sin as the Object of Divine Prescience be certainly future, but by the efficacious Wil of God making it so? [2] What certain Medium can there be of Divine Prescience, but the divine Wil and Decree? [3] And thence, how can God have a subjective Certitude of sin but in and by his own Wil? Hence, (3) Prop. *Gods certain Prescience of Sin infers also a certain predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin.* That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future, has been the persuasion not only of Calvinists, but also of the most sober Scholemen in al Ages, Scotus, Ricardus, Hervaeus, Bradwardine, Johannes Major, and others not a few, as *Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. Par. 3. Thes. 33. p. 443.* confesseth. Yea, *Strangius* himself grants the futurition of Sin in Gods Prescience,

ence, as l. 3. c. 9. p. 640. Yea, *Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Hum. Par. 1. Thes. 59. &c. p. 455.* proves strongly, *That according to Strangius's opinion, there can no contingent [i. e. sinful act] be foreknown by God as absolutely future, but what God first decreed to be absolutely future.* His words are these: 'But some also of those who hold some free acts of God to be absolutely future, and as such to be foreknown by God, without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts, as Learned *Strangius*, yet denie, that free future contingents may be known by God according to any Hypothesis, which doth not include an absolute Decree concerning their futurity: as *Strang. de Volunt. l. 3. c. 11.* His reason is, because nothing can be certainly known, but what is certainly true: but nothing is certainly true, but what is necessary either absolutely or conditionally. Whence he collects, that future conditionates cannot be the Object of divine Science, which is infallible and most certain, unlesse there be included the condition, whence that which is said to be future may be certainly inferred. But if this reason prevails, God can foreknow nothing contingent as absolutely future, but what he before decreed as absolutely future; which yet *Strangius* admits not, who confesseth, that men act many things freely to which they are not predetermined by God. Thus *Le Blanc* of *Strangius's* self-contradicting Hypothesis. And indeed, to speak the truth nakedly, there seems so much force in *Strangius's* reason, whereby he proves, *That all Gods Prescience of free future Contingents includes an absolute Decree of their futurity*, namely from the certainty of divine Prescience, that I no way wonder that he urgeth the same, albeit to the subversion of his own *Phænomena*. And I am very bold, yea confident in asserting, and demonstrating these following Propositions. (1) Prop. *That God can have no certain Prescience of things future, but from his own decree, the only certain determinate cause of their futurity.* And therefore the Socinians denying a certain determinate Cause of things contingent, denie also Gods Prescience to be certain, as *Le Blanc, De Concord. P. 3. Thes. 1. p. 438.* and I cannot see how any can rationally avoid the Socinian objection, who do not resolve the certitude of the divine Prescience into the divine Decree. Hence, (2) Prop. *There is an hypothetic or consequential necessitie that ariseth from Gods certain Prescience.* This is wel urged, though in the defense of an hell-bred Hypothesis, by the Socinians, and cited by *Le Blanc* (as a knot.

knot not easily untied) *de Concord. Par. 3. Thes. 22. pag. 441.*
 ‘ There is, saith he, much of difficultie here, which in times past
 ‘ has exercised the ingenies of Doctors. For seeing it is impossible,
 ‘ that the Prescience of God may be deceived, it cannot be but
 ‘ that those things must happen, which God foresees wil happen ;
 ‘ and therefore that althings happen necessarily : and it is im-
 ‘ possible, but that the very wil of man must produce those acts,
 ‘ which God from eternity foreknew it would produce. This
 Objection I despair ever to see rationally answered by our Ad-
 versaries without contradicting their own Hypothesis. See more
 of this Chap. 6. §. 5. Hence (3) *Idem. The same arguments that*
are urged by our Opponents against Gods predetermining the Wil to
the substrate mater of sin, may be, as they are by the Socinians, urged
with as great force against Gods certain Prescience of Sin. For our
 Adversaries, *Strangius, Le Blanc, &c.* granting the certain futu-
 rition of sin in the eternal Prescience of God, fall under al those
 Imputations and black Consequences which they charge on us,
 who assert the predefinition, futurition, and predetermination of
 the substrate mater of Sin in the divine Decree. This Proposi-
 tion is incomparably wel demonstrated by judicious *Davenant,*
 in his *Animadversions on Gods Love to Mankind*, p. 418, 419,
 442, 462. where he proves, That *Infalible Prescience granted by*
the Arminians, infers as much necessitie on the Wil, as absolute Pre-
destination and Reprobation. Of which more in our next Argu-
 ment ; also c. 6. §. 5.

Let us now a little inquire into the Subterfuges which our Ad-
 versaries take Sanctuarie in to secure themselves from the force of
 this Argument taken from Divine Prescience. And here at what
 a miserable losse and confusion are they among themselves ? How
 few of them agree on any one Principe or Medium for the solving
 this argument ? Some flie for refuge to the Molinists *Middle Sci-*
ence, telling us, That God foresaw that men being placed under such hy-
 potheses, and circumstances, would sin against him, &c. Thus *Baronius,*
Metaphys. Sect. 12. Disp. 2. n. 55, 56. p. 326. where he professedly
 defendes *Fonseca's* conditionate Science, making God to have a condi-
 tionate Science of the first sin, if Eve seduced by the Serpent should tempt
 Adam, &c. Thus also one and another Divine of good note among
 us. But this subterfuge is greatly disliked by the more sober of this
 new Method, particularly by *Strangius* ; who, l. 3. c. 11. p. 651.
 proves nervosely, That there can be no such thing as a *Middle*

or conditionate Science in God, because its Object is not certainly Cognoscible, or Knowable: and this he proves; because an object cannot be certainly known, unlesse it be certainly true: which the object of this conditionate Middle Science is not. Thus also *Le Blanc*, *De Concord. Libert. Par. 1. p. 452, &c.* Others therefore perceiving the infirmitude of this evasion, have recourse to the Dominicans real presence of things future in Eternitie; whereby they make God, by his Science of Vision, to behold the sins of men. Thus *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 10. p. 646. If it be demanded, saith he, to what Science Gods Knowledge of Sins must be referred, I easily grant that it is to be referred to his Science of Vision, &c. But more fully, l. 3. c. 7. p. 594. Among al the modes which are wont to be explicated, there is none more probable than that which is taken from the presence of althings in Eternitie; because the Eternitie of God is Insucsessive and Indivisible. The same he inculcates, p. 595, 596, 597. But this mode also of solving the difficultie, is greatly opposed, by some of his own party, the New Methodists, who take some pains to shew the invaliditie thereof. So *Le Blanc*, *De Concord. Libert. Par. 3. Thes. 37. p. 443.* First, saith he, as for that real presence of futures in Eternitie, namely as they are supposed to coexiste from eternitie to eternitie it self, it appears to be a mere figment; for that one thing coexiste to another, it is necessary that both existe, &c. Thus also a learned and pious Divine among our selves, who has espoused *Strangius's* Hypothesis, fals foul on the Thomists for asserting, *Althings to be eternally present to the divine Intellect in esse reali, &c.* Lastly, others therefore to evade the fore-mentioned inconveniences, take up their refuge under the Infinitie of Gods Prescience. Thus *Le Blanc*, *De Concord. Par. 1. Thes. 40. p. 444.* As for the fourth opinion, which seeks the certitude of the divine Prescience in the infinitie of the divine Intellect, and in the determinate truth of those things which are contingently future, it establisheth nothing but what is certain and indubitable, &c. Yet he grants, *Thes. 41.* That albeit this opinion contains in it nothing but truth, yet it doth not satisfie the Question, nor remove the main difficultie, namely, *How things passe from a state of possibilitie to a state of futurition, &c.* Whence he concludes, *Thes. 43.* Sithat there is so much darknesse on every side, there is nothing more safe than to professe our Ignorance in this particular. And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have, when they see themselves involved in so many self contradictions, and absurdities,

to

to professe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Prescience. Yea, some of them procede so far in this pretended modestie, as to professe, *That the mode of Divine Prescience is not determined in Scripture.* Thus *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. *That God is omniscient is put out of doubt, but touching the mode and manner of Prescience nothing is expressly delivered in Scripture.* The like others. But is it so indeed? Doth not the Scripture declare expressly the mode of Prescience? Why then (1) are our Adversaries so dogmatic and positive in their new modes and measures of Divine Prescience, contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages? How comes it to passe, that they contend with so much heat and passion, for that which they confesse is not expressly delivered in Scripture? Were not a modest *ἵσχυς* or suspension of assent more agreeable to such a Confession? But (2) We easily grant them, that the mode of Divine Prescience is unsearchable and past finding out, as indeed al Divine Perfections are; but yet must we thence necessarily conclude, *that nothing* of the mode of Divine Prescience is expressly delivered in Scripture? [1] Doth not the Scripture evidently declare, That the mode of Gods Prescience is far above yea opposite to that of Mans science, as much as Heaven is above the Earth, yea infinitely more? [2] Doth not the Scripture also remove from the mode of Divine Prescience al manner of Imperfections, much more Contradictions? And is not the mode of Gods Prescience in his own Essence and Decrees, much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Prescience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man? But see more hereof, *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. §. 2.*

§. 3. We passe on to our third Argument, which shal be taken from *the Divine Wil and Decrees*; and more particularly from *the Decree of Reprobation.* And here we shal lay down this Principle, which is granted by *Strangius*, and others of the New Method, *That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition or Predestination.* So *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. *We easily grant, saith he, that the predefinition of God from eternitie, and the predetermination of the create wil in time, mutually follow each other, so that if God doth absolutely predefine any particular and singular act to be brought about by us, he must also determine our Wil to the same.* This he inculcates, c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Concession is as much as we desire to build our Demon-

3 Arg. from
the Decree of
Reprobation.

Demonstration on: for we no way dout but to demonstrate, *That God doth absolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin:* Which we shal endeavour to make good in the following Propositions. (1) Prop. *Reprobation admits no formal motive, proper condition or cause.* This Proposition is generally denied by the New Methodists, who grant, *That God decrees al good absolutely, but as for Sin, say they, God decrees that only respectively and conditionally.* So *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 2. p. 546—548. But we no way dout, but, before we have finisht this Demonstration, to make it evident, that Gods Decree of Reprobation, whereby he determines to leave men to sin, is absolute, as wel as the Decree of Election: Yea, it is to me a thing altogether impossible, to defend an absolute Decree of Election, and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and respective: for if the absolute good pleasure of God be the only cause why some are elected, must it not also be the only cause why others are rejected? Doth not the Election of the one necessarily implie the Reprobation of the other? It's true, our Divines, that follow the Sublapsarian mode, as *Davenant*, &c. speak of Sin as a commun condition belonging to the whole masse of corrupt nature, yet they allow not of any *distinctive condition* or *formal cause* or motive, which should incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another: for nothing can move the divine Wil, but what is some way antecedent to it: Now the consideration of al sin is subsequent to some act of Gods Wil. (2) Prop. *The act of Reprobation is not merely negative, but positive and efficacious.* It's granted, that some of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation, which they terme *Non-election*, or *Preterition*, yet hereby they intend not a *suspense act* of the Divine wil, but include also a positive efficacious act. Thus *Jansenius*, *August. de Grat. Christi*, l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of *Augustin*, *That Gods negative Reprobation is positive.* So *Davenant*, *Dissert. de Elect. & Reprob.* p. 113. But we must take heed, saith he, lest with *Scotus* we think, that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates, which he electes not but passeth by, is merely negative: for in this very act, which we expresse by a Negation, is contained an expresse and affirmate Wil of God. So in his *Determinations*, *Quæst.* 25. p. 117. he tels us, *That it's most certain, there can be no Decree permitting sin, to which there doth not adhere some efficacious Decree.* And p. 118. he instructs us, *That this Decree of permitting sin is efficacious, not in a way of effi-*
cience,

ence, but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil. (3) Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a sovereign Absolute Lord, not as a Righteous Judge. The Pelagians, Molinists, Arminians, and New Methodists consider God in the act of Reprobation as a just Judge, not as a supreme absolute Lord: whence they conclude, that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins; not considering, that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment, but of denying Benefits, wherein the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended; according to that of the Apostle, *Rom. 9. 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay, &c?* What is sovereign Dominion, but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own? And shal we not allow the same Dominion to God, which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay? Is the sovereign Lord tied to his Creature by any Law, more than what is in his own nature and wil? Henec it follows, (4) *That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to al distinctive conditions or causes in man.* Thus *Jansenius, August. de Grat. Christi, l. 10. c. 4. p. 423.* proves out of *Augustin*, *That the absolute Wil of God is the alone cause of Reprobation.* And *Augustin* complains, *That it is a great injurie to God, when men search for causes of things superior to his sovereign Wil: for his Wil is such a supreme Rule of Justice, as that whatever he wils is for that very reason, because he wils it, to be accounted just.* So *Bradwardine, de Causa Dei, l. 1. c. 47.* proves strongly, *That albeit God punisheth no man eternally without sin committed in time; yet he doth not eternally reprobate any for sin as a Cause antecedently moving his divine Wil.* So *Alvarez, de Auxil. Disput. 109. 3^a Conclus.* The positive act, whereby God from eternitie would not admit some into his Kingdome, was not conditionate, but absolute, antecedent, in a moment of Reason, to the il use of Free-wil. And it is proved, [1] *Because there can be no cause of Reprobation.* [2] *Because supernatural Beatitude is not due to any upon the account of natural improvements: Therefore God could from al eternitie without any Injurie, before the Prescience of the good or il use of free-wil, elect some to life eternal, and by a positive act wil not to admit others.* And our Divines generally grant, *That there can be no other cause assigned of Reprobation, than the absolute iudexia or good pleasure of God.*

But none is more categoric and positive in this, than judicious *Davenant*, (who yet in some points came nigh the new Methodists) *Davenant's Hypotheses about absolute Reprobation.*

in his incomparable Animadversions on Gods love to mankind. Wherein he doth puissantly defend the following particulars greatly conducing to the establishment of our Hypothesis. [1] That Gods secret wil of good pleasure is very different from his reveled, preceptive, complacential wil, as pag. 221, 349, 376. [2] That Gods reveled, complacential, approbative wil is the measure of our dutie, but not of Gods decrees or operations, pag. 222, 356, 391, 399. [3] That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is only properly his wil, pag. 392. [4] That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is moved by nothing but itself, pag. 375, 376. [5] That the absolute Decrees of God contradict not general conditional promisses of life and threats of death, pag. 241, 332, 375, 387, 398. [6] That God may be said, according to his wil of complacence and approbation, to intend the salvation of sinners, yea Reprobates, by providing the means of grace conducing thereto, pag. 271, 376, 394. [7] That the externe means and offers of grace must be measured and interpreted according to the known nature of the means, not the unknown wil of God, pag. 353. [8] That God, by his approbative complacential wil unfeignedly wils what he commands, pag. 329, 393, 394, 401. [9] That al under the means of grace are under some remote conditional possibilitie of salvation, pag. 256, 257. [10] That Gods evangelic, providential intention of saving sinners is oft frustrated as to its events by mans sin, although his decretive beneplacite intention is never frustrated, p. 377, 381, 387, 388, 395. [11] That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events, though not with contrary events, pag. 240, 333, 341, 360, 402, 253. [12] That absolute Decrees oppose not the Justice of God; with its difference from that of men, pag. 232, 321, 336, 339, 342. [13] That absolute Decrees oppose not Gods Holinesse, pag. 240—272. [14] That absolute Decrees oppose not the Mercie of God, pag. 277—310. [15] That mere conditional Decrees are inconsistent with Gods soverain Being and Independence, pag. 226. [16] That absolute Reprobation is not repugnant to Gods Truth, pag. 349—362. [17] That absolute Reprobation takes not away the end and use of Gods gifts, pag. 374—404. [18] That absolute Reprobation leaves no man under an absolute necessitie or compulsion to sin, pag. 253. [19] Let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and libertie to the Agents, pag. 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. [20] That the Arminians grant an absolute, immutable, fixed Decree of Reprobation, which admits the same objections that they urge against the Calvinists, p. 302,

332, 333, 340, 351, 354, 400, 418, 419. [21] *Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessitie on the wil, and compulsion to sin as absolute Reprobation*, pag. 418, 419, 442, 462.

[22] Lastly, he shews us, *What is the right use and abuse of absolute Decrees*, pag. 454---526. These Propositions clearly and fully explicated by our judicious *Davenant* give great evidence and demonstration to our Hypothesis, as also distinct solution to the objections of our Opponents, of which hereafter, *Chap. 6.*

§. 4. Our next Argument shal be taken from *Divine Concurse*, ^{4. Arg. from Divine Concurse.} *its Principe, Nature, and Efficacie*; the explication whereof will give us a full demonstration of our Hypothesis; which we shal endeavor to lay down in the following Particulars.

1. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful, may be demonstrated from the *Principe of al Divine Concurse*. What is the active principe of al Divine Concurse, but the Divine wil? Doth not sacred Page expressely speak so much? So *Eph. 1. 11. Who worketh al things after the counsel of his own wil.* And more particularly as to the substrate mater of sin it's said, *Act. 4. 28. that those who crucified our Lord, did acte but what Gods hand, or wil and counsel predetermined to be done*, of which before. And *Strangius* himself grants us, *lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 63. That concurse, as to its prime act is in God, and the same with God.* Now such is the Omnipotence of the Divine wil, that al things must necessarily be done, which he wils to be done, and in that manner as he wils them, as *Aquinas* wel determines. How then is it possible, but that if God wil that the substrate mater of sin existe, it must necessarily existe, and in that manner as he wils it? Can any person or thing resiste the Divine efficacious wil? And what is al active concurse but the determination of the same efficacious wil? See more of Gods wil being the spring and principe of Divine concurse, *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 3.*

2. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater of sin may be demonstrated from the nature of Divine concurse as to its *Totalitie, Universalitie as to effects, Particularitie as to manner of working, Immediation, Antecedence, and soverain absolute Independence.* (1) The *Totalitie* of Divine concurse sufficiently demonstrates its predetermination as to the substrate mater of sin. That Gods concurse to al second causes, acts, and effects is total we have sufficiently demonstrated, *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. pag. 417.*

Y

Thus

1. *Its Principe.*

Cum voluntas Divina sit efficacissima, non solum sequitur, quod fiant ea quæ Deus fieri vult, sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri velit, *Aquin. part. 1.*

2. *Its Nature.*

3. *Totalitie.*

Adeo ut tota
actio pendeat
à Deo, & tota
à Creatura.

Thus much is also granted by *Strangius*, lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. where he assertes, *That the whole action dependes on God, as also on the creature; otherwise God should not concur immediately*: Though I am not ignorant that a Divine of name among us, as also of the same partie with *Strangius*, denies Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be total; yet because he is singular therein, and different from his own partie, I shal take it for granted, *that Gods concurse is total*, and thence endeavor to prove its predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sin. For if God totally concur to the substrate act of sin, must he not also concur to the wil that puts forth that act? And if God concur to the wil in the production of the act, must he not also necessarily determine the wil to that act? That Gods total concurse doth not only reach the act and effect, but also the wil itself is granted by *Strangius*, lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 171. 'Neither, saith he, do we say, that the Concurse of God doth reach only the effect, but not the efficient cause, *sithat the very ἐνεργεια, Energie of the second cause must be from God*; and the action is not lesse an effect than the work, &c.

2. Universalitatis.

(2) The *Universalitie* of Divine concurse as to al effects whatsoever gives us a further demonstration of its efficacious predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. That Divine concurse is universally extensive to al acts of the wil, as wel as to al other objects, by giving forces and assistances to faculties, exciting and applying them to their acts, and ordering them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends, we have copiosely demonstrated, *Court Gent. Part 4. Book 2. Chap. 7. §. 2. pag. 296, 297*. And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be predeterminative? Yea, to speak properly, is there, or can there be any real effieience, influx, or concurse sent forth by God as the prime universal cause of all things, which is not predeterminative? To talke of an universal general concurse of God, which immediately influenceth the wil and al its natural acts, and yet doth not predetermine, *i. e.* excite and applie the wil to its act, what is it but pure non-sense and virtual contradiction?

3. Particularitatis.

(3) The *Particularitie* of Gods concurse as to its manner of working doth also invictly demonstrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. Divine concurse, albeit it be universal as to the extent of its object, yet it's most particular and proper as to its manner of working. Our Adversaries generally, both Pelagians,

Pelagians, Moliniſts, Arminians, and New Methodiſts talke much of a general indifferent concurſe, alike commun to al effects, and determinable by its ſubſtrate mater ; as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it workes on. But, alas ! how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is ſuch a general indifferent concurſe ? Doth not this make the firſt cauſe to be ſecond, becauſe dependent ; and the ſecond cauſe firſt, becauſe independent ? And doth it not hence alſo neceſſarily follow, that the firſt cauſe may, by the indiſpoſition of the mater or reſiſtence of ſecond Agents, be fruſtrated of its intended effect ? What more expreſſely overthrowes the ſoverain Dominion and univerſal Concurſe of God, than ſuch a general indifferent Concurſe ? And yet is not this one of the moſt plauſible ſubterfuges our Adverſaries have to ſhelter themſelves under ? They object, If God ſhould by a particular predeterminative concurſe determine the wil to act in ſins intrinſecally evil, as the hatred of God, or the like, then the ſpecification of the act and moral determination of it to its particular object would be from God ; and ſo God inevitably ſhould be the Author of ſin. This is their principal and indeed their only objection worth a naming againſt our Hypotheſis ; to which we intend a more full answer in the next Chapter, §. 1. at preſent let this ſuffice, [1] We ſay not, that God is a *particular cauſe*, but *univerſal*, working in and by a particular concurſe ſuitable to the indigence of the mater it workes on. [2] We ſay not, that this particular Concurſe of God doth *morally ſpecifie*, or determine the ſinful act to its object, but only phyſically individuate or naturally modifye the ſubſtrate mater of the ſinful act. This is incomparably wel explicated by Dr. Samuel Ward, that great Profeſſor of Theologie, in his Determination of Gods Concurſe, pag. 117. where he ſtrongly demonſtrates, *That the previous Concurſe of God, as the firſt cauſe, doth in its way modifye and determine al the actions of ſecond cauſes* : and if ſo, then ſurely the ſubſtrate entitative act of ſin, as hereafter. [3] That general indifferent concurſe, which our Adverſaries ſo warmly contend for, ſithat they grant it to be cauſative and influential on the ſinful act, doth equally infer God to be the Author of ſin, as our predeterminative concurſe. For if it be cauſative and effective of the act, then ſurely of that individual act, as determined to ſuch an object : for to talke of its concurrence to the act *in genere, in the general*, and not *in individuo*, in its individual deter-

mination to its object, is such an absurditie in Philosophie, that al awakened Philosophers wil decree it: for what Tyro cannot informe us, that al physical acts are *suppositorum*, of individual singular substances, and so without al peradventure individual and singular: and if so, then must not their general concurse reach not only the action in general, but also individually considered, as relating to its object, not *morally*, but *physically*? And wil it not hence follow, that their general concurse is causative of the entitative act, as determined to its object, and so makes God the Author of sin, as much, at least as well as our predeterminative concurse, as more fully Chap. 6. §. 1. Of the particularitie of Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 4.

4. Immediation.

(4) The *Immediation* of Divine Concurse strongly demonstrates the predetermination of the wil as to the entitative act of sin thereby. Our Adversaries generally, both Jesuites, Arminians, and new Methodists, excepting some very few that adhere to *Durandus*, grant an immediate concurse to the entitative act of sin; which if wel followed wil necessarily infer predeterminative concurse, specially according to the concessions of the new Methodists; who say, *That this immediate concurse reacheth not only the effect and act*, (which the Jesuites and Arminians grant) but also the very wil itself, as the immediate efficient of the act. Touching this immediate Concurse see *Strangius*, lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 54, &c. & lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. And among the Jesuites none has more acutely demonstrated this, than *Suarez*, *Metaphys. Disp. 22. Sect. 1.* and our Country-man *Campton Carleton*, in his *Philos. Univers. Disp. 28. Sect. 2, 3. pag. 318. & Disput. 29. Sect. 1, 2. pag. 323, 324.* where he demonstrates strongly, against *Lud. à Dola*, *That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of sin.* Now hence we thus argue: If God, together with the human wil, immediately produceth the very act of sin, then certainly he must of necessitie predetermine the wil to that entitative act: For suppose the sinful act be *motus primò primus*, as they phrase it, or a mere simple volition of the wil, how is it possible, that God should immediately produce this act of the wil, without applying the wil to the act? Do not the very Jesuites, *Suarez*, *Carleton*, with others grant, *That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil*? And doth not *Strangius* with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further, *That Gods Concurse to this sinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil, not only simultaneous*, as
Strang.

Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56? Yea *Strangius* and those of his persuasion grant yet more, *That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect, but also the wil itself*, as *Strang. pag. 171*. And is it not most evident, from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries, touching immediate concurse, that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin? Can we imagine, that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil, and yet God not applie the wil to its act, which is al that is meant by predetermination? Yea, doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act, but also influence the wil in the production of that act, as *Strangius* and others grant, and yet not applie it to act? How is it possible, that God should influence the wil in the production of any act, without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act? And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act, doth he not applie it to the act, and so predetermine the same? Again, doth God by an immediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act, but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act, as *Strangius* also grants? and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration, that God predetermines the wil to that act? Can there be any previous concurse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act, but what is predeterminative? Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause? and if so, must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby? But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument. Lastly, if we allow (with the Jesuites) unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil; al those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination, may with the same facilitie be reflected on them: for if they make God, by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin, do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we? More of immediate Concurse, see *Court Gent. P.4. B.2. C.7. § 4.*

(5) The *Prioritie* and *Antecedence* of Divine Concurse doth invictly demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts. We shal here reassume a Principe already established, and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists, namely, *That the action of the first cause concurring with the second, is not, as to passive attingence, distinct from the action of the second cause.* This is generally granted by the Molinists, as *Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr.*

Arbitr. par. 3. theſ. 28. pag. 433. and by *Fanſenius, Auguſt. tom. 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119.* It's true, the Concurſe of God the firſt cauſe is really different from that of the ſecond, as to *active attingence* or principle, becauſe Gods concurſe, actively conſidered, is the ſame with his wil; yet as to *paſſive attingence*, the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the ſecond cauſe. This being premiſſed, we procede to demonſtrate Divine predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurſe, and that in and by the following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. *The firſt cauſe doth in order of nature or cauſalitie concur before the ſecond.* This Propoſition is potently demonſtrated by the acute Dr. *Sam. Ward, Determinat. de Concurſ. Dei, pag. 116, &c.* And the arguments for it are invict: for [1] where there is ſubordination and dependence in cauſalitie, which is proper to every ſecond cauſe, there poſterioritie is eſſentially appendent. Again, [2] al ſecond cauſes in regard of God are but instruments, as *Aquinas* proves: yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument, albeit in regard of the effect it may ſometimes be termed a principal Agent: Now doth not every instrument ſubſerve the principal Efficient? And doth not that which is ſubſervient in order of cauſalitie move after that which is the principal Agent? But here we are to remember, that when we aſſert Gods Concurſe to be *previous* in regard of its principle and independence, we denie not, but that it is alſo *ſimultaneous* in regard of the action and effect produced by the ſecond cauſe, as *Alvarez, lib. 3. de Auxil. Diſput. 19. num. 4. & Twiſſe, Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat. part. 3. pag. 56.* But that which we denie is, *That Gods Concurſe is ſolely concomitant and ſimultaneous*; and that [3] becauſe this ſimultaneous concurſe makes God only a partial cauſe, and dependent on the ſecond cauſe in the production of its effect. Yea, ſome of the Jeſuites grant, That if we conſider the concurſe of God abſolutely, without reſpect to this or that ſecond cauſe, ſo it is in order of nature before the influx of the ſecond cauſe. So *Fonſeca, Metaphyſ. lib. 6. cap. 2. quaſt. 5. ſect. 13.* The like *Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60, 61.* Thus alſo *Burgersdicius, Metaphyſ. lib. 2. cap. 11.* grants, Gods concurſe in ſupernaturals to be *previous*, albeit in naturals he would have it to be only *ſimultaneous*: which is moſt abſurd: for the active concurſe of God, being nothing elſe but the immanent act of his wil, muſt neceſſarily be the

the ſame in naturals as in ſupernaturals. More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurſe, ſee *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 416.* Hence, (2) Prop. *This previous Concurſe of God as the firſt Cauſe muſt neceſſarily move and applie every ſecond cauſe to its act and effect.* For how is it poſſible, that the ſecond cauſe ſhould act, unleſſe the firſt move and applie it to its act? Can a ſecond cauſe move it ſelf to an act, unleſſe it be firſt moved thereto by the firſt cauſe? Whence, (3) Prop. *This previous Concurſe of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin predetermines the ſame.* For if one and the ſame ſinful action be produced by God and the human Wil, and God concurs in order of nature before the wil, yea premove and applie it to the act, muſt he not neceſſarily predetermine the ſame? Al the wit and ſubtiltie of our Adverſaries wil never extricate themſelves or ſatisſie any awakened mind in this point, *How God doth by a previous concurſe move and actuate the Wil, and yet not predetermine it to the act.* Indeed to ſpeak the truth, the Sentiments not only of the Arminians, but alſo of the new Methodiſts, *Baronius, Strangius* and others about Concurſe, fal in with thoſe of the Jeſuites for a *ſimultaneous Concurſe* only, albeit ſome of them in termes diſown it.

(6) Laſtly, the *ſoverain and abſolute Independence* of Gods Concurſe gives us further demonſtration of his predetermining the wil as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. That Gods Concurſe is not *Conditionate* but *abſolute* and *independent*, we have copioſely proved, *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 412, &c.* And indeed, what more abſurd, yea impoſſible, than ſuch a conditionate Concurſe, whereby the Moliniſts and Arminians ſuppoſe Gods concurrence to depend on mans? Is there not hereby an effectual dore opened to a progreſſe into infinite? For if God concur on condition that man concur, doth God concur to that condition, or not? If not, is there not then ſome act of the creature produced without Gods concurſe? If God concur to the working of that condition, then *abſolutely*, or *conditionally*: if *abſolutely*, then his former Concurſe is not conditional: if *conditionally*, then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence? We take it then for granted, that Gods Concurſe is not conditional, but abſolute and independent. And hence we thus argue: If God concur abſolutely and independently to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, then he doth predetermine the wil thereto: the conſequence is rational and

6. *Absolute Independence.*

and clear: For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the same action and effect, the one must necessarily depend on the other; and that which depends on another must be determined by that other: for every cause that is dependent on another, is so far as it depends thereon determinable thereby. It's true, natural corporeous effects have some dependence on the Sun, without being determined thereby, because the Sun is a limited cause, and has not efficacy sufficient to determine the matter it works on, but is rather determined thereby, and so in that respect dependent thereon: But as for God the first cause whose will, the principle of his concurse, is omnipotent and most efficacious, it's impossible, that he should have any dependence on, or be any way determinable in his concurse by the matter he works on: he being the most universal cause, infinitely perfect, and void of all potentialitie or passive power must necessarily predetermine all second causes to their acts, but be determined by none. But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficacy of Gods Concurse.

3. The efficacy of Divine Concurse proves predetermination.

Nos autem eo nomine, [sc. influxus communis] non determinationem seu prædeterminationem intelligimus, sed vim, *ἐνεργίαν*, & efficaciam Dei, quâ causas secundas sibi subordinat, &c.

Strang. l. I. c. II.

1. Efficacious Concurse as to natural acts.

3. Having demonstrated Divine predetermination to the substrate matter of sin from the Principle and Nature of Divine concurse, we now proceed to demonstrate the same from the Efficacy thereof. Strangius, lib. I. cap. II. pag. 61. albeit he denies Gods general Concurse, whereby he concurs to the matter of sin, to be predeterminative, yet he grants it is efficacious, calling it *ἐνεργίαν*, the force and efficacy of God, whereby he subordinates second causes to himself; so that whatever they are or act, they essentially depend on him in both respects. And this ingenuous concession touching the efficacy of Divine concurse, is all that we require to build our present Demonstration on, which we shall distribute into two branches, (1) Gods efficacious concurse unto all natural acts and effects. (2) Gods efficacious concurse to all supernatural acts and effects.

1. We shall demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate matter of sin from the efficacy of Divine concurse as to all natural acts and effects; which evidently appears in the following particulars. (1) Gods concurse to all physic or natural causes, motions, and effects is most efficacious. This Proposition the sacred Scriptures do abundantly confirm, as *Esa.* 26. 12. *Rom.* 11. 36. *Eph.* 1. 11. *Act.* 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. §. 1. Thus much Strangius and those of his persuasion grant us, as before, c. 2. §. 1. (2) The efficacy of Divine concurse depends on the efficacy and determination

mination of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurse, considered actively, but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermining to act so or so? To presume that active concurse is any thing else but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to crosse the mind of sacred Scriptures and the most awakened Divines, as we have copiously demonstrated, *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 3.*

(3) *Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al second causes to al their natural actions and effects.* Is it not impossible, but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of such an action of mans wil, the said action or effect must necessarily follow? Is not the wil of God sufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts? Is not the efficacitie of the Divine wil so great, that not only those things are done, which God wils shal be done, but in that manner as he wils them? Doth not *Strangius* confesse so much *lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55.* & *lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266.*? Whence if God in his own wil purpose and determine, that the human wil should produce such or such an action, suppose that whereto sin is necessarily annexed, is not the human wil necessarily in regard of the Divine wil, and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto? This is most evident in the crucifixion of our Lord, expressed, *Act. 2. 23.* By the determinate counsel, τῇ ἀεισμενῇ βουλῇ, i. e. by the decreed, fixed, determined wil of God. The like *Act. 4. 28.* of which places before, *Chap. 3. §. 2.* Hence (4) *The efficacious concurse of God modifies, and according to its mode determines al actions of second causes, not only necessarily but freely.* Doth the Divine wil determine itself to the production of every singular individual effect? and may it not, yea must it not then determine the human wil to al its natural acts? Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al such faculties, acts and effects as are subject to its Empire? and has not the Divine wil, which is infinitely more efficacious, power to determine al inferior powers, acts and effects subject to its universal Dominion? And doth it not hence follow, that the soverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious concurse predetermine al the free acts of the human wil, which necessarily fall under its Empire and modification? See this well demonstrated by that judicious Professor *Sam. Ward, Determinat. de Concursu Dei, pag. 118, &c.* Whence (5) *The efficacious pre-determinative concurse of God equally extends itself to al natural good, even to the substrate mater of sinful acts.* *Strangius* and others of

Non solum sunt ea quæ Deus vult fieri, sed etiam eo modo fiunt quo Deus vult fieri, *Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 266.*

Act. 2. 23.

our Opponents grant, That Gods efficacious predetermining Concurſe extends it ſelf not only to al ſupernatural good, but alſo to al natural good, that has not ſin intrinſecally annexed to it: whence we may, by a paritie of reaſon demonſtrate divine Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of al actions, though never ſo intrinſecally evil: for the ſubſtrate mater of al actions though intrinſecally evil, is naturally good. Take the Hatred of God, which is reckoned to be an act moſt intrinſecally evil, and if we conſider it in its ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, ſo it is *naturally good*, and if it were exerted againſt ſin, its proper object, it would be alſo *morally good*: So that indeed the ſubſtrate mater of bad and good actions is the ſame, namely ſome natural good; and Gods Concurſe to the one and other is the ſame. Yea this indeed is acknowledged by *Strangius*, l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. *Al natural acts are good by the bonitie of Being*, i. e. entitatively and naturally—

Et ſic quantum ad concurſum attinet dicimus, Deum concurrere eodem modo ad generationem ex legitimo matrimonio & adulterio, quia phyſicè eadem eſt ſpecie utrobique actio.
Strang. l. 2. c. 3. p. 154.

whence he concludes, *and ſo as to Concurſe we ſay, that God concurs in the ſame manner to generation from lawful Matrimonie and that from adulterie; becauſe the action on both ſides is phyſically of the ſame kind.* A great conceſſion indeed, which would our Adverſaries fully come up unto, how ſoon and how eaſily might we put a period to this Controverſie? For if the ſame action may be, as to its ſubſtrate mater naturally good and ſinful; and both phyſically of the ſame kind, and ſo Gods Concurſe to both the ſame, why then may not God be allowed to predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſinful, as wel as to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is good? Surely if the action be, as to its ſubſtrate mater, in one and t'other naturally good, and phyſically of one and the ſame kind, there can be no rational account given, why God ſhould not predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is evil, as wel as to that which is good. In ſhort, as there is no moral act ſo perfect in this imperfect ſtate, but has ſome vitioſitie adherent to it, ſo there is no natural act ſo ſinful, but it has for its ſubſtrate mater ſome natural good: and as God by predetermining the wil to the moral good is no way the Author of the vitioſitie appendent to the act; ſo by predetermining it to the natural ſubſtrate mater of the ſinful act, he is as much exempted from being the Author of the ſin. The ſubſtrate mater of the one and the other being the ſame, of which more §. 5.

2. Efficacious Concurſe as to ſupernatural Acts and Effects.

2. We procede to demonſtrate Divine Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin from the Efficacitie of Divine Concurſe

curse as to *supernatural Acts and Effects*. Our Adversaries the New Methodists, *Baronius* only excepted, grant that *efficacious Concurse as to supernatural good is predeterminative*; from which we no way doubt, but to draw an invict Demonstration, that Divine Concurse is also predeterminative as to the substrate mater of sinful acts, even such as are intrinsically evil. This Province we shall endeavor to make good by several Arguments, (1) From the Principle of al *Predetermination*: what is the principle of al Predetermination, but the omnipotent efficacious wil of God? And how are al Acts and Effects predetermined by the Divine Wil, but by an immutable predeterminative Decree, termed his *Determinate Counsel*, Act. 2. 23? which is said, Act. 4. 28. *to predetermine* the Crucifixion of Christ? Doth not therefore the same *determinate Counsel* or wil of God predetermine the substrate mater of sin, as well as any act morally good? Is not then predetermination as to its *active Attingence* or principle one and the same, both as to natural and supernatural good, albeit as to its *passive Attingence* and effect it be greatly different? For albeit there be a double Concurse required to supernatural good, one to the substrate mater, which is a natural good, and the other to the moral good, which is supernatural, but only a single concurse to the substrate mater of sin; yet in point of efficacy the predetermination to the later is equal to the former, as to Divine efficiency: For there is as much power and efficacy required to predetermine or premove the wil to the substrate mater, or natural entitative act of sin, as there is to any supernatural good: both are alike facile to the divine omnipotent wil: and surely no reason can be given, why predetermination is necessary for the production of any gracious act, and not as necessary for the production of the entitative act of sin: for the Wil of Man is equally incapable of acting at al, as of acting graciously without Predetermination, whatever some may imagine to the contrary.

(2) From the substrate mater of al *natural and supernatural good*. Are not al gracious acts and habits lodged in human nature? What is supernatural good but a ray of the divine Nature irradiated into human Nature, and seated therein as its proper subject? Is not al grace a supernatural mode implanted in human nature? whence, if God by efficacious Grace predetermine the wil to receive any habitual infusion, or act of Grace, must he not

also necessarily predetermine the wil to the natural act which is the substrate mater of that supernatural mode? And if God predetermine the wil to the natural act of that which is good, must he not also predetermine it to the natural act of that which is evil? What difference can there be assigned between the natural act of Crucifying our Lord, which was intrinsically evil, and that of crucifying the Thieves, which was a piece of Justice? Did not God then as much predetermine the former as the later? Yea, to raise this Argument higher, hath not the same substrate mater, which is supernaturally good and gracious as to its substance, some modal vitiositie and obliquitie appendent thereto in this imperfect state? If then God predetermine the Wil to the substrate mater of that which is supernaturally good, must he not also necessarily predetermine it to the substrate mater of that which is also evil? I am not ignorant what is replied hereto, which we no way doubt but wil prove invalid, and no better than smoke or vapor, when we come to enlarge more fully on this Argument, §. 5.

(3) We demonstrate the necessitie of Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of what is sinful, from the Invaliditie yea vanitie of those reasons which are urged by our Adversaries against it, which do with as much force strike at Predetermination to what is supernaturally good. [1] One principal Objection that our Adversaries urge against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, specially such sins as are intrinsically evil, is *That it destroyes the libertie of the Wil, &c.* We shal not now attempt any answer to the Objection, but reserve it for its proper place, *Chap. 6. §. 5.* only we are to shew, that the whole of this Objection, and the reasons urged to enforce it, do with as much force strike against al Predetermination, even that which is granted to supernatural good: For doth not Predetermination to gracious acts, lay as much compulsion on the wil, and thence as much destroy its libertie, as predetermination to the substrate mater of sin? And is not the same objection with its reasons as much urged, and that with as great color of Reason, by the Molinists and Arminians, against al Predetermination to gracious acts? I must confesse, I could never, neither do I think any else can maintain and defend our ground against the Jesuites and Arminians, if those reasons and grounds which our Adversaries urge against Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, be admitted

mitted as valid. [2] The like may be said of that other objection or reason, why our Adversaries reject Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, namely, *That it makes al Gods Laws naturally and absolutely impossible, &c.* Is not this very objection, and the reason urged to enforce it, as much urged by Molinists and Arminians, against al Predetermination even to gracious Acts? And are not the reasons as valid on the later as on the former side? What reason do the new Methodists give, that Predetermination to the entitative act of sin makes Gods Laws impossible, but that it takes away the Wils Indifference, and destroys the natural power that the wil is invested with to act or not to act? And doth not Predetermination to good as much destroy the wils indifference, and its power to act or not to act? [3] Our Adversaries urge, *That this Predetermination takes away the use of Promises, Invitations, and al evangelic offers of Grace, and supposeth God not to deal sincerely with Sinners, in making offers of Grace, and yet irresistibly determining their Wils against the acceptance of these offers?* Is not this very objection, with its reason urged, and that with as much force of reason by Jesuites and Arminians against Predetermination to gracious Acts? For if no man can entertain those offers of Grace by his own free-wil, without a predeterminative Concurse, are not al gracious Promises, Invitations, and offers of Grace to Sinners, who fall not under this Predetermination, vain and uselesse? Our Adversaries the new Methodists generally, (some few excepted) deny any sufficient Grace or Free-wil in corrupt Nature for the reception of evangelic offers and Grace: and is not then the vitious wil of corrupt Nature as wel determined by its own vitiostie against the offers of Grace, as by the predeterminative Concurse of God? [4] Our Adversaries object, *That this Predetermination to the entitative act of sin, supposeth God to compel and force men to sin, and so makes him to be the real Author of Sin, yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulsion, &c.* and is not this very argument urged by Jesuites and Arminians against al Predetermination even to what is good, and that with as much color of reason? For say they, If God predetermine the wil to what is good, then he compels and forceth the wil to be good; so that the wil being under a compulsion cannot be said to be the Author of its own act, but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercise of that act, which destroyeth al moral good, &c. Which objection.

tion is as valid as that of our Adversaries, and can never be solidly answered if their objection be good; though according to our Principles neither the one or the other objection has any force in it, as we shall demonstrate, c. 6. §. 5. To conclude this argument, I am very confident, our Opponents the new Methodists will never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concurse to what is morally or supernaturally good, so long as they deny the same to the substrate mater of sin, which is naturally good: for al, or at least the most of those arguments they urge against the later, may, and are urged by the Molinists and Arminians against the former, and that with equal force. And this *Baronius* did by his natural acumen foresee, and therefore he took a course more seemingly rational according to his Principles, though less friendly to divine Concurse, to deny al Predetermination as wel to supernatural as natural good; of which see his *Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. n. 66. &c. p. 136.*

§. Arg. from
the Nature of
Sin.

II. Its mater.

§. 5. Our fifth Argument shall be taken from the Nature of Sin, its substrate mater and formal reason. 1. As to the general Idea and substrate mater of sin, we have demonstrated, Ch. 1. §. 2. (1) That al human acts considered in their natural entitie, abstracted from their moral constitution, are neither good nor evil. (2) That al moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Constitution and Determination from the Moral Law. (3) That no human Act considered physically, or according to its natural entitative substance, is intrinsically evil, but only morally, in regard of its moral specification or determination to such or such an object. Hence, (4) That sin has for its substrate mater some natural good. Now these Propositions being laid as so many Principles, we hence argue, That God must necessarily concur to, yea predetermine the substrate mater of actions intrinsically evil: For, if al sinful acts, even such as are intrinsically evil morally, are, according to their substrate mater physically good, doth it not necessarily follow, that God the first cause must concur thereto, yea predetermine the same? Must not every second Cause as such be actuated and so determined by its first Cause and his efficacious Concurse? Doth not the subordination of the second Cause to the first, necessarily demonstrate, not only its dependence on, but also Predetermination by the same in al its natural operations and effects? Is not every Being by participation necessarily limited, defined, and predetermined in al its natural entitative motions by the first Being, which is

is such by Essence? May not this also be demonstrated from the very concessions of our Adversaries, who grant, that vitiositie follows not any Act as a natural Act? So *Strangius*, l. 2. c.

11. p. 243. *We confesse*, saith he, *that Vitiositie doth not follow the act of sin as an act; for then every act would be sin; also that it doth not follow, as the act procedes from God, for then every act that procedes from God, would have sin.* Now if sin follows not the act of sin as an act, what reason can there be why God should not efficaciously concur to, yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin? This is wel explicated by *Lud. Crocius*, (that *Breme* Professor, who was a member of the Synod of *Dort*, and there began the New Method) *Duodecas, Dissert. de Volunt. Dei*, Dissert. 8. Thes. 99. p. 426. ‘*As to the Act*, saith he, *of the Divine Wil about sin*, the effates of Scripture seem to contradict themselves, ‘*whiles that some expressely affirm, That God wils and hates sins, and those that commit them, Psal. 5. 5, 6, 7. Zach. 8. 17. but others seem to say, That God wils, creates, effectes them, Esa. 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37, 38. Amos 3. 6.* But these things do wel agree, ‘*if the distinction be rightly observed, (1) Between the Act, and the Vitiositie of the Act. (2) Between the Act as it is from God, and as it is from the Creature. (3) Between the wil of God decreeing, and the wil of God commanding.* Whence he concludes, *Thes. 100. p. 427.* ‘*For God wils and produceth, by the Creature as the first Cause by the second, the Act, as an Act, of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie, and Vitiositie; and wils and effectes the same, albeit depraved by the Creature, as invested with his moral rectitude, because he produceth it by his own power, from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice, which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause.* Whence he addes, *Thes. 101.* ‘*And this act essentially good, even as defiled by the Creature, God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment, or of exploration or exercise, and as an ordinate convenient Medium, according to his Justice for the best ends.* *Thes. 102.* In this sense ‘*God is said, To create evil, to produce it out of his mouth, to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren, to rob Job of his goods, to command Shimei to curse David, to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines, to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles.* *Thes. 103.* For God decreed to produce ‘*those acts, as acts, and to permit the depravation of them by*

Fatemur quidem, malitiam non sequi actum peccati ut est actus, alioqui omnis actus esset peccatum, &c. Strang.

‘the

' the Sinners, and to use them albeit depraved, wisely and justly
' to ends holily ordained by him.

2. From the formal reason of sin.

2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the *formal nature* of Sin, which consists in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions, as *Ch. 1. §. 2.* we have more fully explicated. Whence we thus argue: If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin, then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins: and if of some, why not of al, even such as are intrinsically evil? That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident, and that from the concessions of our Adversaries, who grant, *That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good, which also, according to their own confessions are modally sinful*: Whence we thus argue; The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same: wherefore, if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good, must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful? When we say, *That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful*, As here, may not be taken *reduplicatively*, but only *specificatively*, i. e. as it *specifies* and *distributes* the same action into *good*, and *sinful*; which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act: so that our Opponents granting, that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good, how can they possibly denie, that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful? When I can see a rational solution given to this argument, (which I despair of) I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause. But they replie, *If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions, it doth not thence follow, that he concurs to actions intrinsically, and in the substance of them evil.* But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor, if we consider wel, (1) That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it, any more than the greatest: the difference between sins modally and intrinsically evil finds no place here: dare our Adversaries say, that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good, but not of that intrinsical evil which is in the hatred of God, or the like? Whence, (2) The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason, If God doth concur,

concur, yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sinful, without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin, why may he not also predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsically evil, without the like imputation? Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins, yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same? Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin, as in the greatest? And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the author of the least sin, wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins? Whence, if we can prove, what our Adversaries wil never be able to disprove, yea what they approve of, namely, that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act, which is imperfectly good, but modally sinful, it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason, that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsically evil, without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto. I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument.

§. 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin shal be drawn from his *Permission of Sin.* And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission; which is either *legal* or *natural*: *Natural* Permission is either *divine* or *human*; and both either *negative* or *positive*. (1) *God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin, but on the contrary severely prohibits it, and that on pain of death.* (2) *Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin, but as conducive to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation.* It's true, Divine Permission regards not only the substrate mater of sin, but also sin formally considered, and so sin under that reduplication, *as sin*, yet not simply considered, but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie: and so much is confessed by *Strangius*, l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. *If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin, it's true, that sin as sin is permitted by God, physically not morally.* Yet I adde, not simply, but *respectively*, as conducive to Gods supreme ends of Government. And *Lud. Crocius*, *Duodec. Dissert. 8. Thes. 74. pag. 415.* assertes, *That God, albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin,*

6. Arg. from
Gods Permission
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yet he permits the formal of sin, not as sin, but as the punishment of sin, as he explicates himself, pag. 430. (3) *There is a vast difference between Gods natural permission of sin, and mans*: al mankind being by their near cognation and mutual dependences each on other, as also by the allegiance they owe to God, under an essential obligation to impede and hinder sin to the utmost of their power, in themselves and in each other, hence it follows, that they cannot permit sin, without being partakers in the sin they voluntarily permit: they are bound by the Law of their Maker and by their communion in human nature to hinder the egresses of sin what they may. But is the soverain God under any such essential obligation to man? Do not al men depend on him, but he on no man? Is he under any obligation, more than what the rectitude of his own nature and wil dictates to him, to hinder sin or give grace? May he not as Rector of the Universe, not only suspend his own influences, but also efficaciously and actively permit his mutable creature to fall into sin, for the advance of his own glorie? Hence (4) *Divine permission is not only negative, but also positive and efficacious*. [1] Gods *negative permission* of sin is by withdrawing the *quid prohibens*, the bridle of restraining and preventing Grace, both habitual and actual; which is not properly a *privation* of any grace due from God, but only a *negation* of undeserved, and peradventure abused grace. This permission we terme *negative*, not in regard of the principe or subject, as if Gods wil were negative, and not efficacious; but only in regard of the terme that follows, namely sin, which is the consequent, albeit not an effect of this negative permission. [2] By Gods *positive and efficacious permission* we understand his wise and providential *Disposition, Limitation, Regulation, and Direction* of al sin, so as it ends and determines in the advance of his own glorie, either in a way of vindictive justice, or triumphant mercie.

These things being premised, our demonstration naturally and with much facilitie resultes thus: *That which God doth, by the determinate absolute counsel of his omnipotent wil, voluntarily and efficaciously permit, that as to its substrate mater must necessarily be predetermined by him*: But now God doth, by the determinate absolute counsel of his own wil, voluntarily and efficaciously permit sin: Ergo, &c. The major dependes on, and receives sufficient evidence from that approved Maxime granted by Strangius and others, namely, that *Divine predetermination is adequate to Divine predefinition or predestination*;

stination; so that whatever is absolutely predefined or decreed by God, is also predetermined by him: whence whatever God doth by the absolute determinate counsel of his wil determine or decree to permit, that must be predetermined by him, as before, §. 3. So that our main work wil be to make good our minor; which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propositions. (1) Prop. *Divine permission of sin is not merely negative, otiose, or contemplative.* To make Gods permission of sin to be an idle or naked contemplation or looking on, with a suspension of Divine assistances, was the proper sentiment of *Epicurus*, and is most agreeable to Epicurean practices, but most opposite to Christianitie. It's true, man oft permits things, because they are indifferent, or because he is ignorant of their vitiositie, or at least wants power to impede and hinder them: but may any of these defects be imputed to the soverain most wise Rector of the Universe? Is he capable of any ignorance? are any things indifferent to him? Do not althings some way conduce to his glorie? or wants he power to hinder men in their sinful courses? (2) *Divine permission of sin is by the determinate absolute counsel of the Divine wil.* For doth not God wil or decree the existence of sin? otherwise how comes it to passe? Can any thing be, but what God hath decreed shal be? Doth not God also order, limit, dispose, and direct al sin to his own supreme ends? And doth not God order althings according to the efficacious, determinate, absolute counsel of his own wil? What is providence but the omniscient soverain disposition of the Divine wil? May we imagine that sin comes into the world against or beside the Divine omnipotent wil? This is wel explicated by *Lud. Crocius*, (who generally follows the new Method) *Duodecas Dissertat. de Voluntate Dei*, *Dissert. 8. Thes. 74. pag. 415.* God wils and decrees the material of sin not the formal, and he permits the formal not the material. Yea, *Strangius* himself, *l. 4. c. 8. p. 832.* grants us, *That whatever is done by God permitting it, as also whatever is said to be done by a negative action of God, in regard of the externe transient action, is yet always understood to be done by a positive action, in regard of the interne immanent action, namely of Gods wil.* Hence, (3) *Divine permission of sin is most active and efficacious.* For what more active and efficacious than the Divine wil, which is the fountain of Divine permission? What is Gods permission or not willing to hinder sin, but his actual volition or willing not to hinder it? and doth not

Deus vult ac
decernit mate-
riale peccati
non formale, &
permittit for-
male non ma-
teriale, *Croc.*

this speak his efficacious ordering and directing of sin to his own glorie? Doth not the sacred Page generally expresse Gods permission of sin in the most active and emphatic notions? What Verbes among the Hebrews note more energie and efficacitie, than such as are in *Hiphil* and *Piel*? And yet are not these frequently used to expresse Gods permission of sin, as *Strangius*, pag. 839? Whence (4) *May we not conclude, that Divine permission of sin necessarily presupposeth Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin?* Surely if God doth by the determinate absolute counsel of his wil efficaciously permit sin, he can with as much facilitie and efficacy hinder it if he please: But how can he efficaciously hinder sin, unlesse he predetermine the wil to the suspension of the entitative act? And if God predetermine the wil to the suspension of the entitative act, may he not as wel predetermine it to the production of the same act? See more of this Argument from Gods permission of sin, *Rhetor. de Provident. cap. 6. pag. 67.*

7. Arg. from Divine Providence about sin.

§. 7. Another Argument to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be taken from the *Providence of God*, which seems greatly, yea (may we not say?) mostly concerned about the sins of men. (1) Gods providence in the conservation of the entitative act of sin strongly demonstrates his predetermination thereof. *Durandus* himself grants, *That al real Beings are conserved by God*: How can God conserve the material entitative act of sin, but by predetermining the same? Suppose the act of sin be a mere simple immanent volition, it is most certain, that this act cannot be infallibly and invincibly conserved by God, unlesse he predetermine the wil to such a conservation: and if God predetermine the wil to the conservation thereof, why not also to its production? What is conservation, as to God, but continued creation or production? (2) Gods providential *Restriction, Gubernation, and Ordination* of sin unto his own glorie doth potently demonstrate his predetermination to the material entitative act thereof. Albeit God be not the Author of sin, yet he is the Orderer thereof: and how can he be the soverain Orderer of it, unlesse he applie the wil to the entitative act thereof? Our Adversaries the New Methodists generally grant, *That God doth regulate, dispose and order al mens sins unto his own glorie.* Thus *Strangius*, lib. 4. cap. 8. pag. 832. saith, *That God doth rule, moderate, and order the sins that he permits, &c.* Yea, *Baronius*, *Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. pag. 158.* saith, *That God doth*

doth preside over mens wicked wils, and rules and governs them, yea, by his Divine providence ordains them to one sin rather than to another, &c. And so much that apocryphous Author, *Wisd. 8. 1.* teacheth us, namely, *That wisdom, [or Divine providence] reacheth from one end to another mightily, and yet sweetly ordereth althings:* which Bernard thus excellently descants on: *Mightily for itself, but sweetly for me.* And doth Divine providence order althings most potently or mightily? And must not also mens sins be included under this universal disposition? And how can God order mens sins mightily or infallibly for his own glorie, unlesse he predetermine the wil to the material entitative act? Take acts most intrinsically evil, even the hatred of God, the commun instance given by our Adversaries, and unlesse we grant, that God doth infallibly applie and predetermine the wil to the material entitative act, what wil become of the providence of God? would it not soon be banisht out of the world? Doth not the sacred Pagine assure us, that al men by nature before conversion are *Haters of God, Rom. 1. 30. εχθροὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ,* and *enemies to God, Rom. 8. 7?* And hence, are not al the human acts of men in such a state spirited with hatred and enmitie against God? Now if God doth not predetermine, *i. e.* applie the wils of such men to their material entitative acts put forth by them, what room is there left for Divine providence among such? Would not this Antithesis of our Adversaries exemt al Pagans that ever were or shal be, al unconverted Jews, yea nineteen parts of twenty at least among such as are called Christians from any predetermination or efficacious gubernation of Divine providence? I would fain have our Opponents seriously to consider this, and how much their Antithesis tends to Epicurean Atheisme, which cuts off the providence of God from intermedling with human affaires: certainly nothing more darkens the glorious beautie and perfection of Providence: would the wise Rector ever have suffered sin to have come into the world, had he not known how to have wrought his own ends by it, yea infallibly to have predetermined it to his own ends? Is not the Lord of Lords served in his own house, this great Universe, by the vessels of dishonor, *2 Tim. 2. 21?* Has he not power to let forth the sins of men, and restrain them at his pleasure? And how can he do this, if he do not predetermine the wils of men to the entitative acts? Doth any thing more directly conduce to the perfection of Divine providence, than that it doth determi-

determinately wil and predefine althings, and destine them to the ends intended by him? And can God performe this, unlesse he move and applie al second causes to their determinate acts and effects? And can this be perfected, if Divine providence do not predetermine the wils of men and al their acts, even such as are most sinful, considered materially and entitatively, to their certain determinate effects? Doth it not belong to the perfection of Divine providence, not only to ordain means for an end, but also infallibly to attain the end by the means appointed? and can God infallibly attain the end appointed by mens sins, unlesse he infallibly determine the wil to the entitative act of such sins? Should God appoint means for an end, and leave it to the indifference of mans ambulatory wil to execute those means, or not, how could Divine providence reach its end infallibly? Yea how could God ever attain any certain prescience that his end should be attained? Suppose it to be the Crucifixion of our Lord, appointed by God as a means absolutely necessary for the salvation of sinners; I demand, how this end can be infallibly attained by this means, so absolutely necessary, unlesse God predetermine the wils of his bloody enemies to this entitative act of crucifying the Lord of Glorie, which on their parts was intrinsically evil? Again, how could the omniscient God infallibly foreknow, that any sinner should ever be saved by this means, if the means were not predefined and predetermined by him? Were the Providence of God about mens sins only general and indifferent, without a particular modification, application and determination of the entitative act, would not the influx and concurrence of mans free wil be exemted from the influx, providence, and wil of God? It's a good Aphorisme of *Aquinas*, par. 1. q. 22. *That Divine providence extends itself only to such things, unto which Divine causalitie extends itself*; and certainly Divine causalitie extends itself to no second cause, act, or effect, but what it predetermines: For wherein consists that causalitie of the first cause on the second, but in applying the second to its act? And if God applies the second cause to its act, doth he not predetermine the same? May we not then hence regularly conclude, that if God doth not predetermine the wil to the natural entitative act of sin, he has no prescience of, nor providence about that sinful act, neither can he infallibly reach his intended end thereby? Lastly, what would become of Christs providential Kingdome as Mediator, should he not predeter-

predetermine the wils of wicked men to the entitative act of their sins? Has not Christ as Mediator purchased al the services and actions of the most wicked men, so far as to render them infallibly subservient to the advance of his own Kingdome? and has not God the Father put the government of the world into his hands? Is he not *King of Nations*, as wel as *King of Saints*? Do not al Kings reign by him? has he not power given him over al flesh, as wel sinful as sacred? And doth he not order althings in the wisest manner for the good of his people and his own glorie, as *Rom. 8. 28*? And is it possible, that the sinful actions of wicked men should infallibly subserve the good of the Church and the glorie of Christs mediatory Kingdome, did he not infallibly predetermine them to the subtrate mater of their sins? How could *Cyrus*, an hater of God, be his shepherd, to deliver the captive Jews, should not God have predetermined him to al his sinful acts? Can wicked men, whose actions are al intrinsically evil, because ful of hatred against God, do such service, without the least disservice as to the spiritual state of the people of God, were not their wils predetermined to the entitative acts of their sins? Can we imagine how Christ, into whose hands the administration of althings here below is put, could so wisely, potently, and irresistibly order and dispose of al the sins of men, for the supreme ends he has designed them to, unlesse he doth predetermine mens wils to al their entitative acts, though never so intrinsically evil? Certainly the Antithesis of our Adversaries would divest Christ of the principal part of his Government as Mediator in his providential Kingdome. See more of Gods efficacious predeterminedative Providence about the subtrate mater of sin, in *Zuinglius, de Providentia*, pag. 375, 376, &c. *Rhetor. de Provident. & Court Gent. P.4. B.2. C.9. §.2.*

§. 8. Our last Argument for the demonstration of Gods pre-terminative Concourse to the subtrate mater of sin shal be taken from the *essential and absolute dependence of the creature on God*. This argument, albeit *last in execution*, yet is it (as they say the end is) *first in intention, efficace, and dignitie*; in so much as that the stoutest of our Adversaries seem to have a venerable estimate for it. *Baronius, Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. num. 58. pag. 129.* strongly proves against *Durandus*, That al create Beings depend on God not lesse as *Agents*, than as *Beings*. Yea, *num. 61. pag. 131.* he proves, That dependence on God not only in being, but also in operation

8. Arg. from
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is intrinsecal or essential to the creature, so that it implies a contradiction to be a create being, and not to depend on God in being and operation. Strangius in like manner concurs herein, lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 61. as elsewhere. And Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par. 3. thes. 57. pag. 438. concurs with Placeus in this sentiment, That provided God be not made the Author of sin, we cannot too much establish the dependence of the second cause on the first in acting. Lud. Crocius, (who is also a new Methodist) Duodecas Dissertat. de Volunt. Dei, Dissert. 8. pag. 415, 416. demonstrates our Hypothesis from this very argument, namely, That God must wil and decree, (which includes predefinition and predetermination) the material of sin, because otherwise there would be an action independent as to God. But yet some of the Jesuites transcend the New Methodists in asserting this dependence of the creature on God; as Compton Carleton, Philos. Disput. 28. Sect. 2, 3. & Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 31. Sect. 14. As for mine own sentiments of the creatures absolute and essential dependence on God the first and only independent Being, they are copiously explicated and demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 9. and I must confesse, I was the more prolix, and, according to what capacitie I have, curious herein, in order to the demonstration of Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse, as wel to the substrate mater of evil as of good acts: and therefore I shal now only touch on this argument, referring the inquisitive Reader to what is there more fully laid down. We have there demonstrated, (1) That creatural dependence is involved in the very essence of the creature; so that to suppose a creature independent in operation, implies a flat contradiction, as §. 5, 6. (2) That creatural dependence importes subordination, inferioritie, and posterioritie, as §. 7. pag. 519. So much also is granted by Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. where he proves, That Divine concurse influenseth not only the act and effect, but also the second cause, which infers dependence of the second cause on the effect, and this dependence notes inferioritie and posterioritie. Hence we thus argue: If dependence in operation be thus essential to the create wil, and argues subordination, inferioritie, and posterioritie as to Divine concurse, then it necessarily follows, that the human wil be predetermined by the efficacious concurse of God in all its operations, even such as have sin annexed to them. The reason of the consequence is to me very evident, [1] From the subordination of the second cause, suppose it be the human wil, to the first: For when there is a direct subordination of the second cause

to

Hic influxus
[Dei in causam
secundam] in-
fert dependen-
tiam causæ se-
cundæ, & de-
pendentia cau-
sæ secundæ à
Deo præsuppo-
nit influxum
Dei in eam;
dependentia
autem innuit a-
liquid inferius
& posterius eo
à quo depen-
det, Strang. l. 1.
c. 11. p. 61.

to the first, the second cause cannot possibly act but as acted by the first: this is essential to the laws of subordination, which notes a subjection to, and passive reception of the subordinate cause from that to which it is subordinate: so that if the human wil be subordinate to the efficacious Concurse of God in the entitative act of sin, it must be efficaciously applied to the said act thereby: and what is this but predetermination? [2] The same may be demonstrated from the *inferioritie* of the creatures wil to God the first cause: For the human wil is by reason of its dependence so far inferior to the Divine wil and its causalitie, as that it is justly reputed no more than a *vital instrument* thereof: And is it not essential to an instrument to act only in force and efficacy from the principal efficient? *Aquinas* assures us, *That al second causes act only by virtue received from the first cause, as mechanic instruments act by direction of Art.* Now if the wil be only an instrument of Divine effieience, must it not necessarily be applied to al its acts thereby? [3] We may lastly demonstrate the same from the *posterioritie* of the second cause: where there is prioritie in a way of subordination, there the posterior cause cannot move or act, unlesse moved and acted by the prior or precedent cause: and if the wil be pre-moved and acted by efficacious concurse, which *Strangius* and other new Methodists grant, as before §. 4. I cannot see how it can with any shadow of reason be denied, that God predetermines the wil to al its natural acts, though sin be annexed thereto. To me it is an eternal truth, that either the wil of man dependes on the wil of God for al its natural motions, or the wil of God dependes on the wil of man; which to affirme is a degree of blasphemie.

C H A P. VI.

The Objections against Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin solved.

This Hypothesis of predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin (1) makes not God the Author of sin. [1] Baronius's objection solved, in that God concurs to the specification of sinful acts not morally, but physically. [2] Strangius's objection solved, in that God concurs to the entitative act of sins intrinsically evil, not only in general, but as determined to their object physically not morally: An indeterminate abstract act a mere Chimera. General Reasons why our Hypothesis makes not God the Author of sin. (2) Our Hypothesis not contrary to the Essence and Attributes of God, his Sinceritie, Justice, Mercie, Sanctitie. (3) Gods Precepts and Promises not made impertinent, by predeterminative Concurse to the entitative act of sin: The use of general Precepts, Promises, and Invitations. (4) Predetermination to the entitative act of sin doth not overthrow Religion, or open the dore to impieties. (5) Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin destroys not human Libertie.

Mucronem autem habebat, non scutum, Lactant.

§. 1. **H**AVING copiously demonstrated our own Hypothesis, and that as wel by artificial as inartificial Arguments, we now come to the solution of such Objections as our Adversaries urge against us: and here indeed what *Lactantius* wittily mentions of *Arcefilas* the Academic, *That when he destroyed the Philosophers, he did also with the same sword destroy himself; so that he had a sword, but not a shield*, is most true of our Adversaries, who whiles they think and endeavor to destroy our Hypothesis by their objections, they do indeed destroy their own; so that whiles they use their *Sword* against us, they want a *shield* for their own defense. This I no way dout but to make apparent in our solutions to their objections. The Adversaries of free grace and efficacious grace have in al ages of the Church turned the edge of their swords and principal forces against the Doctrine of *Reprobation*, and *Gods efficacious Concurse* to and Providence over sinful acts, because in these oppositions they conceit they can most securely concele themselves under a pretexte of vindicating Divine Benignitie,

nitie, Justice, and Sanctitie : hence mens corrupt minds have always endeavored to lode this Hypothesis, of Gods efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin, with al manner of black prejudices and ugly consequences, as if it made the holy God the Author of sin, cruel, &c. This opposition began very early, even by the Gentile Philosophers, as it appears in the Dispute between *Celsus* and *Origen*, *Orig. contr. Cels. lib. 6.* And the Pelagians imputed the same to *Augustin*, as if he introduced a fatal necessitie, whereby he made God to impel men to sin, &c. of which see *Jansen. August. Tom. 1. lib. 3. cap. 15. pag. 115, 116.* and elsewhere. But these black and scandalous imputations have been in al Ages wiped off by the Orthodox, and we no way dout but wil be stil more and more dispelled into mere smoke and vapor, as Evangelic light doth more and more shine forth in its meridian glorie, as *Prov. 4. 18.*

1. The principal Objection which our Adversaries urge against Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin, is, *That it makes God the Author of sin, yea, more the Author of it than the sinner himself.* This objection is greatly exaggerated by our Opponents, with many rhetoric flourishes and pompose triumphs; but with how little weight and force of reason wil appear by the following Considerations.

Object. 1. *That this Hypothesis makes God the Author of sin.*

1. This Objection is urged by *Baronius, Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp. 3. num. 83. pag. 150.* where he enforces it with this reason: *If God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of sin, then God is the cause why the action is of such a species or kind, i. e. the specification of the sinful action is from God: But the action as it is of such a species has vitiositie necessarily attending it: therefore God is the cause why that action has vitiositie adherent to it.* For a more full solution of this argument we are to consider, (1) that the force it has is from that rotten Pelagian Principe, *That God concurs to the substrate mater of sin only by a general indifferent concurse, as the Sun concurs to the production of Monsters;* which *Baronius* asserts, *pag. 143.* And *Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. par. 3. thes. 35. pag. 434.* testifies the same of him. Now this principe is so absurd, and contradictory to the Scriptures, that most of the New Methodists renounce it. But (2) we easily grant, that God doth not concur to the sinful action as it is of such a species or kind morally considered: the moral specification of the sinful act is not from God, but the sinner. Yea, (3) we further grant, that God doth not concur to the specifica-

Baronius's Argument examined.

tion of the sinful act as a particular cause: for albeit God concur by a particular concurrence to all acts, yet not as a particular cause. Thus *Suarez*, *Metaphys. Disput.* 17. *sect.* 2. *pag.* 403. 'The first cause is more principal than the second; and yet simply and properly the effect is not attributed to the first, but to the second cause: for when a man walkes or sees, &c. God is not said to walk, albeit he more principally effectes those motions than man— Wherefore those denominations of walking, seeing, &c. are not attributed to God, because they are not taken from pure efficiency, but from the information and reception of the motion or of the effect: for he is not said to see, who is in any respect said to be the cause of seeing, but he that so produceth it, as that he is informed thereby; yea from this last habitude the denomination is chiefly taken, &c. An excellent solution of this objection urged by *Baronius*, shewing us how the proper denomination or specification of particular acts is taken from the particular cause, not the prime universal cause. Whence (4) we answer positively, that God concurs to the specification of sinful acts materially or entitatively considered as a *physic universal cause*, i. e. God doth not only concur by a general indifferent concurrence to the material entitative act of sin, but he doth by a particular efficacious concurrence so modifie and determine the entitative act, as that the natural specification and individuation thereof may be ascribed to him as the God of Nature. And thus much indeed is granted by *Strangius*, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 3. *pag.* 154. We say not therefore, that God concurs only by a general influx, as the Sun concurs in the same manner to the generation of a man and of an horse, and mouse; but we determine the influx of God to be special unto special effects, as they are physically distinguished specie or in kind, and to every kind of entitie, but not to the reason of moral vitiositie, which consistes in privation. This ingenuous concession of *Strangius* is as much as we contend for, or need by way of answer to this objection of *Baronius*: for who among us doth assert, that the moral vitiositie of sin, which consistes in a privation, is from God, or specified by him: it sufficeth us, that the physic or natural specification and individuation of the material entitative act of sin be from God as the universal Cause of all Naturals. (5) If men contend about the terme *specification*, as that which properly belongs to the second particular cause, I can easily part with it, and substitute in the room thereof a terme equivalent thereto in point of efficacy, namely

namely *modification*, which is used by our acute Dr. Sam. Ward, in his *Determination of Gods Concourse*, pag. 117. where he strenuously demonstrates, *That the previous Concourse of God, as the first cause, doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of second causes.* So that the sum of our answer is this: albeit God doth not as a particular cause concur to the sinful act as of such a species or kind morally considered, yet he doth efficaciously concur to, specify, or rather modifie the substrate mater or entitative act phylically considered, without the least imputation of being the Author of its moral vitiositie.

2. We come now to *Strangius's* argument to prove, that according to our Hypothesis touching Gods predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sin, we make him the Author of sin. This he urgeth with much warmth, *lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 230.* thus: *He that physically predetermines the wil of man to sin, is the cause of sin: But, according to our Hypothesis, God physically predetermines the wil of man to sin. Ergo, &c.* Now whereas we replie, *That God predetermines the wil not to the sinful action as sinful, but as an action or natural being;* he pretendes this response is a mere evasion, and wil no way serve in actions intrinsically evil, as the hatred of God, where the substance of the act cannot be distinguished from its deformitie. So *lib. 2. cap. 12. pag. 273.* he avers, *That God cannot properly predetermine the wil to the entitie of the act, because God is not the cause of the entitie and action, but as it is considered as not yet determined to the object in which the vitiositie is: but he grants that God is the cause of that hatred, which is in the hatred of God, considered in the abstract, but not as determined to that object: and thence we must simply denie, that God is the cause of the hatred of God.* In this argument the whole of his efforts against our Hypothesis doth center; wherein he is followed by one and another Reverend Divine of name among us: therefore it wil be necessary, that we duely examine the strength and validitie of these efforts; which we no way dout but wil appear to be very invalid and infirme.

And (1) we are here to premit as Principes, what *Strangius* and his sectators do concede in this mater. He grants, [1] *That God and man do together concur to the same sinful act.* [2] *That Gods concourse is immediate not only to the act, but also to the wil.* [3] *That Gods concourse is previous, and in order of nature before that of mans wil.* [4] *That Gods concourse is not only general, but also special to special effects as distinguished specie, in kind, not morally but physically.*

physically. [5] *That the hatred of God as an Ens or Being is naturally good.* These concessions are also mentioned by *Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. par. 3. thes. 36. pag. 434.* From which concessions we are greatly confident to give a solid and satisfactory solution to his objection, and the argument on which it is grounded. For (2) this objection and its reason falls with as much force on our Adversaries as on us, as it is most evident by the following Particulars. [1] If, as they affirm, the substance and substrate mater in the hatred of God cannot be distinguished from its vitiositie, then are not they guilty of making God the Author of sin, by allowing an immediate previous special concurse to the kind of the action physically considered, as well as we who adde predetermination thereto? This we have demonstrated, *Chap. 5. §. 4.* from Gods immediate previous concurse. [2] *Strangius, pag. 235.* allows predetermination to acts imperfectly good, yet modally sinful, which also makes God the Author of sin as well as our Hypothesis, as *Chap. 5. §. 5.* But I passe on to a more full solution. (3) His negative assertion, *That in the hatred of God and other acts intrinsically evil, we cannot distinguish the substance or mater of the act from its vitiositie,* is a grosse mistake: for in that very act of hatred of God the vitiositie is separable from the act itself, as it's evident by this, that were that very act turned against sin, its due object, it would cease to be sinful. He replies, *p. 236. That hatred of God as determined to such an object is so far evil, that the vitiositie cannot be separated from it, either privatively or positively:* For, addes he, *we cannot consider this complexum of a vitious act, without considering its vitiositie; as we cannot consider a rational animal without considering animal and rational.* [1] What he here mentions of the hatred of God and acts intrinsically evil is as true of al other sinful acts, though but modally such: for take any sinful act, though never so little, yet if we consider it as invested with al its circumstances and relations to its object, &c. its vitiositie can never be separated from it; yet this hinders not, but that we may consider the act materially, without considering its vitiositie: the like in the hatred of God and al other acts intrinsically evil. [2] His instance from a *rational Animal* is very lame and defective, because there is an essential connexion between the subject and the predicate, so that we can no way conceive of *rational* without including *animal* in that conception: but there is no such essential connexion between the physical act and the vitiositie

tiositie in the hatred of God. [3] Yea *Strangius* himself saith, pag. 232. *That hatred of God as it is an action is not sinful.* The like, pag. 234. Yea, pag. 236. he confesseth, *That good and evil are accidents of hatred of God, if we consider it physically as an action:* which is al we contend for, and sufficient to free God from being the Author of the vitiositie. Hence (4) *Strangius* is greatly mistaken in confounding the moral substance of the act in relation to its object, with its physic or natural consideration as to an individual act: we utterly denie, that the hatred of God considered in its moral relation and determination to its object, is from God as the cause thereof, yet it must be granted, that the individual act determined to such an object is as to its material entitie from God, as the first cause of al natural acts. Thus *Alvarez* answers, who grants, the substrate mater of sin as it relates to its object (I suppose he means morally) is not from God, yet if we consider it *absolutely* as an entitative act, so it procedes from the predeterminative Concurse of God. But (5) *Strangius's* original and fundamental Error lies here, that he conceits *Gods Concurse to terminate* on the natural entitie in the hatred of God only as it is *quid indeterminatum & abstractum, somewhat indeterminate and abstracted from its object, &c.* And herein lies the point of our Controversie, and the principal subterfuge of our Adversaries; which a learned and pious Divine of some note among us expresseth thus: *God is the cause of the action in genere, but not as individually considered.* The invaliditie and infirmitie of this evasion we have already in part demonstrated, Chap. 3. §. 4. But for a more satisfactory reviction thereof let us a little examine it according to Rules both of Philosophie and Theologie. [1] As for a philosophic Examen, nothing seems more repugnant to the Laws and Reasons thereof: for doth not al Philosophie both new and old teach us, that al physic or natural actions procede from *singular substances*, and so are in themselves singular and individual? And are we not also taught by true Philosophie and Reason, that al singular individual actions are determinate? To talk of an action *in genere* abstract and indeterminate is such an *individuum vagum*, which reason and commun sense testifies against. Who ever delivered to us such a Philosopheme, that a human act may be indeterminate and abstracted from its object? It's true, should our Adversaries intend only a logic or mental abstraction we could easily fall in with them, yea make good use of such a concession

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Deus non est aliter causa entitatis & actionis, quam quantum consideratur nondum determinata ad obiectum in quo est malitia, *Strang. l. 2. c. 12. p. 273.*

Actiones sunt suppositorum & singulares.

to defend our Hypothesis ; but they must intend a physical real abstraction and indetermination, such as includes no relation of the act to its object, which is much more absurd than those universal Ideas, which *Aristotle* ignorantly fathered on his Master *Plato*. In short, it is most evident, that every natural action is singular, and determinate ; and, if it be an human act of the wil, such as al hatred is, it necessarily requires an object unto which it is determined : to conceit, that there should be an act of hatred put forth indeterminately and abstractly, with relation to an object, is no lesse than a contradiction. Wherefore this indeterminate abstract hatred which they plead for is but a mere Chimera, existing no where but in their own imagination. [2] It is also as repugnant to the Rules of Theologie : For to introduce an indeterminate abstract general hatred, which has no relation to an object, would open an effectual dore to the subversion of the principal part of Divine Providence, which chiefly if not only regards singulars, as clothed with al their determinate circumstances, as before *Chap. 5. §. 7.* (6) Lastly, this objection of *Strangius*, and the reason he grounds it on necessarily supposeth, that sin according to its formal reason is *positive*, which yet he denies : For if the hatred of God, as other intrinsecal evils, when determined to their object, have not a substrate mater or entitative act distinct and separable from their moral vitiositie accidental thereto, then it hence necessarily follows, that there is nothing in the hatred of God and other intrinsecal evils as determined to their object, but moral vitiositie ; so that take the hatred of God in the whole *complexum* as determined, and there is nothing of natural entitie in it, but al is moral vitiositie : what there is of nature or natural entitie, that our Adversaries grant is from God, the *prime cause* of nature ; so that by denying any thing in the hatred of God, as determined to its object to be from God, they must necessarily hold, that sin according to its formal reason is a positive real Being, which was of old the opinion of the Manichees, and has been of late revived by many of our Adversaries : and though *Strangius* opposeth it, yet his Antithesis necessarily leads him to it ; in as much as he cannot denie, but that there is somewhat positive and real in the hatred of God as determined to its object. Whence I thus further argue : Either this real positive entitie in the hatred of God thus determined to its object is from God, or not : if it be from God, then why may not God as
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wel predetermine the wil to it, as concur immediately by an immediate, previous, special concurse granted by *Strangius*? If God doth not concur to this real positive entitie in the hatred of God, as thus determined, then what other reason can be assigned for such a non-concurrence, but because it is part of the vitiositie or formal reason of sin? And doth it not hence follow, according to *Strangius*'s Hypothesis, that sin as to its formal nature is not privative but positive? Which some of the most rational of our Adversaries now-adays maintain, to preserve their own Phenomena, which otherwise would fall under self-contradiction. So much for *Strangius*'s objection, and the argument he grounds it on, in the solution whereof we have been the more prolix, because it takes in the spirit and center of al his voluminous discourse on this subject. See more in what precedes, *Chap. 3. §. 6. & Chap. 5.*

§. 4.

3. I procede now to some more general solutions for the vindication of Gods sacred Majestie from being, according to our Hypothesis, the culpable cause or Author of sin. (1) We say, *That albeit Gods wil be the effective and predeterminative cause of the substrate mater of sin, yet it is no way a defective or moral cause of sin.* Gods concurse is neither the efficient, nor deficient cause of sin; because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the wil of man, is most perfect and regular in regard of the wil of God: man being by his creation bounded by the Law of God, the least defect in point of conformitie thereto is sin; but God being under no Law, because inferior to none, can break no Law, and therefore be no way defective in his actions. But our Adversaries here with scorne bid defiance to this answer, by telling us, *That albeit God be under no Law from any Superior, yet the rectitude of his own nature is a Law to him, &c.* This subterfuge was broched by *Bellarmino*, taken up also by *Baronius*, *Metaphys. pag. 152.* and *Strangius*; and is continued by some of note among our selves at this day. But alas! what a poor sniftlesse evasion is this? What do our Opponents in urging this, but beg the Question? Who ever among us denied, that God was bound by the rectitude of his nature not to be the Author of sin? But may we not stil demand of them to prove, *That it is against the rectitude of Gods nature to predetermine the wil to the entitative act of that which is sinful?* Is God obliged by the rectitude of his nature to conforme to the new models and congruities of mans vain imagination?

tion? Are not oft those things most congruous to the Divine wisdom and wil, which seem most incongruous to our depraved reason? Must we indeed measure the Divine rectitude of God by measures taken from poor mortals? Is not the Divine wil the eternal law and measure of al Gods actings towards his creatures? And are not al his actings therefore good, because conformed to his eternal Law? Doth he wil any thing because good antecedently to his wil? Are not things therefore good because willed by him? Was it not a great saying of *Augustin, de Civit. Dei, lib. 19. cap. 22. That sin itself as it is justly permitted by God fals under the eternal Law, i. e. the Divine wil predefining and predetermining the wil of man to the substrate mater of it, and permitting the vitiositie*? When therefore our Adversaries shal prove, that Gods predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sin is repugnant to the rectitude of the Divine nature, they wil do something to confirme their Antithesis; but before that be done, they do but beg the question.

2. None the Author of sin but the particular moral cause.

(2) To vindicate the sacred Majestie from being the Author of sin, we say, That sin being in its formal nature a privation, none properly can be said to be the *Author* or *moral cause* thereof, but the particular cause, that either *commands, counsels, invites, persuades, compels* thereto, or *actes* the same: But is the holy God culpable in any of these respects? Is he not so far from commanding men to sin, that he severely prohibits the same, and that on pain of death? Doth he not by al manner of affectionate dehortations dissuade therefrom? Did he ever compel any one person to violate his own sacred Laws? It's true, we affirme, that he necessarily predetermines the wil to the entitative act of that which is sinful, yet do we not as much denie, that he compels or impels any to sin formally considered? Doth not the sinners wil at that very moment when it is thus predetermined by God to the material entitative act of that which is sinful, as voluntarily and chearfully elect and embrace the sinful act, as if there were not the least predetermination? And doth not this sufficiently clear his sacred Majestie from *impelling or compelling* the wil to sin?

3. God concurs only to what is naturally good in sin.

(3) Do we affirme any thing in this point, but what the most of our Adversaries do, and al must grant, namely that God doth efficaciously concur only to what is naturally good in mens sins, not to the moral vitiositie therein? If they hold, as *Strangius* and others do, that sin is as to its formal nature a mere privation, must

must they not also necessarily grant, that al sin has some real, positive, natural good for its foundation or subject? Was it not a commun Effate among the Greek Philosophers and Fathers, *ἡ ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἔχει τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ παρυστάσιν, τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἕνεκα, καὶ ἔχει ἑαυτῇ γινώσκον, Sin hath no subsistence of its own, but privation of subsistence, it being brought about for the sake of good, not for its own sake?* Now if al sin have some good as its substrate mater and subject, wil it not necessarily follow, that the blessed God, who is the fountain of al good both natural and supernatural, doth efficaciously concur, yea predetermine the wil thereto, without falling under the imputation of being the Author of the sin appendent thereto? (4) Yea, is not the holy God so far remote from being the Author of that sin which is annexed to natural actions, as that he brings good out of it? Are not the moral evils of men, which are opposite to the Creators Laws and the creatures best good, so wisely ordered by the skilful hand of the Creator, as that they potentially subserve his principal end and supreme good? Is there so much folie and madnesse in the hearts of Sinners as to extract evil out of good; and is there not as much wisdom and bonitie in the great God, as to extract good out of evil? Was not the Crucifixion of our Lord an evil of the most crimson and deep tincture? and yet did not the wise Physician of Souls bring the greatest good even the salvation of Sinners out of it? And can he not do the same out of al other acts, though never so intrinsically evil? But how can this be accomplisht, if he do not predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act? I shal conclude our solutions of this Objection, with that excellent distinction and determination of great *Bradwardine, de Caus. lib. 3. cap. 29. pag. 739.* 'Without doubt God violently impels no man against his wil, but spontaneously impels and draws al men willing to al their free acts. Furthermore it may be probably said, that God doth in some sense necessitate to the act of sin, as to the substance of the act; yet it doth not thence follow, that he doth necessitate to sin, as it is sin or the deformitie of sin, &c. as before *Chap. 4. §. 2.* So much for the first Objection.

§. 2. It is further objected, *That our Hypothesis touching Gods predeterminative concurrence to the substrate mater of sin, is contrary to the Essence and Attributes of God, namely to his Sinceritie, Fidelitie, Justice, Clemence, or Mercie and Sanctitie.* 1. Our Adversaries make a great clamor against our Hypothesis, as that which oppo-

Object. 2. From the Essence and Attributes of God.
1. His Sinceritie and Fidelitie.

feth the Sinceritie and Fidelitie of God, in giving Laws with severe Prohibitions against sin, Promises and Invitations unto Sinners to repent, &c. To this first branch of their Objection we shal answer more distinctly and in its parts in what follows, §. 3, 4, 5. at present let this general Response suffice, that the Sinceritie and Faithfulness of God is sufficiently vindicated, in that Gods Commands, Promises, and Invitations unto Sinners, flow from his complacent, legislative Wil, which is the Measure, Rule, and Reason of our dutie and actings towards God; but his Predeterminative Concurse flows from his Beneplacite Decretive Wil, the Rule and Measure of his own actings towards his Creature: Now these two wils, albeit they are not repugnant each to other, because they are not *adidem*, yet they are disparate and diverse: the things commanded by God may be repugnant to the things predetermined by him, yet his wil commanding is not repugnant to his wil predetermining. Indeed Gods preceptive wil is only in an analogic, figurative improper sense termed the wil of God, as significative of his soverain pleasure for the Government of his Creature; and therefore Gods predetermining men to the material act of what is sinful, implies not the least shadow of repugnance to his Sinceritie and Fidelitie in giving Laws and Prohibitions against Sin, or Promises to penitent Sinners. Yea, there is nothing that our Adversaries can urge against us for asserting a predeterminative Concurse, but may be retorted against them for asserting an immediate previous Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin: Yea, let them but grant, as they do, Gods certain prescience of sin, and the same black Imputations which they lode us with, wil al fal with as much weight on themselves, as before Chap. 5. §. 2.

2. *From Divine Justice.*

2. As for what they urge from the Justice of God, that our Hypothesis is contradictory thereto, in that he cannot in Justice punish that Sin, which he predetermines men unto, we answer, (1) That Gods Predetermination lays no violent force or compulsion on the wil to sin: he doth only as the first cause and God of Nature sweetly though potently applie the wil to its act. (2) The wil doth in the very same moment, wherein it is predetermined by God, voluntarily and freely, as a deficient depraved facultie, elect the very act it is predetermined unto; so that it doth as freely, deliberately, and fully espouse the act, as if there were no Predetermination on Gods part: and what more just than that

that the Sinner should be severely punished for that sinful act which he doth deliberately and voluntarily exert? (3) Here is in this objection a poor Sophisme, which they call *No-cause for a cause*: For Gods predeterminative Concurse is not the cause of mens sins, albeit mens sins be a necessary consequent thereof. (4) The same difficulties, which our Adversaries urge us with in point of Divine Justice, return on them, who assert an immediate previous Concurse to the Mater of Sin; neither can they without apparent violence to their own Reason impute this objection to us, which their own Hypothesis is as much obnoxious unto.

3. They urge us with an Imputation on the *Clemence* and *Mercie* of God, in that predeterminative Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin, makes the blessed God to be cruel towards his poor Creature; and this two ways: As (1) *In that it makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment, without regard to their Sins.* (2) *In that it supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal Torments, and yet irresistibly to predetermine yea impel men thereto, as Baron. Metaph. p. 151.* This Objection our Adversaries adorne and exaggerate with many specious and plausible pretextes for the Vindication of Divine Clemence and Mercy, as they pretend, and for our confusion; Yet we no way doubt but to make it appear, that al is but as emty vapor before the Meridian Sun. Therefore to answer, (1) to the first branch of the Objection, *That our Hypothesis makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment, without regard to their sins,* [1] We grant, that the Decree of Reprobation is, and must be according to our Hypothesis, *absolute*, because there is an adequate commensuration between absolute Predefinition and Predetermination, as our Adversaries also maintain; of which before Chap. 5. §. 3. [2] Yet we peremptorily denie, that God reprobates or predestines men to eternal punishment without any regard to their sins. Divines say, that albeit sin be not the motive or ground moving God to reprobate men, yet it is considered in the Decree of Reprobation as that for which God wil at last condemn men. It's true, the *Supralapsarian* Divines, who make man as *labile* the object of Reprobation, differ somewhat from those of the *sublapsarian* persuasion, who make the *corrupt masse*, or *lapsed man* the object of Election and Reprobation; yet they both take in the consideration.

3. From Gods
Clemence and
Mercie.

deration of sin in the Decree of Reprobation; and they both make the Decree of Reprobation in it self absolute: for the Sublapsarians make sin only a commun condition of the corrupt Masse, not *distinctive* or *discriminative* of Reprobates from the Elect; as *Davenant*, *Animadversf. on Gods Love*, p. 84. proves, *That the Supralapsarians charge not Gods Reprobation with mans destruction*; Though he himself goes the Sublapsarian way. But, [3] Here lies the bitter root of this forged Imputation affixed on us by our Adversaries, that they consider the Decree of Reprobation as an act of Divine Justice, which regards the object as already constituted, and not the constitution thereof. This is incomparably wel observed by judicious *Davenant* in his answer to *Hoard*, *Animadversf.* p. 229. ‘For those Inferences therefore, *That if absolute Reprobation be granted, God may be properly called a Father of Crueltie, Παλλών*, I marvel how he trembled to thinke of them, and how he never trembled to utter them. ‘That wherein he perpetually is mistaken, is, the making of ‘Non-election or Negative Reprobation a *Vindicative act*, the ‘confounding it with the judicial Sentence of Damnation, the ‘conceiving it to worke in the Non-elect an invincible necessitie ‘of committing Sin, with such like monstrous fantasies, which he ‘takes for Principles needing no proof, whereas they are such ‘grosse errors as need no confutation. (2) The second part of the Objection, which supposeth *the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal torments, and yet irresistibly to predetermine and impel men thereunto*, has been sufficiently refuted in what precedes, §. 1. and indeed throughout this whole Discourse, and wil also come under consideration in what follows.

4. *From Divine Sanctitie.*

4. Our Adversaries charge also our Hypothesis with a Repugnance to the Sanctitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature, in that, by asserting *Gods predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin, we make the act of sin to be wel-pleasing to God*. This objection is greatly aggravated by a Reverend Divine among our selves, who in the confutation of *Twisse*, argues thus: *If God willeth that sin existe by his Permission, (1) He willeth Sin. Yea, (2) God wils sin as much as man. Yea, (3) This makes God equally to wil Sin and Holiness. Yea, (4) Then God takes complacence in Sin.* Answer. These are high charges indeed, and if they could be made good against us, we should not deserve protection from any wel-governed Kingdome or State: for what more inconsistent

sistent with civil Government, than to make the Supreme Rector and Governor of Mankind equally to wil Sin and Holinesse? But these Calumnies and Reproches are not of yesterday, but have been time out of mind imputed to the assertors of Efficacious Concurse, and therefore we have been more large in the refuting of them, §. 1. of this Chapter. Thus *Bradwardine, De Caus. l. 2. c. 28. p. 572.* ‘When it is argued, saith he, *that the sinful act doth please God Wel*, (1) The Adverbe *Wel* may determine ‘the Verbe *to please God*, in regard of the Divine complacence, ‘and so there is no dout, but that as the evil Act [entitatively ‘considered] doth please him, so it is highly wel-pleasing to him: ‘or (2) in regard of the Act that is wel-pleasing; and that either ‘in regard of the *substance* of the act, or in regard of its *vitiositie*: [1] If we regard the act *naturally*, so it’s true, that it is ‘wel-pleasing to God, but if we regard it *morally*, so it’s false. ‘[2] If we regard the *vitiositie* of the act, so it is not properly ‘effected by man, nor yet by God, it being not properly an ‘effect, but pure Privation only. An acute and excellent Decision of this Controversie, were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices; the sum whereof is this, The Act of sin entitatively and substantially considered is naturally good, and so wel-pleasing unto God, the Author of Nature; yet if we consider it morally in regard of its Vitiositie, so it is infinitely displeasing to God. This is as a Key to open the dore to a more full solution to al objections against us: so that at present we need say no more than this, that our Hypothesis is no more obnoxious to these aspersions, than that of our Adversaries. Is not the Divine Sanctitie as illustrious in Gods predetermining to the substrate mater of Sin, as if we held only with our Adversaries an immediate previous concurse thereto? Are not those very Acts, which are morally evil as to the Sinner, both naturally and morally good as to God? Suppose he predetermine to the entitative act of sin, yet must we thence necessarily conclude, that he predetermines men to sin formally considered? Must not the sinful qualities of al moral effects be imputed to the second particular cause, and not to the first universal cause? It’s true, the Sinner comes short of the Divine Law, and therefore sins, but doth God come short of any Law? Has not his Wil the same Rectitude which his Nature is invested with, and therefore whatever he wils must be right and holy, even because he wils it? The sin which he governs,

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is it not only sin in regard of the Creatures wil, not in regard of his wil? It is confest, that God and the Sinner concur to the same sinful act materially considered; but yet is their Concurse the same? Yea is there not morally an infinite distance between the one and the other? Doth Sin as to Gods Concurse, include any more than a natural act, which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glorie morally good? but doth it not, as to mans Concurse, speake moral vitiositie? Again, what doth Gods permission of sin implie, but a natural or judiciary Negation of that Grace he is no way obliged to give? But doth not sin as to the sinner denote a moral privation or deficiency of that rectitude which ought to be in his act? Is there any thing in the world purely, simply, and of it self sinful, without some substrate mater naturally good? What reason therefore can our Adversaries allege, why God may not predetermine the wil to the said substrate mater, without prejudice to his Sanctitie?

Object. 3. *From Gods Word.*

§. 3. We descend now to a third objection taken from the Word of God, both *Preceptive* and *Promissive*, which divine Predetermination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin, doth, according to the Antithesis of our Adversaries, render *uselesse, impossible, yea collusive* and *unsincere*. For say they, *Gods Precepts, Promises and Comminations, whereof mans Nature is capable, should be al made Impertinences, through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them.*

¶ *Preceptive.*

1. As to Gods Laws and Prohibitions they urge, *That our Hypothesis renders them altogether uselesse, yea naturally and simply impossible.* This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhetoric flourishes, which are the best armes they have to defend their declining cause with. But having God and Truth, though naked and simple, on our side, we no way dout but to stand our ground against al their fiery, or venomous darts. And in answer to the first part of their Objection from the Impossibilitie of divine Precepts and Prohibitions, we answer, (1) That our Adversaries greatly please themselves in their false sophistic Ideas and Notions of what is *possible*, or *impossible*; which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguity and confusion, Chap. 1. §. 4. with endeavors to explicate what is possible and what impossible to corrupt Nature, as to divine Commands. (2) We are to know, that the Laws of God in their Second Edition were primarily intended to subserve the ends of the Gospel

as

‘for Gods Law, which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace,
 ‘we say, that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace,
 ‘considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. Au-
 ‘gustine, and by the Church of England, as considered under the
 ‘conditional Decrees of late framed by Arminius. And p. 418.
 he strongly proves, *That Divine eternal Prescience of future Acti-
 ons or Events infers as absolute a necessitie of such events and impossi-
 bilitie of the contrary, as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and
 Reprobation do, of which hereafter, §. 8.*

2. *From Gods
 Promisses and
 Invitations.*

2. As for the later part of our Opponents Objection, *From
 the Promisses and Invitations of God, which are made uselesse and
 collusive by our supposed divine Predetermination to the substrate mater
 of Sin,* we answer,

(1) *All Pro-
 misses primarily
 intended for the
 Elect.*

(1) That all Gods Promisses and evangelic Invitations, which
 are but branches of the Covenant of Grace, are primarily in-
 tended for the elect Heirs of Salvation, to whom they are many
 ways useful, notwithstanding Divine Predetermination: For the
 blessed God promiseth life and happinesse on the condition of
 Repentance and Believing, not as if there were any potence or
 abilitie in corrupt nature, by its own free-wil, to accept of these
 offers, or performe the Condition on which the offers depend,
 but thereby convincing the Soul of its extreme impotence, he
 doth together with the offer and invitation made convey Grace
 into the elect Soul, for the inabling of it to performe the Con-
 dition: So that these general and conditional Promisses are in
 reference to the Elect, for whom they are primarily designed,
operative of Grace, albeit as to others they are only *exactive* of
 dutie: whence the impossibilitie which attends corrupt Nature
 is taken off as to the Elect by Divine Grace.

(2) *The use of
 evangelic Pro-
 misses as to Re-
 probates.*

(2) Neither are those general evangelic Promisses and Invi-
 tations uselesse as to Reprobates: for, [1] They declare the
 infallible and essential connexion which there is between the
 condition and the thing promised therein, namely, Life and Sal-
 vation. And to make this more clear, we are to remember, that
 both Logic and rectified Reason assures us, that a conditional
 enunciation doth not always note a possibilitie of the Antecedent,
 and Consequent, but only their necessary connexion: that in all
 conditional Propositions, on which evangelic Exhortations and
 Invitations are founded, there cannot be supposed an indifferent
 and indeterminate possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent,
 but

but only the connexion of the Antecedent with the Consequent, is evident from that of our Lord, *John 15. 6. If a man abide not in me he is cast forth, &c.* Whence it is apparent, that a solid and serious Invitation unto Sinners may be built on a Condition in some mode impossible: The God of al grace has, by his evangelic Constitution and Covenant, established an inviolable connexion between Faith and Salvation, so that this Proposition is infallibly true, *If thou believest, thou shalt be saved*: and the holy God has given his Ministers Commission to preach it to al Mankind, neither is there the least collusion or fraudulent intention on Gods part, albeit he doth predetermine the Most of men to the substrate mater of Unbelief: for the sinceritie of Gods intention appears in the realitie of the offer, which consistes in the infallible connexion of the Consequent with the Antecedent, grounded on the evangelic *Paſſum* or Ordination, as *Davenant* wel observes, *Animadvers. on Gods Love*, p. 377. where he shews, 'That the Decree of God, permitting *Pharaoh* to abuse the gifts 'of God to his own destruction, was not contrary unto the end 'or use whereunto those gifts and actions of God had a fitting 'ordination in their own nature. *Sop.* 387, 388. he demonstrates, 'That Divine eternal Decrees, whereupon may infallibly be in- 'ferred the abuse of Grace temporally offered, do not crosse the 'end for which such Grace is administred to persons not elected. And he gives this reason for it, p. 352. 'Gods meaning must be 'always interpreted according to the known nature of the Means, 'and not according to the unknown Wil of God concerning the 'infallible event or successe of the Means. Gods meaning, 'when he offers any Grace unto men, is that they should per- 'forme such actions whereunto such grace conduceth: and his 'meaning when he promiseth glory unto any man, *if he believe and persevere*, is truely to performe it if he so do. But it is not 'always Gods absolute wil to cause men to use his Grace to 'their own good.— If the Remonstrants wil have nothing term- 'ed *Gods meaning* but his absolute Wil, in their opinion as wel as 'in ours it wil follow, that God had no meaning to give *Cain* or '*Judas* saving Grace or Glorie. Lastly, p. 392, 393, 394. he proves, *That God doth by his wil of Approbation and Complacence unfeignedly wil what he commands and exhorts men to, albeit he decree the contrary event.* Hence, [2] These general Promisses and Invitations have this use also as to Reprobates, that it leaves

them without the least shadow of pretence or Excuse for their unbelief: for if God doth by such Promisses and Invitations declare his real intention to save men if they believe, and withal an expectation that they accept his offers, yea, his complacence in such an acceptation in order to life, with a provision of al means necessary thereto, what excuse can men have for unbelief? Wil they say, that Gods predetermining men to the entitative act of unbelief contradicts such a real intention? Take the Replie of *Davenant, Animadv.* p. 271. 'We answer, that God is 'no otherwise said to intend outward events, than by providing 'orderly means for the producing such events. Non-election 'provideth no means of making men sin, and therefore it in- 'cludeth no intention of God to make men sin, though it in- 'clude a prevision of sinful Events, and a Decree to permit 'them, &c.

(3) *The Anti-thesis of Anti-predeterminants destroyeth the use of Promisses, &c. as much as our Hypothesis.*

(3) The Hypothesis of our Adversaries in granting Predetermination to what is good, and Divine Prescience of sinful acts, doth as much dispirit and destroy the use of Divine Promisses and Invitations as ours. For, [1] In that they assert none can per- forme the condition required, and so embrace the evangelic offer made, without efficacious predeterminative grace, do they not leave al Reprobates under as great an impossibilitie of Be- lieving as we do? Are not al offers, for want of this predeter- minative Grace, altogether uselesse to them, for whom it never was intended? [2] So also as to Gods certain Prescience of their Sins, did not God, according to their Concessions, certainly foreknow, that they would never, yea never could accept of the offers made to them, without predeterminative Grace, which he decreed never to give them? Hence doth not this certain Prescience infer as natural and absolute impossibilitie, as our pre- determinative Concurse to the entitative act of Sin? This is wel argued by *Davenant, Animadv.* p. 242. 'His [*Hoard's*] nibbling 'at the *Synod of Dort*, and charging them with mantaining a *fa- tal Decree*, is to little purpose. If he cal that *fatal*, which is 'certain and immutable, we are not afraid to affirm, that al 'Gods eternal Decrees are certain and immutable; and that very 'eternal Decree of Reprobation, which he imagines to follow 'upon the foresight of mens final impenitence, is as absolute and 'immutable, and in this sense as fatal as that which we defend. Thus also p. 332. 'The Remonstrants (we adde also the New Metho-

‘Methodists) dare not promise Salvation to any persons reprobated, according to their decree founded upon the prevision of their final Infidelitie and Impenitence, but under these Conditions, *Si crediderint & pœnituerint, if they shal believe and repent*: we assure them of Salvation under the same conditions, notwithstanding the absolute Decree of their Non-election, we adde, and Gods Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin.

(4) To put a period to the vain Cavils of our Adversaries, we grant, that even Reprobates, notwithstanding Gods absolute Reprobation, and Predetermination unto the entitative act of sin, stil retain a remote radical power and Indifference of wil to embrace the good things offered in the Gospel. For neither doth the natural corruption of the wil, nor yet Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin take away the *radical Indifference* or *Flexibilitie* of the Wil, or the *passive, natural remote* power it is naturally invested with, as a rational elective facultie, to embrace whatever good, whether natural or spiritual, that is absolutely or conditionally tendered to it: and this sufficeth to ground divine Exhortations and Invitations on; for the Propositions and Offers being made to rational Creatures, they might, were they but willing, embrace the things that belong to their peace tendered to them; but here lies the Plague of their hearts, *Joh. 5. 40. They wil not, &c.* So that the blessed God making such gracious offers, so suitable to the needs of a rational creature, and having given him a remote, passive, natural power of understanding and wil suited thereto, doth not this suffice to leave him without al excuse for his wilful Impenitence and Infidelitie, notwithstanding the predeterminative Concurse of God to the entitative act of his Sin? And that this is the Doctrine of the Calvinists and Church of *England*, we are assured by *Davenant, Animadv. p. 257.* ‘They confesse, that under the Evangelical Covenant, *Si credideris, salvus eris, If thou believe, thou shalt be saved*, every man hath a true claim to Eternal Life: They confesse, that wheresoever is Christs Church, there is such a sufficient administration of Grace as would have saved the Non-elect, had they not opposed a malignant voluntary act of their own wil against the motions and operations of Divine Grace; according to those words of our Saviour, *Joh. 3. 17. & 12. 47, 48. & Act. 13. 46.* Calvin saith as much, in *Joh.*

4. *What Power we allow to Reprobates.*

Object. 4. *From the overthrow of Religion.* Book III.

‘*Joh. 3. Mendi nomen iterum iterumq; repetit, ne quis omnino arceri se putet, modo fidei viam teneat.* He therefore, as well as the Remonstrants, grants a conditional possibilitie of Grace and Salvation to al men; but we say, the non-elect are always permitted to fail in the performance of the condition. And doth not this sufficiently vindicate the sinceritie of God in al his Evangelic promises, invitations, and tenders of grace and happinesse, yea every way as much as the new Method of our Adversaries, who grant certain prescience and predetermination to what is good?

Object. 4. *From the overthrow of Religion.*

§. 4. Another Objection urged by our Opponents against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, is, *that it overthrows al Religion, and makes mens faculties, whereby they are capable of moral government, remisse, sluggish, uselesse and vain; yea they stick not to avouch, that this our Hypothesis opens the dore to Familisme, Enthusiasme, and the most prodigious impieties and enormities:* This they aggravate with many rhetoric aggravations. Answer, This Objection is grounded on the same false Hypothesis with the precedent, namely, *that the wil predetermined by God is moved only by an inward violent impulse, which makes al Gods precepts, promises, and comminations mere impertinencies, and mens faculties uselesse and vain.* What a grosse Sophisme this is, and how much the Hypothesis of our Adversaries fals under the force of it, as well as ours, we have already, in what precedes, sufficiently demonstrated, and shal do again in what follows. We shal only adde at present an excellent demonstration and solution given by judicious *Davenant, Animadv. pag. 418.* ‘For the second branch of this reason, whereby he goeth about to prove that absolute predestination and reprobation destroy both *Hope* and *Fear*; it is grounded upon an error confuted and rejected by the commun consent of al Divines, namely that the eternal Decrees of God concerning future events make the contrary events impossible, do make the temporal and immediate Agents to do al they do out of an absolute necessitie, having no libertie *in modo agendi* to abstain from so doing, or to do the contrary. Were this true, the Remonstrants, who acknowledge eternal and absolute Decrees, upon a presupposall of an eternal absolute prescience, should by their Doctrine destroy hope and fear (the nerves of Religion) as well as we. But more of this in answer to the next Objection.

Object. 5. *From the libertie of the wil.*

§. 5. The last Objection we shal mention, (which is indeed first in order of nature) is, *that our Hypothesis overthrows the libertie of the*

the wil, introduce a fatal necessitie, and is the darling of Hobbes, with the like unjust and scandalous reproches. This is much urged by Strangius, Baronius, and some of name among our selves.

Answer, (1) In this I confesse the spirits and principal forces of al their Objections centre, and that which the Defendents of efficacious concurse have been in al Ages urged with by the Pelagians and Patrones of free-wil. Thus *Augustin* was ever and anon upbraided by the Pelagians with a deligne to introduce a *fatal necessitie*: the like the Synod of *Dort* has been reproched with by the Arminians: and now, because the name of *Hobbes* sounds very harsh in Christians ears, therefore that is fastened on us. But this is no new method, but long since invented by the *Accuser of the Brethren*, for the oppressing of this suffering truth. (2) What the true Idea and notion of *Libertie* includes, and thence how little our Hypothesis doth infringe the same, we have sufficiently demonstrated in the explication of the libertie of the wil, *Chap. 1. §. 3.* (3) We answer with *Bradwardine, lib. 3. cap. 29. pag. 739.* that God violently impels no man to sin, albeit he spontaneously impels or draws the wil voluntarily to the substance of that act which has sin annexed to it; of which see what precedes *Chap. 4. §. 2.* (4) Our Adversaries seem herein very unjust, in that they fasten their false Ideas of predeterminative concurse and libertie on us, and so make us to hold what follows upon their sentiments. For they placing the wils libertie in an actual indifference and indetermination; as also making al predeterminative concurse to acte by violent impulses on the wil, which being so impelled remains no longer free, but is acted as a machine, &c. it's no wonder, if from such false principes their forged consequence and conclusion follows naturally. Thus *Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 243.* makes Gods predetermination to the entitative act of sin, to be an impulsion to sin. The like is urged by one and another Divine of name among us, who wil allow no predetermination to the entitative act of sin, but what is violent impulsion. It's true *Bradwardine, lib. 9. cap. 29. pag. 739.* useth the word *impel* for Gods predetermining concurse, and the like *Twisse*; but then they limit it to such a spontaneous voluntary impulsion, as is no way prejudicial to the wils libertie: But our Adversaries make al predeterminative concurse, even in the supernatural acts of Grace, to be by violent impulses, such as leave the wil no more power to acte in a contrary way, than a mere Machine, which is impelled

The injustice of the New Methodists in urging this objection, and its inconsistency with their own sentiments.

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by a *vis impressa*, a force impressed from some extrinsic efficient: for thus they expresse themselves, that to be predetermined even in the supernatural acts of Grace, *is to be constantly managed as mere Machines that know not their own use.* I must confesse had we such Ideas of predeterminative concurse, it would necessarily follow, that the human wil is thereby divested of al its libertie; neither can I see how our Adversaries wil be ever able to defend themselves against the Pelagians and Arminians on their principes, which suppose al predetermination to be a violent impulsio like that of *Machines*. I ever disliked the Cartesian Hypothesis, which makes the souls of Brutes to be but *Machines*; but to make the human soul and wil of man to be but a *Machine* in the reception of predeterminative grace or concurse introduceth that *fatal necessitie the darling of Hobbes*, which is unjustly fathered on us. We say, that predeterminative concurse is as to its principe and mode of working the same as to natural and supernatural acts; neither doth it in the one or t'other at al infringe the libertie of the wil, but fortifie and confirme the same, in that it workes sweetly according to the indigence of the wil. And this I shal with much confidence assert, that we can with as much reason defend the conciliation of human libertie with Divine predetermination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin, as our Adversaries the New Methodists can defend the conciliation of human libertie with Divine predetermination to the supernatural acts of Grace: for albeit the termes produced be different, the one a supernatural, the other only natural good; yet predetermination as to its principe the Divine wil, as also as to its manner of working, which is agreeable to the condition and libertie of the wil, admits no difference. And this *Baronius* was sufficiently apprehensive of, and therefore denied al predetermination; and I no way doubt but that in the issue our Adversaries wil be forced to denie al predetermination, or to grant us what we contend for as to the substrate mater of sin. Yea, (5) we shal yet ascend a degree higher and affirme, *That Gods certain prescience of sin*, which our Adversaries generally allow, infers as much a necessitie on the wil, as predeterminative concurse to the entitative act of sin. This we have sufficiently demonstrated, *Chap. 5. §. 2.* and therefore shal here only superadde an excellent demonstration of judicious *Davenant*, *Animadv. pag. 418, 419.* 'For the Divine eternal prescience of
' future actions or events inferreth as absolute a certaintie, im-
' mutabilitie,

‘mutabilitie, necessitie of such events, as the Decrees of absolute
 ‘Predestination and Reprobation do; (we may adde, by a paritie
 of reason, predetermination which is adequate to absolute De-
 crees) ‘And therefore the Schole-men are as much troubled in an-
 ‘swering the Question, *Whether the Divine prescience, or providence*
 ‘*brings a necessitie to the things foreknown?* as in the other, *Whe-*
 ‘*ther Divine predestination imposeth a necessitie on things?* And the
 ‘Philosophers, who never dreamed of Predestination or Reproba-
 ‘tion, were yet much troubled to shew, how any thing could be
 ‘*fortuitous or contingent*, admitting an eternal and infallible pre-
 ‘science of al future events in God— So that if this Author, or
 ‘any other Remonstrant, wil but take the pains to consider, how
 ‘the Schole-Divines clear the eternal and infallible prescience,
 ‘wil, and providence of God from imposing fatal necessitie upon
 ‘events foreseen, willed, provided, he may with the same facilitie
 ‘know how to clear the eternal absolute Decrees of Predestina-
 ‘tion and Reprobation from imposing on mens actions any fatal
 ‘irresistible necessitie. As Gods absolute prescience doth not
 ‘take away the possibilitie of the contrary action or event, no
 ‘more doth his absolute Decree. Thus our judicious *Davenant*,
 in vindication of the absolute Decree of Reprobation, which holds
 most true also of Divine predetermination as to the substrate ma-
 ter of sin: for according to the confession of our Adversaries,
Strangius and others, absolute Reprobation necessarily infers Di-
 vine predetermination as to the entitative act of sin.

CH A P. VII.

The genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants, with the Antitheses of their Adversaries, particularly the New Methodists.

- (1) *The genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants, with the false
 Hypotheses and consequents imposed on them by the Molinists, Armi-
 nians, and New Methodists.* (2) *The Antitheses of the New Me-
 thodists, with their dangerous consequents.*

§. 1. **I**T has been the practice of our Adversaries in al Ages to
 clothe our *Hypothesis* of efficacious predeterminative Con-
 curse with the *Bears skin* of many false Ideas and black ugly con-
 E e sequences,

sequences, but their own *Antithesis* with the *sheeps clothing* of many fair and colorable pretexts; wherefore to vindicate our selves and unmasque them, we shal adde, as a *Coronis* to this Discourse, the genuine sentiments of such as defend Divine predetermination, &c. as also the proper *Antitheses* of their Adversaries.

*The genuine Hypotheses of
of the Predeterminants.*

1. **T**Here is nothing future but dependently on some absolute Decree of God, either effective or permissive.

2. The Futurition of the entitative act of that which is sinful, is from the effective wil of God.

3. The Futurition of sin is from the permissive wil of God, efficaciously decreeing to leave men unto sin.

4. The actual existence of sin is the consequent, but not the effect of Reprobation.

5. God absolutely decreed to permit *Adams Fal*, *Strang.* 858. *Davenant, Animadv.* p. 322, 323.

6. Gods Decree to permit sin is not otiose, but efficacious.

7. God efficaciously decrees to permit sin for the manifestation of his own Glorie.

The false Hypotheses and Consequents imposed on the Predeterminants, by Molinists, Arminians, and New Methodists.

1. **G**ods absolute Decrees, which give futurition to things, take away al power from the creature of acting contrarily, yea make the contrary naturally, and simply impossible.

2. The futurition of sin is from the effective wil of God, yea very God, *Str.* 631, 632, 635. *Le Bl. Concord. Libert. par. 1. Thes.* 55, &c. p. 454. as before, c. 5. §. 1.

3. The Decree of God giving futurition to sin necessitates men to sin.

4. The existence of sin is from Reprobation as the proper cause thereof.

5. God impelled and necessiated Adam to fal, *Baron. Metaphys.* 150, 151.

6. Gods efficacious Decree to permit sin makes him the Author of sin.

7. God wils and decrees sin as sin, yea simply wils and intendes the damnation of Sinners.

8. Gods

8. Gods absolute Decree of Reprobation impels no man to sin, *Ward, pag. 132.*

9. There is no act so substantially and intrinsically evil, but the vitiositie thereof may be separated from the entitative act.

10. God doth not predetermine, much lesse impel any man to the least sin.

11. God doth not predetermine the wil to any sinful act, as it morally refers to its object, but only physically, *Alvarez, refer. Strang. 240--242.*

12. Gods predetermining the wil to the material entitative act, whereunto sin is annexed, doth not bespeak him the Author of Sin.

13. God, by his efficacious wil and actuose providence permits the wil to sin, but is no moral efficient thereof.

14. God, by predetermining the wil to the entitative act of sin, doth not tempt men to sin, *Jam. I. 13.*

15. In sinful acts God predetermines the wil only to the entitative act, not to its sinfulness; but in good acts, God predetermines the wil not only to the act, but also to the goodness thereof.

16. Sin is committed against Gods wil of complacence and approbation, but not against his wil of natural permission.

8. Gods absolute Decree of Reprobation impels men to sin.

9. In acts intrinsically evil the vitiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act considered in its individual nature.

10. Predeterminative concurrence brings men under a fatal and Hobbian necessitie of sinning.

11. In acts intrinsically evil God predetermines the wil to the act as sinfully relating to its object, *Strangius, pag. 206, 234, 240, &c.*

12. Gods predetermining the wil to the material entitative act of sin makes him the cause of sin, *Strang. pag. 341, 342. Baron. Metaph. 150, 151.*

13. The Sinner doth not determine himself to any sinful act any other way than God, *Strang. pag. 242, 243.*

14. God doth more than tempt men to sin, in that he predetermines the wil thereto, *Strang. pag. 269.*

15. Predeterminative concurrence to the entitative act of sin maketh God to afford as much influence and concurrence to the worst of actions as to the best, *Strang. pag. 277.*

16. God doth not only permit sin, but approve of it, yea take complacence in it.

17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin is very well consistent with the natural libertie of the wil, and its natural, passive, remote power of receiving Laws, and obeying the same.

18. Gods predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin may very well be reconciled with his wisdom, veracitie, and sinceritie in the prohibition and punishment of sin.

19. God punisheth one sin by leaving men to another, yet without being guilty of the least sin.

20. Sin by Divine wisdom is made a means accidentally utile and subservient to Divine glorie, albeit it hath no moral bonitie in it.

21. All Gods invitations, comminations, exhortations, and promises argue in God a real wil of approbation, and Evangelic intention that Sinners repent and live, albeit they never repent.

22. Gods physick complacence is towards the entitative natural act of sin, and yet his moral displicence is against its obliquitie and vitiositie.

§. 2. Having given the proper Hypotheses of the Predeterminants, with the false Hypotheses and consequences imposed on them by their Adversaries, we now proceed to lay down the proper Antitheses of the Antipredeterminants, and more particularly of the New Methodists, and the dangerous consequences which naturally result therefrom.

17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin, destroys the libertie of the wil, introduceth a fatal necessitie, and makes the matter of all Gods Laws to Adam and his posteritie, a natural, simple, and absolute impossibilitie, Strang. 567. Bar. Metaph. 150.

18. Gods predetermination to the entitative act of sin is irreconcilable with his wisdom and sinceritie in prohibiting and punishing sin, Baron. Metaphys. pag. 151.

19. God, in punishing sin by efficacious dereliction or leaving men to sin, becomes guilty of sin.

20. God wils sin and approves of it as a means naturally and morally conducing to his glorie.

21. That Gods predeterminative Concourse to the substrate matter of sin makes him not really to intend what he pretends to by all his invitations, promises, comminations, and exhortations to repent.

22. God takes not only physick complacence in the entitative act, but moral complacence in sin, by predetermining the wil to the entitative act thereof.

The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants, with their consequences.

The

The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants.

The dangerous Consequents of those Antitheses.

1. **T**HE Futurition of althings is not from the Divine wil and decree, *Strang.* 628, 631.

2. The futurition of althings is not simple, but complexe, *Strang.* 640.

3. The futurition of althings is not eternal.

4. The same particular cause that gives existence to any thing gives futurition to it.

5. The futurition of the entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God, but the wil of man, *Strang.* 585, 628, 631, 632. *Le Blanc*, 454.

6. Whatever God wils he approves: or complacence is essential to al acts of Gods wil, *Strang.* 546, 548.

7. God decrees not the entitative act unto which sin is intrinsically appendent, *Strang.* 562, 587.

8. There is a twofold Decree in God, one absolute, the other respective, conditionate, and consequent, *Strang.* 546.

9. Al Gods Decrees are not particular, but some general only, *Strang.* 558.

1. **N**othing is certainly and infallibly future.

2. *Complex Propositions are in order of Nature before their simple termes.*

3. *God did not from al Eternitie foresee althings future.*

4. *Nothing is future before it is existent, at least in its particular causes.*

5. *The futurition of sinful acts is a mere contingense to God.*

6. *There is in God a velleitte, or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect.*

7. *There is something in Nature which was never decreed by the God of Nature.*

8. *God hath a general antecedent conditional love and desire of the Salvation of al men.*

9. *Some Decrees of God may be frustrated and never come to passe.*

10. *Repro-*

10. Reprobation is not absolute, but conditional, dependent on the prevision of mens actual sins.

11. Gods prescience of mens sins is conditional, and dependent on mens free-wil, not on the Decree of God, *Strang.* 642, 647.

12. Gods permission of sin is only privative and inefficacious, *Baron. Metaphys.* 157, 158.

13. God wils only his own permission of sin, not the existence of sin by his permission, *Arminius.*

14. There is a twofold Concourse of God, the one predeterminative, the other only general.

15. It doth not belong to the perfection of Gods Providence absolutely to predefine and predetermine al free acts of the human wil, *Baron. Metaphys.* 147. *Strang.* 568, 584.

16. Al positive real Beings and acts are not from God as the first cause of Nature, *Strang.* 584, 630.

17. God predetermines to what is good, but not to the material entitative act of that which is intrinsically evil.

10. The reason why God hated Esau and loved Jacob must not be resolved into the ~~indifference~~ or good pleasure of God, but into his prescience of Esau's actual and final disobedience and Jacobs obedience.

11. There is Scientia media, or middle Science in God, dependent on mans ambulatory wil, and so only conjectural and uncertain.

12. God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world, but doth not, neither can omnipotently rule, dispose and order their sinful acts for his glorie.

13. When it's said, that God wils the permission of sin, it must be understood only of the effect.

14. Al Divine Concourse is not particular, total, immediate and efficacious.

15. The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts: or, the second cause can act without being applied and actuated by the first cause.

16. God can make a creature, which by having its capacities preserved and made habile, can of itself act without immediate efficacious concurrence, *Baron.* 131.

17. Supernatural good is from God, but not al natural good.

18. What

18. What is predetermined is naturally and simply impossible.

19. Man in his lapsed state has a moral power to close with Divine exhortations and offers.

20. Unregenerate men may prepare themselves for the entertainment of Grace.

21. To predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin is to impel men to sin.

22. Divine predetermination to the entitative act of sin puts an end to human libertie.

23. Some human acts are indifferent *in individuo*, and so neither good nor evil.

24. Some human acts are so intrinsically evil, that the vitiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act.

18. *Efficacious grace in Conversion destroyeth human libertie.*

19. *Gods efficacious Concourse is in the power of mens natural free wil, either to use or refuse the same.*

20. *God vouchsafeth to al men sufficient grace, which if wel improved, he wil reward with efficacious grace, Strang. 229.*

21. *Al Predetermination impels the wil, and acts it as a mere Machine.*

22. *There is a twofold libertie, one essential to the wil, but lesse proper, the other accidental, consisting in indifference, which is most proper.*

23. *Al human acts ought not to be performed for Gods glorie.*

24. *The vitiositie of sin is essential to some human natural acts, as natural.*

We do not produce the consequents here drawn from the Antitheses of Antipredeterminants, as their proper sentiments, at least not of al that espouse those Antitheses, but only as such as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheses, albeit they do not formally assent to al of them.

F I N I S.

ERRATES.

BOOK II.

PAge 489. l. 31. for *God read us.*

BOOK III.

Page 10. l. 33. for *drive* r. *dente.*

p. 22. l. 26. after *elsewhere* put a period.

Item l. 36. dele *by.*

p. 23. l. 32. r. 721.

p. 24. l. 39. dele *and.*

p. 28. l. 1. dele *and flating.*

p. 42. l. 36. r. *that God only.*

p. 76. l. 19. r. *same.*

p. 79. l. 38. r. *to Gods.*

p. 80. l. 31. for *like*, r. *agreable.*

p. 86. l. 7. r. *Tarnovius.*

p. 89. l. 3. for *is he*, r. *he is.*

p. 111. l. 18. for *Baronius* r. *Bellarmino.*

p. 119. l. 16. r. c. 34.

p. 129. l. 23. r. *This he.*

p. 142. l. 5. dele *who.*

p. 145. l. 2. r. *so not.*

p. 166. l. 26. r. *Compton.*

p. 170. l. 9. r. *it workes.*

